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ABSTRACT

The 18 essays in this journal issue provide insight into the theory, issues and practice of forensics. They consider the following topics: an agenda for forensics education; problems of forensics in the United States today; improvement of debate practice and teaching; rhetorical dimensions of argumentation; use of speeches as an instructional device in forensics; variation of the debate experience by experimenting with form; use of the Limited Research Debate Tournament to teach analytic skills to forensic students; analysis and debate of propositions of value in academic forensics; cross-examination debate; uses and limitations of fiat power; the status of presumption; the issue of inherency; strategies for dealing with proposals for change in public policy advocacy; early intercollegiate debates in the United States; trends in debate from the 1920s to the 1970s; the American National Debate Tournament; forensic opportunities offered by state organizations; and the future of forensic studies. (GW)

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COMMUNICATION
SPECIAL FORENSICS EDITION
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EDITOR'S PAGE

Forensics has been defined as "an educational activity primarily concerned with using an argumentative perspective in examining problems and communicating with people" by the authors of Forensics as Communication. Forensics was one of the central themes of the Communication Association of the Pacific's convention held in Fukuoka, Japan in June of 1977. Many of the essays in this edition of Communication were presented in person at that convention. I was fortunate in that I was among the participants at that convention. I therefore take special pride in sharing this collection with you. A variety of topics are covered in the following pages. I am confident that each of these essays will provide insight into the theory, issues and practices of forensics.

James Benjamin
Editor
Communication
Forensics Edition

AN AGENDA FOR FORENSICS

by James H. McBath*

I assume that nearly everyone in today's audience is concerned with the status, quality, and advancement of forensics education. Our literature abounds with speculations about theory and practice and with critiques of current activities. The journals and convention papers produce lush crops of criticism and ask many seemingly unanswerable questions about forensics. Some critics remind us of a famous passage in James Stephens' Irish Fairy Tales: "To ask questions can become the laziest and wobbliest occupation of a mind, but when you must yourself answer the problem that you have posed, you will meditate your question with care and frame it with precision."

Surprisingly little of the discussion centers on the educational dimensions of forensics. Perhaps this is a result of our tendency merely to accept the familiar. Sometimes activities, like institutions, are simply the sum of historical accidents that have happened to them. Like the sand dunes in the desert, they are shaped by influences, but not by purposes or design. In his keynote speech to the National Developmental Conference on Forensics, the president of the American Forensic Association called for an attempt to conceptualize an ideal forensics program. "Some writers," said Scott Nobles, "seemed content to define forensics as 'whatever we're doing' and to praise highly the great diversity among forensic programs."¹ Today I hope to advance our discussion of forensics education by suggesting an agenda that offers forensics optimum prospects for advancement in the educational community.

Certainly the ability of any program of study to prosper depends on its capacity to remain versatile and adaptive; not to be trapped in techniques, procedures, and routines; not to be imprisoned by pet theories, comfortable habits, and customary ways. But just as important--perhaps more important--programs should regularly inventory their assets, those singular characteristics on which to build their case for development. When the distinguished historian Allan Nevins wrote a book about the future of his profession, he titled the opening chapter, "A Proud Word for History." In a similar spirit I approach today's agenda for forensics. Stated briefly: What are the inherent strengths of forensics that merit attention and cultivation?

First, forensics has an essential linkage with liberal education. It is noteworthy that not one of the major inquiries into the substance of education has failed to endorse skills fostered by training in forensics. The Harvard Report, General Education in a Free Society, suggested as basic goals: "To think effectively, to communicate thought, to make relevant judgments, to discriminate among values." Several years later the President's Commission on Higher Education explained that

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"developing the skills of communication is perhaps the least debatable of the objectives of general education." Derek Bok, president of Harvard University, put it this way:

There are certain intellectual skills and habits of thought that are so fundamental that they will serve students well in almost any problem or career in which they happen to engage. What are these intellectual skills? The most obvious is the ability to communicate orally and in writing with clarity and style. Equally important is the capacity for careful analysis--the ability to identify issues in a complex problem, collect the relevant information, marshal the pertinent arguments on every side of the question, test every contention and eliminate those that rest on faulty reasoning, and arrive at conclusions soundly related to the available data and arguments.²

Our purpose in reciting these statements is not so they can be framed and hung on a wall--although they might be--but to remind us of the fundamental harmony between the goals of forensics and the goals of liberal education. Critical thinking and communication are central to the purposes of both. There is no question that teachers and administrators in one's school are more impressed by this oneness of purpose than they are with win-loss records, trophies accumulated, and other symbols of student achievement.

Second, the field of forensics has a significant potential for research. People communicate arguments at every level and sector of contemporary living. Opportunities for scholarship are limitless. Robert Hutchins once said: "A university may be a university without doing any teaching. It cannot be without doing any research." Hutchins' dictum applies to all academic fields. Questions need to be asked about the nature of forensics, theory and practice in forensics, relation of forensics with other disciplines, and teaching and evaluation strategies.

Let me give you an illustration of the possibilities of using the tournament as a laboratory. Recently Anita James at the University of Southern California accumulated comprehensive data from the National Debate Tournament conducted in April 1977 regarding judging philosophies, demographic information, and completed ballots. Her study aims, first, to determine correlations between demographic information and philosophical positions. For example, do the age, experience, and geographic location of debate training or coaching have anything to do with the judge's receptivity to various argumentative approaches? Second, it seeks to ascertain the relations between stated philosophical positions and judge's rationales for decisions. That is, do judges vote the way they say they will? And, third, the study tries to determine the degrees of correspondence between usage of specific affirmative or negative techniques or strategies and the judge's stated positions about them. If a judge says he disapproves of a certain type of case, does he tend to vote against it?

This research, by providing insights into the ways that judges judge, will add to our knowledge about forensics practices and their

evaluation. It also can inform us about the larger topic of the relationships between attitudes and overt behavior, a subject on which we have surprisingly limited information.

One more example will help. In May of this year the two finalists teams at the National Debate Tournament were invited to Washington to consult with members of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission. The four debaters and their coaches spent three days in Washington discussing issues and ideas that had emerged from the year-long debating about consumer product safety.

Forensics education, like any academic field, needs to be enriched by its regular scholarship. And increasingly more of the research should examine the relationships between what is being taught in forensics and the world for which the students are being prepared.

Third, forensics has a significant representation in the persuasion posts of public life. Three years ago in preparing the final report of the National Developmental Conference on Forensics, we wrote to leaders in American society--in education, politics, and the professions--requesting that they recount their experience in forensics. Excerpts from a few of the letters were printed in Forensics as Communication, but these were only fragments of the responses. Before coming to this conference I reread the letters. Many of the responses were general, like that of United States Senator Edmund Muskie who wrote:

The art of debate is an essential tool in a free and democratic society such as ours. Debate training develops the ability of a people to govern themselves. The collective judgments expressed in a democratic society cannot reflect wisdom, responsibility, and foresight unless they are subjected to the critical analysis and evaluation which are possible only through debate.³

But other letters spoke of specific contributions of forensics. A distinguished attorney, Richard Markus, past president of the American Trial Lawyers Association said:

Upon reflection, I suspect that my training in argumentation and debate was the single most important factor in my decision to become a trial lawyer and any success I may have achieved in that profession. While the skills of oral presentation were necessarily developed during my forensic training, I consider those skills clearly secondary to the skills of organization and analysis which were finely honed during that training. They involved the ability to evaluate a general topic with minute care over an extended interval, followed by the ability to organize a concise persuasive argument on that subject, followed by the ability to apprehend and organize material presented by an adversary in a short time, followed by the ability to respond in a tightly knit and well supported structure in a similar short time interval.⁴

Congressman Marvin Esch of Michigan commented:

It is my belief that forensics activity . . . provides a solid basis of educational experience for those whose goal it is to enter public service as a life's work and/or those involved in public policy decision-making. Skills such as effective research procedures, objective analysis, the ability to readily comprehend issues and to communicate effectively are all those which are fostered by forensic activity and which are vital ingredients in the make-up of those who wish to enter public life today.⁵

Paul Woodring, education editor for Saturday Review, wrote:

Debating is particularly good preparation for editorial writing because an editorial writer also works within a space limitation--often a single page of a magazine. He, too, must select the strongest arguments and support them with evidence before coming to a conclusion. He must be able to see both sides of an issue, deal fairly with opposing arguments, and then select the major arguments that support his own position.⁶

Perhaps the fullest statement was from Helen Wise, immediate past-president of the National Education Association. With nearly one and a half million members, NEA is the most influential of organizations for secondary school teachers in the United States. Miss Wise wrote:

I have often been asked what experiences or courses in my college career best prepared me for the extensive public appearance work that I have been doing. I always give the same unqualified response. The single most important activity in my college background was my participation on the Varsity Debate Team at the Pennsylvania State University.

No college freshman can project 25 years to decide what he needs to learn--subject matter is easily forgotten and in today's world, the knowledge explosion makes constant learning an inevitability. But all adults today need to be able to communicate with clarity, to articulate ideas, to reason, to separate key facts from the barrage of ideas we all are exposed to every day.

No single activity can prepare one better than debating--the ability to think on one's feet, to form conclusions rapidly, to answer questions logically and with clarity, to summarize ideas are all processes which forensics activity develop and develop well.⁷

Fourth, the clientele of forensics is capable of expansion. The capacity for growth is limited by resources, not by subject requirements. If we are sincere that forensics has special benefits for students, then the benefits should be widely available. To be sure, forensics may have special appeal to the academically talented. After all, the activity depends upon independent study and creates a kind of tutorial relationship between teacher and student. A good forensics program can become a kind of ongoing honors program for the academically talented. But the

forensics program can accommodate varieties of talent and differing levels of ability. And as we have commented earlier, the skills nurtured in forensics are generative or master skills with wide applicability.

Every year our government publishes a volume entitled the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, listing more than 30,000 occupations beginning with abalone diver and ending with zylo mounter. After devoting some 40 years of research to the effort, the United States Employment Service has determined that the world's work can be described by three major functions--work with data, work with people, and work with things. Most jobs consist of combinations of the three functions. And the three skills needed to perform these functions are specific knowledge, communication skills, and the ability to work with things.

Now I can't promise that proficiency in debate or oral interpretation, for example, would be useful to an abalone diver let alone a zylo mounter. I would claim, however, that skill in reasoning, testing evidence, analysis, and speech would prove beneficial to most people whatever their careers. And that is my point: that there is wider membership for forensics than just the gifted or talented who tend to comprise our present clientele.

Fifth, forensics is basically a communicative ability. In his paper at Kobe last June, Donald Klopff presented impressive evidence of a common denominator in American and Japanese forensics. When American respondents were asked to name the values of forensics training, the one mentioned most often was improved public speaking ability. The survey determined that programs in Japan primarily seek "to promote better English speaking practices."⁸ This mutuality of emphasis is appropriate and desirable. The able debater is an able speaker debating well. The distinguished professor Donald Bryant put the matter succinctly:

Without in any sense backing off from the prime importance of a consequential message, teaching must renew persistent attention to the principle that it does matter how something is said; that how something is said, in fact, is an important part of what is said; that the selection and management of language--including the utterance of it--make the meaning of the message; . . . that they give form and ultimate significance to what is transmitted and received.⁹

The National Developmental Conference on Forensics made a special reference to this point: "Tournament debate should be an enterprise in the comparative communication of arguments." Debating, they continued, is not an exercise in the rapid recitation of bits of evidence, erroneously known as "information processing." The conferees condemned these practices: the presentation of material at a rate too fast for many persons to follow; the practice of a team presenting more pieces of information or minor points than opponents can absorb; the use of language shorthand to increase the quality of information presented at the expense of clarity of argument; the relative infrequency of explanations among evidence, inferences, and conclusions; and the relative rarity of discussions of value assumptions. It is significant, I think, that the volume reporting results of the conference was entitled Forensics as Communication. Not as logic, or evidence, or refutation, or mental

gymnastics, and surely not as information processing--but as communication.

There are, of course, natural barriers to the field of forensics achieving its potential. One is the altogether human tendency for specialists to defensively protect their own territories. Sometimes specialists take a kind of pride in their own self-sufficiency, as if the need to define the merits of one's field is unnecessary or somehow demeaning. Another barrier to the agenda is the tendency of teachers to want to narrow their specialties or even to protect them from change. Sophisticated educators may become quite as preoccupied with problems of orthodoxy and heresy as the most bigoted politician or theologian. It is possible, in short, to fail to maximize the natural advantages of forensics.

Therefore, I have urged an agenda that links forensics to the central concerns of modern education by emphasizing the liberal basis and wide applicability of experiences in forensics. The agenda will stress that game aspects are only incidental to core characteristics; that the status of any field is measured by its scholarship as well as its teaching; that the alumni of our programs be recognized as validations of its content; that the student clientele is capable of expansion; and that the over-arching purpose of forensics is to train people to communicate arguments more effectively. The pursuit of such an agenda will, in itself, speak a proud word for forensics.

FOOTNOTES

1 "The Issues of Forensics," Forensics as Communication, ed. James H. McBath (Skokie, IL: National Textbook Co., 1975), p. 57.

2 "On the Purpose of Undergraduate Education," Daedalus, I (Fall, 1974), 164.

3 Letter dated 24 July 1974.

4 Letter dated 6 August 1974.

5 Letter dated 22 June 1974.

6 Letter dated 25 July 1974.

7 Statement dated 15 July 1974.

8 "Forensics in America and Japan," paper delivered at the Communication Association of the Pacific Convention, Kobe, Japan, 19 June 1976, p. 16.

9 "Critical Responsibilities of the Speech-English Program," The Speech Teacher, X (November, 1961), 277.

WHAT'S WRONG WITH FORENSICS

by Hal W. Bochin*

Forensics activities in the United States have recently undergone the most searching evaluation and reappraisal in their history. In May 1971 the Western Forensic Conference meeting in Fullerton, California, recommended that a national developmental conference be held "for the purpose of exploring ways to improve forensic education as an academic resource for the American educational community."¹ With the aid and encouragement of the Speech Communication Association, the American Forensic Association, a number of regional forensics organizations, and private grants, a planning committee was formed which developed a three-phased project.

In the first phase, six research reports identifying emphases and trends in college and high school forensics programs were commissioned and later published in the Winter 1974 edition of the Journal of the American Forensic Association. Secondly, the period from November 1973 to September 1974 was officially designated as the "National Developmental Conference on Forensics Year." At state, regional, and national meetings discussions were held in which the major issues confronting forensic education were identified and topics for the third phase of the project were selected. Thirdly, based on letters of recommendation and conformity with predetermined criteria, task force members were selected to meet together from September 1 to September 6, 1974, at Sedalia, Colorado. The participants were encouraged to read all the background papers and reports generated in the first phases of the project. They were also required to prepare a position statement or response to a paper. At the conference task groups met in work sessions to prepare resolutions which were eventually debated and voted upon by the entire assembly.²

The purpose of this paper is to examine one of the recommendations passed by the task force assembly, to point out what problems the resolution tried to correct, and to offer suggestions on how forensic programs outside of the United States might avoid the problems being faced by American forensics today.

The single resolution passed by the task force assembly which I feel is most important is number eight: "Forensics should develop students' communicative abilities, especially the abilities to analyze controversies, select and evaluate evidence, construct and refute arguments, and understand and use the values of the audience as warrants for belief."³

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That the thirty-one assembled scholars should find such a recommendation necessary is illuminating. Of course forensics should develop communicative abilities. Why else would one engage in forensics contents? Unfortunately, the resolution is aimed at an important problem. The argument can be made that in some cases forensics has, in fact, fostered poor communication practices.

Thanks to a tape recording made and analyzed by Stan Rives, we know that in the final round of the 1976 National Debate Tournament, the first affirmative constructive speech was presented at 211 words per minute (WPM); the first negative constructive at 264 WPM; the second affirmative constructive at 251 WPM; and the second negative at 274 WPM. The debate apparently heated up in the rebuttal speeches for the speakers spoke at even faster rates. The first affirmative spoke at 243 WPM; the first negative at 254 WPM; the second affirmative at 234 WPM; and the second negative at an amazing 293 WPM.⁴ Considering that "people tend to evaluate speech above 185 words per minute as too fast"⁵ and that "a rate in excess of 185 WPM is too rapid for a normal public speaking situation," the best debaters in the country were probably speaking much too fast for the average listener. Nevertheless, a number of forensic authorities attempt to justify such behavior. Austin Freeley writes:

Experienced varsity debaters operating in tournament situations on the national circuit are under great pressure to pack as much evidence and argument as possible into the time limits. . . . Their opponents will strain to follow every word; the judge, usually an argumentation professor, understands the situation and often is willing to concentrate on the speech and record the arguments accurately on a flow sheet.⁷

Others justify such speaking behavior on the grounds that an inter-collegiate debate is an intellectual clash whose purpose is "to discover which team can out-think the other." In such a view "speech is peripheral rather than essential."⁸ Some assume that when speaking to lay audiences, debaters will slow down and adapt. This, however, is not the case. When experienced intercollegiate debaters confront a basic speech class, for example, the audience is usually annoyed, if not terrified. "What on earth are they talking about?" "I didn't understand a word they said." These are the comments I hear regularly when debaters meet the general public. Even at debate tournaments held before large audiences, debaters insist on rapid delivery.⁹ It goes without saying that such rapid speaking does not foster communication.

A second way in which communication is hindered is through the excessive use of jargon or what one critic calls "oral shortcuts."¹⁰ American collegiate debaters have developed a vocabulary of their own. A negative team's argument that the plan will not solve the need presented by the affirmative becomes a "PMN;" disadvantages of the affirmative proposal become "disads." "Overviews" and even "underviews" abound. Arguments are "piled through" or "dropped." Condoning or even rewarding such practice is contrary to the notion of developing communicative ability. Yet this is exactly what happens. The negative speaker who spoke 293 WPM won the debate and the national championship.

He becomes a model less successful debaters will attempt to imitate. Maybe next year we will break the 300 WPM barrier.

Another phrase of the task force's resolution invites investigation: "... especially the ability to analyze controversies. . . ." American collegiate debate has begun to place a premium on the ability to build and defend an affirmative case tangentially related, if related at all, to the national proposition. In 1970-71 the announced topic was "Resolved: that the Federal Government should adopt a program of compulsory wage and price controls." In the final round of the National Debate Tournament that year, the affirmative team discussed the plight of migrant farm workers.¹¹ In 1971-72 the topic for debate was "Resolved: that greater controls should be imposed on the gathering and utilization of information about U.S. citizens by government agencies." During the year affirmative teams offered cases dealing with drivers' licenses, parolees rights, cancer prevention, legalization of victimless crimes, eyewitness testimony in trials and, in the final National Debate Tournament round, the teams debated the abolition of conscription and the destruction of the records of military deserters.¹² Literally hundreds of affirmative cases were attempted under the 1975-76 topic, "Resolved: that the Federal Government should adopt a comprehensive program to control land use in the United States." Few had anything to do with what an expert would consider "land use."

It has been argued, however, that the so-called "squirrel" case is the result of yet another problem, the increasing use of the spread argument. To use a spread means to offer as many arguments as possible against each of the contentions raised by your opponent. It usually means that an assertion by the debater is followed by a short statement of an authority supporting that assertion. William Reynolds points out what the debater hopes to gain by using this technique:

. . . argument from authority offers a highly efficient and economical way of developing proof. It often appears far easier for one to assert a harm or a disadvantage, for example, and confirm it with the testimony of an expert than it is to develop the proof by other means. . . . The argument from authority promotes spread argumentation since it often permits the initiation of more arguments than can be dealt with in the time span of the debate.¹³

A strange interpretation of the topic is an attempt to avoid being hit by spread arguments--at least the first time an unusual case is offered. When the spread catches up, a new case is developed.

What have judges' reactions to squirrel cases and spread debating been? Each judge at the National Debate Tournament is asked to fill out an information sheet in which he discusses his feelings towards various debate techniques and styles. These sheets are then presented to the contestants at the tournament. In an analysis of the judging sheets filled out in 1974, J. Robert Cox found that when "the spread leads to analytical and/or communicative abuses judges universally condemned the technique."¹⁴ Nevertheless a number of judges reported that they "appreciate a mechanically proficient spread" or "enjoy

a high-quality spread round."¹⁵ Any substitution of quantity of argument for quality seems to me to be a step away from instruction in analyzing controversies.

One last phase of the task force's recommendation deserves attention: ". . . select and evaluate evidence." Even those who argue that debate is an exercise in dialectic and claim that improvement in oral communicative ability is not a goal of the debate game, stress the notion that debate teaches students how to evaluate evidence. As noted earlier, however, the use of the spread technique places a premium on short statements of authority, statements which are seldom analyzed or defended. Returning to the final round of the 1976 National Debate Tournament, we find a tremendous amount of evidence being used in each speech.

TABLE 1
PIECES OF EVIDENCE USED¹⁶

<u>Speaker</u>	<u>Constructive</u>	<u>Rebuttal</u>	<u>Total</u>
1st affirmative	18	12	30
1st negative	34	10	44
2nd affirmative	20	0	20
2nd negative	50	4	54

With this quantity of evidence being offered, it is no wonder that most of the evidence consisted of paraphrase rather than direct quotation and that "oral identification of sources of evidence is normally fragmentary."¹⁷ The standards of the American Forensic Association make the following requirements: "Debaters should document their evidence accurately and completely. Complete documentation should generally consist of author, credentials, publication, and year. . . . To avoid misunderstanding, it is emphasized that this information should be presented in the speech. . . ."¹⁸ This standard was not met in the final round of the National Debate Tournament. As one of the judges of the final round debate wrote: "The rate of speech was at times incomprehensible. The ability to determine whether evidence is pertinent to the claim presented is becoming more and more difficult."¹⁹

Evaluation of evidence has apparently been replaced by counter citation. For every authority you quote, I'll quote two who have the opposite view. Such tactics have led Reynolds to conclude: ". . . our standards of proof with respect to the argument from authority have deteriorated. . . ."²⁰ The authority is seldom qualified by the debater in terms that reveal his or her degree of expertise, special biases, method of research, and the context in which the authority is reporting. Furthermore, the argument rarely contains an explanation of the expert's reason for arriving at a conclusion. Finally the argument typically excludes the reservations and qualification the authority may have

placed on his or her finding.²¹

Freeley's advice is sound but generally ignored. He suggests: "Rather than using three pieces of evidence and delivering them at too rapid a rate for easy comprehension, it would be better to use one well-chosen piece of evidence, integrating it carefully into the case and helping to drive it home by use of an effective rate."²² Given this sage advice, it is strange to find him defending the use of evidence below the level acceptable for general argumentation in certain cases. In the final round of the Heart of America Debate Tournament sponsored by the University of Kansas, Freeley defends poor handling of evidence with this excuse: "The students were adjusting to the highly specialized audience found at the final round of a national tournament."²³ Where one would expect to find the best of argumentative practice, the worst is not only found, but excused.

Justifying and/or rewarding excessive speaking rates, the squirrel case, and the spread can only prevent forensics from developing students' communicative abilities. Practices such as these led two debaters from Oxford University who toured American college campuses in 1973 to charge that debate could be described as "four machines with voice-boxes shouting into a dictaphone that writes out their speeches, adds up the subpoints, and declares the winner."²⁴

But you are probably beginning to say to yourselves, it seems that you have some real problems in America, but how do they apply to the rest of us, especially to Japan? After all, the reason for the existence of our forensic events, especially those sponsored by the English Speaking Societies is "to help the members learn to speak English more fluently."²⁵ My response is that American intercollegiate forensic competition started with this as one of its goals as well. But competition, which is admittedly a strong motivating factor for students, has led to practices which are antithetical to the original goals. If I can win a debate by offering more arguments than my opponent can handle because I can talk faster than my opponent, I will talk as fast as I can. If I can win because my opponent never dreamed someone would use a particular approach to a proposition, then I will search out the most tortured construction of the proposition I can find. If I can get away with paraphrasing and failing to qualify my sources so I can save time for more arguments, that is exactly what I will do. Henry McGuckin sums it up: "It is competitive urgency which promotes dishonesty and superficiality. How many forensics students have I heard concede superficiality, if not dishonesty, but defend their efforts with the final clinching argument, 'But it wins.'"²⁶

It is the duty of judges and coaches to see that such practices do not win. I disagree with Harris and Smith who write that for judges to fight back with the ballot "is idealistic but pragmatically unacceptable . . . only a massive effort by judges could be expected to have an impact."²⁷ I think that rather than risk losing a ballot because of poor practice, most debate teams will try to communicate effectively. I think that many students realize the worthlessness of some of the

practices I have described. The team from Oxford may have been correct when they asked rhetorically: "Is it possible that a silent majority of debaters are dissatisfied, not recognizing how widely their criticisms are shared?"²⁸

I see two obstacles preventing judges from acting against poor argumentative and communicative practices. First, many potential judges who are dissatisfied with the way college debate is tending get out of the activity. They believe it is easier to leave forensics than it is to change it. Second, some judges may feel it impossible to vote against students who are doing the same things that their own students are guilty of. How can they vote against a case on the grounds that it is non-typical when their own students are running a case that is equally obscure? Only when judges are willing to vote against the practices they condemn and only when coaches are willing to tell their own students that certain practices may win debates but are argumentatively unsound, will a start have been made toward meeting the recommendations of the developmental task force assembly.

The use of five-man debate teams and the selection of different propositions for use in debate at different tournaments may help to spare Japanese forensics the problems of excessive speaking rates and the spread technique. The ultimate responsibility for maintaining high standards of communication and argumentation, however, rests with the student coaches and advisors. Hopefully they can learn from the American experience and keep forensics directed toward the development of students' communicative abilities, one of the most challenging and rewarding goals a university has to offer.

FOOTNOTES

¹ James H. McBath, "Beyond the Seventies," Journal of the American Forensic Association, VIII (Spring, 1972), 175.

² A history of the developmental conference and its recommendations has been published. See James H. McBath, ed., Forensics as Communication (Skokie, IL: National Textbook Co., 1975).

³ McBath, p. 16.

⁴ Stanley G. Rives, ed., "1976 National Debate Tournament Final Round," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XIII (Summer, 1976), 47.

⁵ Donald H. Ecroyd, et al, Voice and Articulation: A Handbook (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1966), p. 110.

⁶ Raymond S. Ross, Speech Communication: Fundamentals and Practice (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 135.

⁷ Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1976), p. 304.

⁸ Mark Arnold cited in McBath, Forensics as Communication, p. 102.

⁹ Charles L. Montgomery, "1984?" Journal of the American Forensic Association, VIII (Spring, 1972), 225.

¹⁰ Rives, p. 48.

¹¹ Peter Haywood and Julian Priestley, "Come Home, Debaters," Spectra, IX (June, 1973), 10.

¹² David W. Shepard, "Burden of What?" Journal of the American Forensic Association, IX (Winter, 1973), 361-363. See also Kathy Corey, "The Spirit of 72: A Response to David Shepard," Journal of the American Forensic Association, IX (Winter, 1973), 364-366.

¹³ William Reynolds, "Theory and Practice in Forensics," in McBath, Forensics as Communication, p. 114.

¹⁴ J. Robert Cox, "A Study of Judging Philosophies of the Participants of the National Debate Tournament," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XI (Fall, 1974), 70.

¹⁵ Cox, pp. 69-70.

¹⁶ Rives, p. 48.

¹⁷ Rives, p. 48.

¹⁸ "A.F.A. Debate Program and Debate Tournament Standards for Colleges and Universities, Revised August 15, 1974," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XIII (Fall, 1976), 116.

¹⁹ King Schofield, "Final Round Judge Critiques: 1976 National Debate Tournament," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XIII (Fall, 1976), 71.

²⁰ Reynolds, p. 115.

²¹ Reynolds, p. 115.

²² Freeley, 304.

²³ Freeley, 395.

²⁴ Haywood and Priestley, pp. 10-11.

²⁵ Donald Klopff and Satoshi Ishii, "TESL Through ESS," unpublished paper, p. 6.

26 Henry McGuckin, "Better Forensics: An Impossible Dream?"
Journal of the American Forensic Association, VIII (Spring, 1972), 185.

27 Thomas E. Harris and Robert M. Smith, "A System Analysis of the
Current Debate Controversy," Jcurnal of the American Forensic Association,
IX (Winter, 1973), 358-359.

28 Haywood and Priestley, p. 10.

DEBATE AND THE CHURCH OF REASON

by David A. Thomas*

We in debate are believers in the Church of Reason. The Church of Reason is described by the ghostly character, Phaedrus, in Robert Pirsig's Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. Phaedrus excoriated the entire higher educational system as a fanatical institution obsessed with the mission of training students in classical reason. Pirsig's Church of Reason analogy is apt in many of its comparisons. One perceptive comparison is that members of the Church of Reason are most dogmatic about those aspects of doctrine least susceptible to empirical demonstration. Phaedrus said,

You are never dedicated to something you have complete confidence in. No one is fanatically shouting that the sun is going to rise tomorrow. They know it's going to rise tomorrow. When people are fanatically dedicated to political or religious faiths or any other kinds of dogmas or goals, it's always because these dogmas or goals are in doubt.¹

Two conflicting dogmas are prominent in debate: Most of our true believers are engaged in competitive tournaments, but some are equally devout adherents to a view of school debate as a local, non-competitive, audience-oriented activity. To the questioning outsider, we debate fanatics of either sect cannot satisfactorily explain why our commitment runs so deep. Questions and adverse criticisms often solidify our dedication more firmly.²

One ritual of our branch of the Church of Reason is a periodic outbreak of articles published by defenders of the faith. The strain of maintaining an intact faith produces denunciations of heresy and calls to repentance. Naturally, such articles are answered by those of a different persuasion, and the exchanges take on the character of a "gut-level" debate. How dare anyone question our faith? How can we sit mute, thus insulted? Our journals remind one of a religious schism. We read the familiar polemics and apologetics again: Tournaments ruin delivery and ingrain aggressive behavior; audience debates make buffoons out of our serious advocates. Or: Tournaments teach organization, research, and clear thinking; audience debates train students in audience analysis and communication skills. These zealous discussions of the comparative merits of tournaments and audience debates may be considered fervent quests to find the proper liturgical setting for the sacrament of debate in the Church of Reason.

Religious beliefs are by definition matters of faith which cannot be demonstrated by reference to facts. Thus, our essays are mainly

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supported by each writer's own personal testimony and by quotations from similar previous testimonial essays. There are many citations of cathartic debates-over-debate appearing in the literature, of which the Ritter-Schunk exchange in the Spring 1976 Speaker and Gavel, is a recent example.³ This repetitive history could ironically be interpreted as strong evidence in itself that debating solves nothing.

Dogmatism leads to oversimplification. Articles which pit "the tournament system" against "audience debates" generate images of two easily identifiable models of debating practice. In a typical argumentative exchange, writers point to the best examples of the type of student debate activity being defended, and ridicule the diabolical excesses of the type being attacked. It is useful to keep in mind that "the tournament system" includes many activities such as the National Debate Tournament, the National Forensic League Tournament, and their antecedent qualifying tournaments; as well as varsity, cross-exam, junior varsity, novice, Serendipity, off-topic, Lincoln-Douglas, Protagorus and other varied format tournaments. Similarly, student audience debates occur in a multitude of settings, such as classrooms, local service clubs, churches, parent's organizations, school assembly programs, and faculty groups. There are even audience debate tournaments.

All these events are mentioned in connection with school-sponsored forensics programs. Whether we think of some sort of tournament debate, or some sort of audience debate, we are talking about a controlled student exercise in a laboratory setting. They are artificial rather than real, and conducted for student practice.⁴ Therefore, the most useful discussions of appropriate vs. non-appropriate debate practices should focus on pedagogical perspectives rather than on personal, existential, quasi-religious preferences for a certain style of debating.

It is also useful to keep in mind that student debaters have varying individual needs, interests, abilities, and aptitudes. Freddy Freshman might find several types of debate opportunities to be beneficial, but others to be worthless or counterproductive (to him); whereas Suzy Sophomore's range of beneficial and non-beneficial debate activities might be exactly the opposite of Freddy's. Debate attracts introvert and extrovert, active and passive, pragmatist and idealist, fluent and inarticulate, in all combinations.

Individual differences call for clear educational aims. Cronen's model of argumentation (fig. 1) easily lends itself to a diagram of the variety of activities available for specific educational aims.⁵ Both the instructional aims and the selected audience can be expanded greatly in this model to include the precise intentions of debater and coach.

The Church of Reason has not inspired all of our writings. To the credit of our field, there have been several pedagogically oriented articles in the literature along with the more opinionated ones. These have been marked by an emphasis on matching the debate format with educational goals sought in the experience, rather than by the evangelistic tone of the Church of Reason. In them we find the usual




Fig. 1 Modification of Cronen's Model of Argumentation

call for more research; but the need is directed towards finding ways to evaluate the instructional utility of the selected modes of debate, rather than rationalizing convictions.⁶

Some of the empirical research called for by our critics is beginning to appear with more frequency in our literature. It could be useful in guiding and informing the practices of our faith. For instance, Burgoon has reported factors upon which tournament judges evaluate tournament participants.⁷ On a broader scale, Cronen has tested several hypotheses concerning the impact of selected argumentative tactics upon speaker credibility and other variables in the audience debate setting.⁸

If taken to heart, these and similar contributions could improve debate practice and teaching. The example these researchers have set for us is just as important as the data their studies have produced. They have shown how it is possible to test empirically many of our items of faith which previously have merely been asserted. The Sedalia Conference recommendations on research and scholarship may encourage more of us (especially our younger scholars) to engage in this sort of study.⁹

There is resistance to it. The Church of Reason is powerfully entrenched. It does not universally accept debate primarily as an educational tool. Cynics may say that data produced by empirical research will never affect its dogmas if change is called for as a result. Empirical research has been done in the past, but those findings have neither been consistently applied nor much regarded by our true believers. Brembeck and Howell's well-known correlations between

critical thinking and debate were published in the 1940's,¹⁰ but our "Audienceites" apply selective recall to them. The large and continually growing body of research findings in attitude and attitude change, ethos, evidence, organization, etc., has likewise been ignored or haphazardly adopted by audience debaters and tournament contestants alike, for all practical purposes.

This essay is not meant to disparage public discussion and debate over the relative suitability of different approaches to debate. Devotion, enthusiasm, and loyalty to our profession are admirable traits. Questions related to our values, goals, and methods occupied much of our attention at the Sedalia Conference, and more than a few of the interactions we had were typical of the Church of Reason. What is suggested here is that simplistic positions, challenges, and rebuttals concerning "audience debates" and "the tournament system" may inspire us, but they do not especially advance our discipline, especially as it may be perceived and interpreted by those not already in the fold. More precise articulation of our aims and how to meet them, research designs which can answer the questions we ask about them, and recommendations for changes dictated by research findings, are what we need. Who knows? If we follow these emphases, we may hear less fanatic shouting in the name of the Church of Reason to accompany our certifiable achievements.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Robert Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values (New York: Bantam Books, 1974), p. 146.

² Not all debaters and debate coaches maintain a high level of commitment. The turnover rate is extremely high in both categories.

³ This lengthy footnote may be of interest to future researchers, either to find fuel for more sermonic articles about debate, or for cooler scholarly and historical purposes. The references for the Schunk-Ritter exchange in the Speaker and Gavel are as follows: Kurt W. Ritter's "Recapturing the Rhetorical Dimension: Debating in Campus Forums," appeared in the Fall, 1974 issue, followed by a response from John F. Schunk, "Maintaining the Logical Dimension: A Response to Kurt Ritter's 'Recapturing the Rhetorical Dimension,'" in the Spring, 1976 issue, pp. 38-40. A second article by Ritter, "Debate as an Instrument for Democracy: A Rejoinder to John Schunk," appeared in the same issue, pp. 41-43.

Speaker and Gavel is the source of a number of other articles in the same vein. The following Speaker and Gavel citations are representative: Paul A. Barefield, "Contemporary Forensics: An Appraisal," VIII (January, 1971), 35-38, 52; Howard Pelham, "The Justification for Debate Must Be Expanded," IX (January, 1972), 45-47; and Arthur N. Kruger, "Treating the Ills of Academic Debate," XI (November, 1973), 15-19.

Theodore Clevenger, Jr. published a regional journal article refuting five assumptions generally made by critics of competitive

debate: "Toward a Point of View for Contest Debate," Central States Speech Journal, XII (Autumn, 1960), 21-26. Among his citations of documentation, Clevenger referred to a few articles (which by now must qualify as relics) that indicate how long the ritual of debating over debate has been carried on. Two of those entries include Howard S. Woodward, "The Decisionless Debate with the Open Forum," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, VII (1921), 279-291; and E. D. Schonberger, "Debate and the Audience Problem," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVI (1930), 291-296. There are, of course, still older examples to be found in the literature.

Contemporary with Clevenger's article, Speech Teacher featured a special collection of debate articles, including one by Russel R. Windes, Jr., "Competitive Debating: The Speech Program, the Individual, and Society," IX (March, 1960), 99-108. In reply to Windes, Gerald M. Phillips wrote "Imagination--the Answer to Tournament Debate," Speech Teacher, IX (September, 1960), 207-210.

Other inspirational articles include one by a group of mid-western university debate coaches, "A Statement of the Place of Tournament Debating in Speech Education," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XL (December, 1954), 435-439; Harvey Cromwell, "What's Wrong with Debate?" Southern Speech Journal, XVIII (March, 1953), 176-179; Robert S. Cathcart, "Adapting Debate to an Audience," Speech Teacher, V (March, 1956), 113-116; Hermann G. Stelzner, "Tournament Debate: Emasculated Rhetoric," Southern Speech Journal, XXVII (Fall, 1961), 34-42; Robert L. Smith, "NFL: A Perversion of Values," Central States Speech Journal, LI (1959), 7-10; John E. Gow, "Tournament Debating: A Time for Changes," Journal of the American Forensic Association, IV (Fall, 1966), 107-111; and a recent contribution in the prophetic tradition, Robert A. Valentine's "Tournament Debates: To Speak Perchance to Win--What?," Kentucky Journal of Communication, V (Fall, 1974), 4-7.

The author of the present article has contributed to this accumulated literature with articles on both sides of the controversy. In "Forensics Shock: Making Forensics Relevant to Tomorrow's Higher Education," Speech Teacher, XXIII (September, 1974), 235-241, he urged forensics directors to develop a viable public debate program among other future actions. But in "Why Have Competitive Forensics?," The Forensic, LXI (March, 1976), 6-8, he gave his strong personal testimony in favor of debate tournaments.

Most of the authors cited above are inclined to admit degrees of both values and liabilities for the different approaches to student debate activity, despite the enthusiasm and relative one-sidedness of their statements.

⁶ Wayne Brockriede wrote in 1970, in the context of the turmoil of the late 1960's, that students and faculty might join the "real world" and debate actual campus issues, controversies, rather than confine themselves to artificial learning environments. This proposal went beyond the usual classroom or service club debate, and suggested that debaters join in wherever controversies arise. Concerning this proposal, Brockriede said, "I have not thought through thoroughly the kind of shape it might take." See "College Debate and the Reality Gap," Speaker and Gavel, VII (March, 1970), 75. If he had thought it through,

Brockriede might have withdrawn that proposal, at least insofar as official sponsorship is concerned. It may be that experience is the best teacher; but in debate and forensics education, the purpose of having a program would seem to be to enable students to develop better argumentative techniques than demonstrations and mob confrontations. At least in a sponsored setting, whether open forum or tournament, the teaching unit can be designed and controlled to meet desired aims. Furthermore, if use of the budget is involved, taking part in political controversies may constitute a serious violation of local governing regulations and thus endanger the status of the forensics program.

5 Vernon E. Cronen, "The Functions of the Debater: Orator, Critic, Pedagogue," Central States Speech Journal, XX (Winter, 1969), 263.

6 Some representative works of this type include Michael M. Osborn's "A Blueprint for Diversity in Forensics Programs," Speech Teacher, XIV (March, 1965), 110-115; Glen E. Mills, "Audience and Tournaments: Two Forms of Over-Emphasis," Speech Teacher, IX (March, 1960), 95-98; Theodore L. Walwik and R. Samuel Mehrley, "Intercollegiate Debate: An Intrapersonal View," Speech Teacher, XX (September, 1971), 192-194; William H. Bennett, "The Role of Debate in Speech Communication," Speech Teacher, XXI (November, 1972), 281-288; and William Dreyer, "Behavioral Objectives and the Rationale for Educational Debate," Florida Speech Communication Journal, III (1975), 6-11.

7 Judee K. Burgoon, "Evaluation Criteria as Predictors of Success," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XI (1975), 1-4; cf. Burgoon with Charles Montgomery, "Dimensions of Credibility for the Ideal Debater," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XII (Spring, 1976), 172-177.

8 Vernon E. Cronen, "The Interaction of Refutation Type, Involvement, and Authoritativeness," in Rhetoric and Communication: Studies in the Illinois Tradition, ed. by Jane Blakenship and Hermann G. Stelzner (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976), 155-170; cf. Cronen with Nancy Milheve, "The Evaluation of Deductive Argument: A Process Analysis," Speech Monographs, XXXIX (June, 1972), 124-131.

9 The Sedalia Conference recommended, for example, that all members of the forensics community should contribute to research and scholarship, using a variety of research methods and publication outlets and that graduate programs should encourage master's theses and doctoral dissertations in forensics. "Recommendations on Research and Scholarship," in Forensics as Communication, ed. by James McBath (Skokie, IL: National Textbook Co., 1975), pp. 34-40.

10 William S. Howell, "The Effects of High School Debating on Critical Thinking," Speech Monographs, X (1943), 83-96; Winston L. Brembeck, "The Effects of a Course in Argumentation on Critical Thinking Ability," Speech Monographs, XVI (September, 1949), 177-189. These articles have stimulated more recent research. Cf. Ted R. Jackson, "The Effects of Intercollegiate Debate on Critical Thinking Ability," Speech Monographs, XXIX (June, 1962), 92; and Richard Huseman, Glenn Ward, and Charles Gruner, "Critical Thinking, Reflective Thinking, and the Ability to Organize Ideas: A Multi-Variate Approach," Journal of the American Forensic Association, IX (Summer, 1972), 261-265.

RHETORICAL DIMENSIONS OF ARGUMENTATION

by Gerard A. Hauser*

We usually encounter the term "rhetoric" used in a negative way, so it may seem odd to find it here attached to the idea of argumentation. Arguments are honorable; they are the "good" reasons offered by reasonable advocates to support their views. Rhetoric, on the other hand, is frequently regarded as a dishonorable practice; being the use of language to make matters appear other than they are. Exemplified by overstatement, deceptive phrasing, and empty talk, it is characterized as "mere rhetoric." If argument aims at the truth, rhetoric so construed aims at appearance. Instinctively our defenses rise when "rhetoric" is used in this way.

But there is another, more noble, sense in which "rhetoric" is used. It has its roots in Greek and Roman antiquity and stretches forward to the present. This more noble sense of the term forms part of the basis for argumentation as a mode of inquiry. It is this sense of "rhetoric" which I shall make the subject of this essay.

The noble rhetoric is defined most generally and simply by Cicero when he says it is the art of speaking well. It is the method for communicating ideas and feelings effectively, for making arguments in a compelling fashion, for decision-making through public discourse.

Cicero's definition recognizes that one of the ways in which humans deal with their environment is through speaking, through the use of language symbols. In saying this, we acknowledge that much of what transpires in our human environment is contingent upon the facts of a given case, is not absolutely determined to be so. The "realities" of our lives are open to modification and change, and the language symbols used in speaking can act as mediators of that change. Indeed, most of the matters in our lives which call for reflection and personal decision are not certainties. Instead, they are rooted largely in the quagmire of murky uncertainties that permit more or less likely outcomes, better or worse alternatives. Seldom is there the clearly and indisputably correct or incorrect alternative. Still, decisions must be made on such matters, as Cicero and we recognize. Rhetoric provides a method which can assist in rendering these decisions more intelligently. In other words, the art of speaking well is really a method for public problem-solving.

Cicero's definition pays homage also to the need for agreement in making public decisions. Humans interested in resolving problematic matters strive to speak well not for the sake of contemplating the beauties of their discourse but for the end of making ideas effective to others. Our need to interject speaking into the realm of making choices is reflective of this basic fact: the matters to be decided

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cannot be decided by us alone. Others must agree with, support, and act in concert with the decisions made if these decisions are to be of any consequence. So for Cicero, and for us, whenever individuals who belong to a society or social unit have a say in the forming of decisions, the art of rhetoric becomes relevant because it is the only language art specifically concerned with increasing the effectiveness of our point of view over the alternatives available.

Because this art is a public one--open to all and practiced before others--it is non-partisan. The art itself is above the biases of its practitioners. There is no denying that when a speaker presents his views on a subject, he puts forth his side of the question, tries to emphasize the correctness of his analysis of the problem, urges the desirability of his proposed solutions, tries to shape a message that will touch his audience where they are likely to feel the rightness of his cause and make it their own. But in an open society there is never just one side to a case, never just one speaker possible on a matter. Others, with differing points of view, also have the opportunity to speak. The various appeals of differing voices increases the choices available to listeners. Because both sides of an issue can be heard, rhetoric allows for an increase in the information presented, in depth to the analyses of the information, in multiple perspectives toward the problems presented, and in access to alternative solutions of these problems. Practiced wisely, rhetoric preserves our freedom and unites us into a society.

Argumentation is founded on this rhetorical perspective. It is concerned with the presentation of reasons which will warrant a conclusion in a convincing manner. But "convincing" implies that it is so to someone. The art of framing arguments intended to "convince" presupposes not only a firm grasp on its subject matter but also a sensitivity to those factors which may influence its successful communication to a particular hearer or hearers at a specified time. It is not a purely formal undertaking, but also a social one. Its efficacy is not determined by preset tests of validity but by the criteria reasonable and qualified listeners may apply. In other words, argumentation is a public act of communication and, as such, its successful execution requires skill in the art of communicating publicly--in rhetoric.

We can see this point more clearly if we look again at the definition of rhetoric given above. When we study or employ rhetoric as the art of speaking well, what we really are doing is studying or employing a method of altering reality for pragmatic ends through the mediation of symbols. That sounds complicated but it is really fairly simple when examined. Let us consider the key terms in this statement in light of argumentative practice.

First, rhetoric is a method. We can think of rhetoric as analogous to logic. Both are systems for doing something. Logic is a system for checking our reasoning. To do logic we must understand the procedures that are applicable to checking thought. Once we understand those procedures, we can apply them to our reasoning and can operate as logicians.

So too with rhetoric. Rhetoric is a system for generating and managing discourse. It has a set of procedures that apply to these objectives. Once we understand these procedures, we can apply them to our communicating and can operate as rhetoricians.

The procedures of rhetorical method are, essentially, these four: invention, disposition, style, and delivery. Invention is an art of discovery. Its concern is first with finding what ideas a speaker may express on his topic, and second which among these ideas are likely to result in a desired outcome with a particular audience. A rhetorician uses what are called topoi--heuristic categories--as a system for generating ideas. These are nothing more than points of view one may take toward a subject to discover what may be said about it from that perspective. Such categories as "dynamism" or "potential" or "quality" may count as topoi. Further, invention is guided by the rhetor's purposes for communicating. Purposiveness guides us as we select from among those ideas generated by topoi those most suited to our communication needs. Considered in its full scope, invention covers the range of finding, supporting, and testing ideas. It underscores the need for thorough understanding of topic, occasion, and audience if we are to communicate with effect. As the initial concern of an arguer, it tethers his behavior to ideas rather than ploys and gambits. Invention, then, is the procedure for acquiring ideas suitable to communicate our position most effectively.

Disposition is an art of organizing. Its concern is with imposing rational pattern upon discovered ideas so that they may be coherent and compelling to a particular audience. As a general draws a battle plan to secure maximum firepower advantage, so too does a rhetorician to secure a favorable hearing. He arrays his materials with forethought about the situation and its demands, the expectancies and potentials of his audience, the nature of his materials, and his specific rhetorical objectives. When disposing, he is a strategist and requires effective procedures for laying sound strategy. Hence, he attends to possible ways to pattern information, order arguments, or outline the entire message. At each step he is arraying materials to test the relationships among the parts, the strengths and weaknesses of individual ideas, arguments, and supports, and the coherency of the whole. Disposition, then, is the procedure for developing sound strategy for arguments to be presented to others.

Style is the art of expression. Its concern is with using language suited to ideas. It takes into account that ideas will be presented by a particular person in a defined situation for a desired effect with a specific audience. Each of these will temper the way ideas will be understood. Through stylistic attention to our language, we attempt to express ourselves in ways likely to make our meanings clear and compelling under the prevailing circumstances. Style sets about producing a fusion between our manner of expression and the substance of what we have to express. This fusion is essential if we are to evoke sought meanings from listeners. For example, argumentation is enhanced insofar as we select our language symbols with regard for their clarity, economy or their special resources for meaning. Style, then, is the procedure

for making ideas and their expression effectively one.

Delivery is the art of presentation. Its concern is with the vocal and non-vocal stimuli that will enhance meaning and elicit desired response. Since a good deal of our argumentation is conducted orally, we are confronted by the problem of determining, at the moment of utterance, ways of adapting to an audience which will facilitate communication. Since our oral presentation of an idea frequently is the primary basis for listeners' evaluations of that idea, arguers seek guidance to enhance their thought's reception. Rhetoric guides arguers through the principles of bodily action, vocal quality, adjusting to feedback, or striving for communicativeness. Delivery is the procedure for enhancing thoughts and feelings through oral and nonverbal presentation.

By mastering these procedures, we acquire a method for communicating effectively. The scope of this method includes more than the utterance of a persuasive message. It addresses as well the ways in which we think about and manage ideas and feelings relevant to such utterance. Because argumentation is concerned not only with framing but also with communicating arguments, it is inherently rhetorical in the ways we have been considering. Hence, it partakes of rhetoric as a method to guide the arguer in the intelligent crafting and artistic performing of public discourse.

So much for rhetoric as a method. Our definition went on to stipulate that rhetoric is concerned with altering reality. By this I mean that rhetoric is a way of making something happen that is not now happening. It is addressed to a public so that we may influence their thinking and, subsequently, their behavior to bring about or forestall change. Consequently, rhetoric is most concerned with the "now," the present state of affairs. It is concerned also with the future, with what should be the state of affairs or future goals. Finally, it is concerned with discerning whether or not words will be effective as a method for achieving our goals, since some goals, like overcoming the pull of gravity, cannot be achieved directly through words. Rhetoric is a method for altering reality when the situation in which we find ourselves can be changed through words. Whenever we ask about what needs to be changed, whether it can be changed through discourse and the special considerations of communicative needs that must be met to affect change, then we are considering our problematic state as a rhetorical situation. So considered, rhetoric directs our analysis to three essential features of situations: First, we attempt to determine the exigency that gives rise to communication. Rhetors search for the overriding imperfection marked by urgency that defines a situation as capable of resolution through discourse. Second, we attempt to discern those among potential listeners who have it within their power to aid if not actually to affect change. Finally, we attempt to take into account those constraints which are limitations and/or opportunities regarding our intended message.

It is apparent that considerations related to our rhetorical situation are basic in framing and presenting arguments. Unless we are clear on the point at issue, who is qualified to judge, and which

contingencies may enhance or mitigate the force of our claims, we are unlikely to raise cogent and compelling contentions.

Thirdly, our definition claimed that rhetoric is concerned with pragmatic ends. Rhetoric is an art that aims at the useful; it is utilitarian. It is not concerned with arousing appreciation for the beauty of what is said, nor with evoking joy through a stirring performance. There are other methods and arts and studies addressed to these. Rather it rests on an assumption mentioned above: there is much in life about which we have no certainty, only a better and a worse. The test it applies is whether the proposed solution solves the problem feasibly and effectively without undesirable consequences. The test of rhetoric is not any abstract truth. It is, instead, its efficacy in the minds of its audience.

This point is important with respect to arguments. It reminds us that arguments will be tested against norms. Sometimes the criteria will assess the abstract results within a system of thought. Such formal testing may occur in philosophy or mathematics, for example. In other cases the test will be in terms of the concrete results which follow from endorsing a contention. In political debates, this is frequently the case. In both instances, the concern is still pragmatic in the sense that the American philosopher and psychologist William James used the term--they will be judged by whether they establish a difference that makes a difference.

Lastly, we said that rhetoric seeks its ends through the mediation of symbols. When we apply rhetorical means to solve problems, we use language. All language symbolizes those things that are the referents of its words. Consequently, when we experience a problem through communication, we have second hand experience--vicarious experience. For example, when Hawaiians read in their newspapers or see on their televisions accounts of snow storms and freezing weather, it is only indirectly that they experience the physical discomforts of these conditions. Rather than encountering winter directly, they encounter it through symbols.

Rhetoric is that aspect of communication that tries to use words and gestures to manipulate what listeners take to be real by evoking changes in people's attitudes, beliefs, and subsequent behaviors. As attitudes and behaviors change, so does our human environment. Changes in our human environment in turn, can lead to changes in the physical environment. In other words, our language symbols mediate between reality and our perceptions of reality. Insofar as language can shape what we see as real, it affects the ways in which we act. And insofar as the way we act can change physical environments, rhetoric stands as an effective instrument for bringing these changes into being. This, I take it, is a primary goal of argumentation.

Implicit in this explanation is the idea that rhetoric begets more rhetoric. And so too with arguments. There is no formal end point to arguments pro and con. Argumentation is an ongoing process. The decisions arguments guide us toward are likelihoods at best. Other

spokespersons will see matters differently and new audiences will hold perspectives that suggest alternative ways for dealing with problems. Only in an utopia does the need for argumentation cease. In our world, filled with ongoing problems, the risks of being "hustled," and the opportunity for enriching cohesion, final solutions are rare indeed.

This, then, is the mission of a noble rhetoric. It views humans as personally and socially more effective when they understand themselves, their fellows, and their world. Such understanding is fundamental to infusing formal analysis with existential importance in our argumentative practice. It is at the heart of argumentation which hopes to change our world.

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USING OUR HERITAGE: SPEECH AS MODEL

by Patricia Townsend*

For in everything which we teach, examples are more effective even than the rules which are taught in the schools, so long as the student has reached a stage when he can appreciate such examples without the assistance of a teacher and can rely on his own powers to imitate them. And the reason is this, that the professor of rhetoric lays down rules, while the orator gives a practical demonstration.

Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory,
X Chapter I

When Quintilian wrote this advice in the first century, the idea of using speeches as instructional devices in the teaching of rhetoric already had a long history. For as long as we have a record of the methods used in speech instruction, the use of models played a significant role. Isocrates, whom Goodwin Berquist called the foremost teacher of speech in Athens during the Golden Age, used both his own and his students' speeches for demonstration and analysis. One of my favorite images is of an ancient sophist stumping around festival to festival to declaim one of his sample speeches to attract students who wanted to invest time and some drachmas in his school of oratory. The other great teachers of the classical era in Greece and Rome had their students study the famous orations of the past, as did their spiritual descendents even unto the present.

In America, those students educated in the classical traditions received a firm acquaintance with the Greek and Roman orators. For example, Richard Johannesen reported that in 1642 Harvard College set up laws to guide students declamation in Latin and Greek were given each month. In 1968 Ron Matlon surveyed teachers of the beginning college course and found that 865 of the 1,396 people surveyed used speech models. Most famous orators mention studying historic, great speeches. It is not without significance that Frederick Douglass' first book was the Columbian Orator.

If all this be true, then why did I feel called upon to come half-way around the world to talk with you about the use of speeches as an instructional device in forensics. I have a strong and unquantified feeling that we have been drifting away from this time honored practice. Texts have fewer samples. In shoptalking with colleagues, the use of model speeches rarely comes up. We seem, of late, to have become obsessed with the idea that what is new is necessarily better--and that ain't necessarily so. Since McLuhan, we have persisted in diminishing

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the importance of the message in the communication process. We have been concerned with such exotica as the effect of bralessness in non-verbal communication, the dilation of pupils when viewing pleasant and unpleasant objects, the amount of perspiration emitted during stress conditions. I am hopeful that the pendulum is ready to swing toward a more balanced view of the communication process. I am encouraged to see a greater number of rhetorical studies appearing in the journals. I want to add my encouragement to the movement supporting appreciation of our heritage, a veritable treasure-trove of gems for teaching the principles of communication. As the highly successful platform lecturer Russel Conwell admonished in his most frequently given speech, we have "acres of diamonds" in our own academic backyard. So, I would argue with Booker T. Washington that we "need to cast down your bucket where you are."

Rather than belabor you with an extended exegesis of why the use of speech models can be an invaluable instructional device, I shall suggest to you ways in which important aspects of speech preparation and delivery can be introduced through the use of speech models in forensics contests. My purpose is not to deplete the possibilities but to inspire you to try using models more frequently as you prepare students for forensics contests and for class projects. I am assuming that you really are already acquainted with the possibilities and just need a nudge to get going.

The speeches cited will be from the United States or England. This comes not from chauvinism but from ignorance. You know much better than I who are the best speakers from the areas included in the Communication Association of the Pacific.

Lest I be considered guilty of plagiarism, I wish to acknowledge the inspiration for the format for this paper. As I was originally going through the outlining stage for this presentation, the easy listening music I was using for background was interrupted with great regularity by Mr. Block presenting one of the 29 reasons why H & R Block should prepare the listener's income tax. If Mr. Block could find 29 reasons for something so painful as income tax, surely I should be able to find 29 uses for speech models. And so I did.

In associating the topics to a particular forensic event, I shall be using the definitions presented by Jim Pfefferkorn in his "Survey of Forensic Opportunities Offered by State Organizations." The associations are a little extended on occasion to allow for an exercise that might work better in the regular class. Generally the pattern goes from introducing the most basic to the more sophisticated speech principles or practices.

Interpretive Events

Non-Original Oratory

This event is an excellent way to introduce young and/or inexperienced participants to forensic competition. I would suggest that the

speech topics introduced with this event be from the very basic.

1. Stage presence and poise. Stage fright and lack of confidence by whatever names you choose to call them continue to be one of the biggest orgies threatening the competency, not to mention the composure, of beginning students. Starting the student into the competition with the security of a tested speech removes some of the ego involvement and pressure. After all, if it was good enough for William Faulkner to give upon receiving the Nobel Prize, it must be good enough for the eighth grade student.

2. Sense of rhythm in speaking. Both Cicero and Quintilian assure us that the commonfolk have an innate ability to appreciate speech which has an appropriate rhythm. Not to argue them but simply to observe, that this inborn ability seems late blooming in some of our budding speakers. Just reading Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address" aloud, having the speech mechanisms go through the motions, giving the ears an opportunity to hear the cadence should help identify when speeches are arrhythmic.

3. Rhythm and blends for different languages. Both Edna Sorber and I studied conversational Spanish this spring as we completed our preparations to join you here in Japan. Though our friends suggested that our geographical and linguistic knowledge left a bit to be desired, this language effort re-emphasized for us the point that different languages have different stress and blend patterns. Studying and presenting speeches in alternate languages seems to me to be a good approach. Presenting a memorized oration in a language different from your first would make a good exercise for language study as well as speech.

4. Speech, speakers, and history. Most of these contests require an introduction and transitions. That plus understanding the speech well enough to present it effectively mandate that the student know at least a little something about the speaker and the social and political climate in which he delivered the speech. Since so many students have only a vague glimmering about the history of their area, this contest through the study of significant speakers offers us a chance to strike a blow for some feeling for the history of your area and appreciation of the speakers who played important roles in that saga. My mind still boggles at a student who couldn't remember whether FDR had something to do with World War I or World War II before she studied his speaking.

5. Self-discipline. Having suffered through the era of "gut reaction communication and damning of cold impersonal logic (or lack thereof)" let us encourage respect for a disciplined presentation of one's art. It does take effort to memorize an oration or to have a polished extemporaneous presentation. At this rather elementary level the rewards for thorough preparation are noted.

6. Relation between literature and rhetoric. Though this is a bit tangential, Thomas Sloane's suggestion that interpreters would profit from a rhetorical approach to the study and presentation of literature, prompted the idea that we could, in a prescribed way, look at speeches

from a literary point of view. I don't want to start the debate that the speech's founding fathers fought in the early twentieth century. Speeches are practical and not developed for aesthetic purposes solely. But literary and rhetorical critics can learn from each other.

Original Events

Analysis of Public Address

This contest makes a good transition from completely depending on the work of another person to combining original and unoriginal. This also permits the instructor to introduce topics on a somewhat more elevated plane.

7. Audience Analysis. Since the student is commonly asked to make comments about the speech setting he is forced to consider the kinds of factors which make a difference in communication events. Perhaps you might settle at this time for the student's simply recognizing that the speaker has aimed at a particular target.

8. Audience adaptation. Could well identify some of the obvious adaptations which speakers made.

9. Beginning rhetorical criticism. In some states you can really develop the student's critical skills through his analysis and criticism. Since we spend so much time as consumers of communication this process needs to be introduced somewhere. In Wisconsin our contest is called "Significant Speech" and the rules specifically forbid going into rhetorical criticism. Personally, I think that this is a mistake and the contest is not providing as valuable experience as it otherwise could. But I don't get to make the rules.

Extemporaneous Speaking

As the contest most closely resembling ordinary real life speaking, this contest offers many chances to use models to show how other speakers have coped with their problems.

10. Organization. Just as diagraming a sentence can show how the parts of the sentence relate to each other, dissecting a speech can give the student the opportunity to discover how the several parts of the speech are put together. Two interesting object lessons sometimes occur: (1) that there is a pattern which has worked effectively for many people for years, no matter how the parts are labeled, and (2) speeches that are well organized are easier to read, to understand, and to remember.

11. Transitions and summaries. Going beyond organization as it relates to the parts of the speech, the student can observe the use of special techniques like transitions and summaries. With my students I count it a step forward when they get beyond introducing a new idea with "and another thing." A student critic admired Ralph Nader's

transitions by saying that he changed topics so smoothly that you didn't notice until you were busy thinking about a new idea.

12. Amplification. Models can be a great help in showing how other people took an idea and developed it. With enough samples you could encourage the student to try to recognize what kind of material commonly is used to support what types of statements.

13. Need for current and quality material. Typically the topics and materials are from "current" magazines. Also typically, the topics are the subject of continued journalistic exposition. The extemper who depends on a magazine two months old is likely to miss some significant material that was in the newspapers within the last several days. Could models forestall this? Probably not. But models could warn him of this probability through study of debates and/or court cases. The Presidential Debates of last Fall provided an interesting case study of two men arguing that their argument was based on the most recent and most authoritative information.

Impromptu Speaking

This contest varies in the amount of time allowed for preparation. Generally, though, it seems to be handled similarly to the extemporaneous. There is one topic which seems a natural to introduce with this contest.

14. Speech preparation as a non-enduring process. If you believe that Quintilian was right when he organized the Institutes of Oratory around the premise that learning to be a good orator is a life long endeavor, you may well use some of the great "impromptu" speeches as bases for discussions. Why was it that Charles James Fox could carouse all night and then so acquit himself the next day that he was generally accepted as being the best parliamentary debater at that time? How was it that Daniel Webster said of his widely acclaimed "Reply to Hayne," "I have been preparing for that speech all my life." What methods can the students discover to help prepare themselves for unplanned speaking situations? Unfortunately, many of the impromptu speeches have proved ephemeral, but a study of the lives of the orators give useful hints.

Informative Speaking

15. Clarity. Need we live in Snow's "Two Worlds" or is it possible for the scientist to speak to the layman? Is everything so complicated that the ordinary people might as well throw up their collective hands and leave everything to the experts? Speeches by articulate scientists suggest no. With all of these topics the illustrations can be either good or bad. Prize examples of obscurity can be found in U.S. government publications. You would hope that the student would recognize techniques like associating the unknown with the known, illustrating, from the good examples.

16. Research skills. In this contest the student needs to become aware that he/she is the expert. Along with that expectation comes the responsibility to have good material. Unlike the preceding

contests in original speaking, this contest affords him/her ample opportunity to plumb his/her own knowledge and experience as well as to exploit the information available from local authorities and the library. The model can show the result of good researching; study of the life of the speaker may give the method. In Wisconsin we have a category called Public Address in which the speeches may at times be persuasive or informative. The significant thing about them is that all of the contestants will be speaking on one or the other of two topics. Outdated, overused material stands out very obviously. The injunction of the Boy Scouts to "be prepared" suddenly has a terrible significance. Perhaps the student will identify with the meticulous preparation that many successful speakers follow. Even so flamboyant a speaker as F. Lee Bailey is reputed to have well researched arguments which he studies thoroughly the night before so he can appear informed and without notes. The researching by Ralph Nader is a well known phenomenon and thorn in the flesh of General Motors and several other American firms.

Original Oratory

This contest above all others offers the student the opportunity to show his most effective public speaking. Not surprisingly, this contest gives you the opportunity to use models to illustrate almost any problem the student might have. I will use the classical canons to illustrate some of the ways in which you might use the study of speeches to help the student bring his own knowledge and experience together.

17. Logos--evaluation of evidence. An enjoyable approach is to examine the evidence used in a debate to see which evidence seemed best. What is the difference between good and bad evidence? Who decides whether evidence is good or bad? You can get some interesting discussions going regarding some of Nixon's uses of evidence. Or, you can get some contrasting types of evidence such as those used by Darrow and Bryan in the Scopes trial.

18. Logos--identification of assumptions. The student will have moved up several steps of sophistication when he can recognize the importance of some of the unspoken bases for reasoning. For example, some women students revel in picking out chauvenistic assumptions from the speaking of unliberated males.

19. Logos--patterns of reasoning. Most students find it relatively easy to rattle off memorized definitions of the forms of reasoning but experience difficulty in identifying the forms in speeches. The next step would be for them to use the different terms correctly.

20. Pathos--identification of persuasive strategies. The models can serve here to awaken the student persuader to the idea that he has many options available. This could spin off into any aspect of persuasion in which you thought the speaker needed attention.

21. Ethics. Hitler's speeches make interesting springboards to discussing the criteria for judging ethics. Sometimes it is even more interesting to have the students read a speech by some demagogue without

telling them who it is. As the student reads speeches related to his topic, he might well ask himself what, if any, are the ethical obligations of the speaker? Does the speaker bear any special responsibility toward the audience?

22. Pathos--facing a hostile audience. If the student's position is highly controversial or if his/her material creates a very negative reaction, he/she may well profit from seeing what previous speakers in difficult positions did. A favorite problem I like to pose for the students is to have them imagine that they were the relatively unknown young Atlanta newspaperman Henry Grady who found himself facing 200 New England businessmen who had been whipped to a fever of Northern patriotism by a general who was a Civil War hero, a highly respected orator who drew touching word pictures of the return of the victorious Yankee soldier and even through the group ritual of singing "Marching through Georgia." As the first Southerner to speak to them since the Civil War, what can the speaker do to change the mood so the audience will be prepared to listen to his pro South speech.

23. Pathos--adapting the same message for different situations. The contestant will not be able to adjust his speech radically as he presents his oration at various times. Nonetheless he/she should become aware that in real life, adaptation to the part of the country or to the special audience does take place. Media coverage is making such adaptation more difficult for contemporary politicians; therefore, many of the best examples are historical. It is interesting to note the tempering of comments done by both Lincoln and Douglas in their debates depending on whether they were speaking to an audience predominantly sympathetic to the slave states or to the free states. More recently, civil rights activist Stokeley Carmichael changed his speech noticeably depending on whether he was speaking to white or black audiences.

24. Ethos--developing credibility. Political campaign speeches are basically aimed at creating enough faith in the voter so that he chooses to support the candidate. With luck the speaker will recognize that ethos is an important part of his persuasiveness. He could then study some of the various methods for building ethos. If you wanted to make a class project instead of individual instruction, you might analyze a whole campaign. How was it that ole Jimmy became President of the United States? Religious and other movement leaders also provide good examples. What is there about Reverend Moon that captivates young followers?

25. Ethos--restoring credibility. This particular problem is not likely to be a problem for the student speaker personally but he/she might have sources or information which has been under attack. Unfortunately, recent history has provided us with enough prominent figures under serious investigation that the speech attempting to rebuild credibility has almost become a genre unto itself. The United States is not alone in finding some of her leaders in embarrassing situations, but she does give the speech students some prime examples. Nixon's 1952 "Checker's" speech is an American classic though he has extended

his contributions in this area with more recent ones like some of his Watergate speeches. Lest the Democrats not get their just due, Teddy Kennedy's "Chappaquidick" speech is also a fine example. It is interesting to see how students respond to attempts at ethos building by high and low esteemed sources.

26. Disposition--apportioning of material. By now you assume that the student has mastered the basics of organization and is ready to consider judgmental questions like what and how much of the material to include. One aspect of this is to decide whether to present only one side or to present several points of view. What do the sample orators do? Can the student locate a pattern for certain kinds of decisions?

27. Disposition--psychological ordering. In looking at the several speeches does a pattern develop for the placing of the most and least important points? Is it possible to infer when the speaker has the best odds if he starts with his strongest point?

28. Style--choice of words. After reading several representative speeches, can the student generalize about the use of words by effective speakers? Do successful speakers use many technical or unusual words? Do they use only the basic 500 words? Is there any inference to be made about his competency? his values? Edwin Newman, among others, has been chastising us for the paucity of our language. Perhaps seeing effective use of the language will inspire the student to break the "you know," "neat," and four letter word syndrome.

29. Style--words in groups. This is a place where your imagination can go wild. You can introduce them to the use of figures of speech, special techniques for vividness. Challenge them to write a speech for a particular situation and then compare it with what the real speaker did. One difficulty with playing with stylistic embellishments is that students may be heavy handed with them. You may want to make the point that appropriateness is important. Reading contemporary examples could put them in closer touch with reality. An illustration of my concern in this area coincides with a finding by B. W. Hope and Judith Hale in a 1973 Journal of the American Forensic Association article in which they found that there was a substantial difference between the speech openings used by contest orators and those used by public speakers. Speeches for real situations may help to bring the oration closer to the speaking out there in the real world.

In summary, then, what I have attempted to do was to pique your interest in using speech models to introduce the topics of speech theory that you might stress in different forensic events. Like Quintilian, I believe that students learn well from examples. More optimistic than him, I think we can use models at many levels of instruction.

VARYING THE DEBATE EXPERIENCE: EXPERIMENTING WITH FORM

by Edna Sorber*

When a new student who wanders into the debate area wants to know exactly what debate can do for him--which isn't quite the same question some debate coaches think should be asked--they prefer "what can he do for debate?"--the usual objectives of clear thinking, organization, improved fluency, research techniques, specific knowledge, roll easily off the tongue. When faculty members from other disciplines ask a similar question--what does debate do for the student, they often answer it themselves: unbalanced thinking, overemphasis on organization, too rapid delivery, too restricted knowledge of research, etc. Such condemnations often end up with the "you can always tell a debater by his sound." In itself, that last might not be a bad idea. If, in fact, debate did the things we like to think it does, sounding like a debater would be a good trait, not a bad one. In order to more nearly approximate that goal, perhaps closer attention to the objectives could bypass some of the objections.

To indicate that debaters are too closely bound to the form, for instance, might indicate not that there is too much emphasis on the form, but that the form itself is too restrictive. In considering debate as a contest used for the purpose of achieving educationally justifiable results, emphasizing desirable goals provides an opportunity for varying that form.

Consider that debate ordinarily has the following characteristics:

1. It is a team contest.
2. It gives equivalent opportunities to each team.
3. It is oral.
4. It deals with a single topic.
5. It must result in a decision.

These characteristics might be considered minimum rules. There appears to be little inherent connection between these rules and the objectives mentioned earlier. Ways of implementing the rules in order to achieve the objectives, then, could be done in a variety of forms. If the present orthodox form does not accomplish the objectives, some other form might do as well. Not only are there no hard and fast rules about the present form, but there is even evidence that other forms could give as much satisfaction. One survey of debate format preferences showed such diversity. In 1971 the University of Illinois experimented with a tournament involving three experimental and the orthodox form. Speech lengths varied, order of speeches varied, and some forms incorporated cross-examination. A survey following the tournament found that all were approximately equal in appeal to the debaters and coaches.¹

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Klopf's 1975 survey of American college forensic practices found variety in usage of a number of formats. "The orthodox debating style predominates; 38% of the schools' debaters practice this style but not exclusively. Ninety-two percent of the schools offer at least two other styles, with cross-examination second in popularity (25%) to orthodox, Lincoln-Douglas third (18%) and audience fourth (13%). Six percent use the less popular styles of legislative, radio/television, British, and parliamentary debate."²

Variations might be proposed, then, on each of the five characteristics named. The fact that debate is a team contest, for starters, means simply that at least two people must be involved, at least one for each team. The number can vary considerably from that base, however. In fact, it might be possible to have several teams involved. Nothing limits the contest to two. While we usually consider the fact that a debate topic is controversial, all controversies do not fall neatly into two distinct classifications. Even when questions of policy seem to have only a "yes" or "no" response possible, there is a third position with some validity. The mediator in a potential strike situation between a teacher's union and a school board, for example, fulfills a role different from that of either of the adversaries. He might be considered a third team--on occasion his team wins--a compromise he suggests is adopted. As a contest, then, debate might involve two or more teams. The example just given suggests that it is not necessary even to consider having the same number of persons on each team. While the union and the board might have negotiating teams of equal numbers, nothing in the situation mandates this. Moreover, an equivalent number of mediators might merely confuse the situation further. As a judge who has heard debaters as unwilling to concede obvious points as some labor and management groups seem to be, I would have welcomed the chance to try, as a mediator, to get the work back on the original trail, and show where I thought the arguments presented were faulty or meritorious.

Just as the number of teams is not dictated by the nature of the exercise, neither is the number of team members. Most of the tournament debates I have heard have had two member teams. Historically this has not always been the case, with three members being the standard in 19th century United States debating. The five man team which has been used in Japan sounds like an interesting approach to variety. The one-man Lincoln-Douglas type, giving credit to the campaigning of those two politicians, has had adherents particularly in the western part of the United States and most recently in the nationally sponsored Bi-centennial Youth Debates. However, there is nothing sacrosanct in any of these numbers, as long as the number involved is not too cumbersome to carry out the goals of the debate.

In addition to specifying that debate is a team contest, it is usually granted that every team must have equal opportunity to defend its position. This does not mean treating every person on every team in exactly the same fashion. As a matter of fact, that would be impossible. Since study has shown that there are persuasive advantages in first and last positions in speaking order, most have decided that in a debate equivalent opportunity is granted if the side with the more

difficult position to advocate has both of these positions. Thus speaking order advantages help to overcome the disadvantages of argumentative position. Even with this framework, however, there is nothing sacred about the order of intermediate speeches. Since the usual policy question is phrased so that the affirmative side will be advocating a change of some sort, and this is considered to be a more difficult position to defend, most rules will list the affirmative with the very first and the very last speeches. Depending on the style of debate (traditional, cross-ex, or what-have-you), speeches may have designations within these extremes indicating the usual type of material contained or the type of presentation to be offered (constructive, rebuttal, etc.). Nowhere, however, is it ordained that all constructive speeches must precede all rebuttal speeches. The fifteen minute "negative block" of traditional style two-man debate is precedent for permitting two speeches from the same side to follow each other directly. The order of speeches, the type of speeches, and even the length can vary. When a practice must fit a class period limitation, or when a demonstration must be cut for audience appeal, or a radio or television debate must be fitted into a particular time slot, time limits are juggled to fit the over-all time available. Several adaptations have been made for television, both as to length and number of speeches, even to number of members on a team. A Chicago series in 1964-65 used four members on each team, with speaking as follows: "One gave the 4 minute constructive speech, a second cross-examined for 1 1/2 minutes, a third cross-examined for 1 1/2 minutes and a fourth gave a 3 minute rebuttal speech."³ As early as 1953, University of Michigan televised a debate program in a courtroom setting which involved very short questioning periods utilizing "attorneys" and "witnesses."⁴

For variety, the time limits can be experimented with arbitrarily. Just as speaking order does not have to be identical for the two teams, it might be assumed that time of speaking does not have to be identical, although most experimenting does accept that. Rebuttal speeches and questioning periods are usually significantly shorter than the times designated for presenting original arguments. It is conceivable, however, that a form might be devised where the most significant material could come in answer to a single question from, say a mediator, or an audience member as well as from an opposition team.

Whatever forms are devised for giving equal opportunities to each of the contesting teams, however, all are likely to come in oral form. Current practices do sometimes involve giving outlines of cases, selected bits of evidence, plan outlines, or what-not to opponents and/or judges, but such practices would seem not to be in keeping with the objectives stated earlier involving development of improved fluency. There are logistic reasons why these practices seem difficult to defend as well, so for all practical purposes, let us assume that debate is still an oral activity.

The nature of debate as an oral speech activity requires that the persons who participate actually communicate orally with somebody. In our tournament situations this commitment to oral communication is very nearly completely bypassed by some debaters. After a season of repeating

the same information, the same arguments, too often in exactly the same words, a kind of shorthand develops which permits the judge to keep a detailed flow sheet composed of abbreviations known only to him and the debaters. Use of this oral shorthand causes two specific kinds of reactions on the part of judges--either they, because they understand and condone this communication, reward those who seem to squeeze the most into their allotted time insofar as it directly relates to the opponents' arguments, or, if they are less familiar with the shortcuts and jargon or simply hold the somewhat unorthodox position that oral communication should be intelligible both as to sound and substance, fail to reward the more "expert" of the teams. Naturally such differences in judging lead to philosophical conflicts on the whole theory of debate as an educational venture. If, in fact, those debaters whose style--and that includes not just rate of speech but choice of words, examples, and all the other attributes of rhetorical style--can adapt themselves to situations other than the high pressured tournament with ease there might be reason to believe that these characteristics could be carried over into any life situation. At the recent Central States Speech Association convention, one program set up two "teams" to debate this very issue. It may be significant that the "pro" team supporting current stylistic practices was a generation (as college students and coaches go) younger than the "anti" team. While they disagreed on many points, I thought their failure to see eye to eye on whether top flight high pressure tournament debaters could also do good audience debates (what in our area are sometimes referred to as "British" style), represented the most basic philosophical difference. In effect, they did not show that there is a carry over of this style.

Varying the audience situation, forcing the debaters to adapt to the audience they have would seem to offer variety in styles of presentation. Perhaps prohibiting anyone from taking notes would vary the strategy involved in speaking. A number of years ago I remember a very successful team that demonstrated its uniqueness in speaking entirely without notes. These debaters were truly expert--the same technique tried by a junior team from the same college failed miserably. Emphasizing the oral aspects of the contest for all participants may lead to a spoken performance, but ignores the content of the activity. One generally accepted rule in this area is that debates deal with a single topic.

Debate textbooks ordinarily list three types of topics that are suitable for debates. Miller, however, indicates that the third will inevitably be debated with emphasis one of the other two and limits the selection to those two: questions of fact and questions of value. He convincingly, I think, argues that questions of policy must be argued either from the viewpoint of value (is it a good idea or not), or from the viewpoint of fact (is it practical, feasible, etc.), or a combination of both, but that it is not a discrete type in itself. Since most tournament questions, including the one chosen for national debate each year, are questions of policy, his position is, indeed, different.

He indicates that:

The key to the choice of a factual or value orientation lies in the definition of the term should--a term which occurs in most policy propositions. If should is defined in terms of mean-ends interests . . . then the issue becomes one of fact, revolving around considerations of whether or not the stipulated ends would occur. If should is defined in terms of intrinsic ethical considerations . . . then the issue becomes one of value, revolving around the goodness or badness of these moral precepts. Although the two may overlap, it should be apparent that all parties to the dispute must first agree on where the emphasis should be placed; otherwise, the argument will proceed from different premises, and no clash of ideas can occur.⁵

Testing the difference described by Miller several years ago, Pi Kappa Delta instituted an "experimental" division in its national tournament. Some months ahead prospective entrants were notified of the general area that would be covered and were told that several topics would be used during the eight round tournament. They were not told the nature of the topics. Chosen were one question of fact, one of value, and one of policy. It is interesting that some contestants considered this selection to be unfair as not being within the bounds of understood rules while others considered the non-policy questions simply undebatable.

Obviously--or perhaps not so obviously, since the presidential "debates" were not bound by this criterion--limiting the subject becomes a necessity if within a given time limit arguments are to be met head on. There is nothing in this characteristic of debate, however, that legislates the type of topic, or the specific subject matter.

Parenthetically, it is on the issue of topic choice that some of the current practices in tournament debate have created a great deal of heat. Topics are sometimes categorized as too broad, too narrow, too demanding. As a result "squirrel" cases or peculiar and narrow limitations are set by an affirmative team. There have been attempts on both college and high school levels to counteract this tendency with tournaments dealing entirely with extemporaneous performances. The Protogoras tournament was one sample.⁶

Having a simple topic, whatever its origin, makes possible direct clash which can lead to a definite decision. Although there has been from time to time a movement to make scholastic debate less competitive by deemphasizing the aspects of "winning," as if that trait itself were undesirable, the majority of inter-scholastic and intercollegiate debates do demand a decision. Philosophically I can see an argument for not overemphasizing this aspect of the activity, but I have found it impossible to encourage students to participate without giving some attention to the fact that competition will help them to sharpen their techniques. In fact, since they ordinarily consider competition to be fun, that aspect of the activity doesn't really need any justification for the student. Practice debates, or ones done as demonstrations for classes, for example, are an entirely different matter. In fact, in any

situation where the personnel involved are from the same squad, other advantages of the occasion usually override the necessity for winning. This seems basic to the well-being of the squad. An occasion which I remember from a "challenge" tournament points this up very well. In that variation on the regular tournament format, an elaborate system permitting losers to challenge winners after each round eventually made it possible for one team from a particular school to challenge another team from the same school.⁷ Unknown to the judge in this particular instance was the fact that the team going home from that particular tournament with the better record was to be designated as the school's entry in a national contest. In fact, the judge didn't even know the teams were from the same school. What he did know was that he was physically drained from listening to an hour of the bitterest, most personal, hard hitting attack by one team on another that he had ever heard. I don't remember how those teams got home from the tournament, but I do remember that the coach threatened to make one of them go by public transportation--he was afraid to have both in the same car for a trip of several hundred miles. Perhaps this is unusual. Maybe teams from the same school can debate each other under some circumstances, reaching a decision which both can live with. One suggestion supports just such an effort.

In this proposal, rather than putting a team from one school against a team from another as is done now, affirmative and negative teams from the same school would debate each other before the critic-judge.

At a typical tournament, the teams will debate each other, let us say eight times, before eight different critic-judges. Their performance would be scored in a manner similar to the judging system in a diving contest . . . (where each is rated on a score of 1-10, with 10 representing perfect form) . . . each school would be rated in accordance with how nearly, in the opinion of the critic-judge, the school achieved perfection when dealing with a chosen issue(s) within the confines of a specific form or structure. . . . At the conclusion of the tournament the school with the greatest number of points would be declared the winner.⁸

Nevertheless, most debates do have decisions. It is possible to vary the type of decision insofar as it is possible to vary the "decider." In most tournament situations a single judge--sometimes referred to inaccurately as an expert judge--renders a decision based on "which side did the better debating." A great deal of argument has been engendered over that phrase. For the moment, interpret it as you see fit--as expert judges yourselves. There are other ways, and other judges. The use of "lay" judges, composed of people who are not concerned with the niceties of debate style but with the effect that the debate has on their thinkings has been tried in both tournament and audience situations. This was to be the basis of the recent Bi-centennial Youth Debate judging. As it happened, however, one study has shown that for the individual events activities in that program, at least, not a great many of the judges actually were "lay" judges. Arguments on the

desirability of "lay" versus "expert" judges need not even be considered if the object is to provide the debater with different experiences--variety in use makes possible pragmatic judgments on the desirability of one type of preparation over another in choosing a judge.

There is, of course, no reason to limit the decision to the work of a single judge. In one tournament all those involved in elimination rounds who did not make the final round were used as judges--no coaches, only debaters. In other elimination rounds often three judges, or even five are used, usually a combination of coaches and others with some knowledge of debate.

A 1973 survey of college forensics indicated that while 87% of those responding attended tournaments, with a few attending as many as 40 in a year, most participated in from 11 to 26. In an effort to vary this tournament attendance with other types of debate experiences, however, a number of other debate situations were mentioned, in many of which judging would seem to be different from the orthodox tournament style.

Public debating is used in 54.6% of the programs, and most of them (43.9%) present from one to six per year, but four schools say they give more than 40 public debates in a year. On television 25.1% of the schools present debates, usually no more than three per year, and 9.4% give about the same number over the radio.⁹

The audience decision--more familiar in other situations than in American college groups--is often used in these public debates. On our campus we have had, from time to time, a modified "British style" debate, in which the audience moves to one side or the other of a middle aisle depending on which team they agree with. At the end of the debate, the audience is counted, and the side with the larger number is declared the winner. The Wayne State tournament, Debate Days in Detroit, has provided a variety of audiences, labor groups, club organizations, public schools, etc., with a corresponding variety of responses.¹⁰ In this tournament each debate had two decisions: one from a critic-judge and one from the audience. In all, debaters ordinarily involved in competition seem better satisfied if the competition is climaxed by a decision of some sort.

From time to time suggestions have been made with regard to content as it affects format. For instance the use of a "demurrer" was proposed to separate agreements about procedure from substantive arguments. The format proposed would be that:

. . . at the end of each speech the opposition may offer a demurrer motion which will consist of a two to three minute attack upon procedural issues raised in the immediately preceding speech. The defending side would then be given an equal period of time in which to reply to the particular procedural point under attack. The judge would be expected to rule promptly on the issue and would be allowed two minutes in which to state and explain his ruling.¹¹

Other suggestions have involved including even impromptu debate, along with peer group decisions, all in a rural setting¹² using debate as a means of developing interest in the history classroom.¹³

If the basic goals of debate participation are to provide the student with the ability to think clearly, organize, become fluent, learn research techniques and specific knowledge about designated topics, all within a contest activity, it would seem that there are infinite ways to vary the acquisition of these skills. Some of those suggested here have been tried with varying degrees of success; some are merely ideas. All are intended to stimulate the creativity of anyone who would utilize debate as an educational activity.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Lawrence R. Wheelless, "Two Surveys on Debate Format Preferences of Debaters and Coaches," Journal of the American Forensic Association, VIII (Winter, 1972), 134.

² Donald Klopff, "Forensics in America and Japan," Speech Education, V (August, 1976), 221.

³ S. Clay Willmington and Linda A. Swanson, "A Televised High School Debate Tournament," Speech Teacher, XV (November, 1966), 299.

⁴ Edward Stasheff and N. Ed Miller, "Televising a Debate in a Courtroom Setting," Speech Teacher, III (September, 1954), 216.

⁵ Gerald R. Miller, "Evidence and Argument," Perspectives on Argumentation, eds. Gerald R. Miller and Thomas R. Nilsen (Chicago: Scott, Foresman & Co.), pp. 24-49.

⁶ William D. Semlak, "The Protagoras Memorial Tournament: Some Theoretical Considerations," Journal of the American Forensic Association, VIII (Winter, 1972), 177-122.

⁷ Otto F. Bauer and C. William Colburn, "A Challenge Debate Tournament," Journal of the American Forensic Association, V (Winter, 1968), 1-9.

⁸ William Reynolds, "Theory and Practice in Forensics," Forensics as Communication, The Argumentative Perspective, ed. James H. McBath (Skokie, IL: National Textbook Co., 1975), p. 119.

⁹ Richard D. Rieke, "College Forensics in the United States - 1973," Journal of the American Forensics Association, X (Winter, 1974), 127-133.

¹⁰ John K. Boaz and George Ziegelmuehler, "An Audience Debate Tournament," Speech Teacher, XIII (November, 1964), 270.

11 Malthon M. Anapol and Ralph L. Towne, "The Use of the Demurrer in Debating: A Proposal," Journal of the American Forensic Association, VII (Fall, 1970), 125-129.

12 Robert W. Norton, "A Tournament in the Woods," Journal of the American Forensic Association, VIII (Winter, 1971), 245.

13 Richard C. Huseman and David M. Goodman, "The History Classroom: A Role for Debate in the Thematic Approach," Communication Education, XXVI (March, 1977), 166.

THE LIMITED RESEARCH DEBATE TOURNAMENT

by Raymond Bud Zeuschner*

The purpose of an intercollegiate forensics program may have been best summarized by Haiman when he noted, "[it] is to serve as a means by which society hopes to achieve the greatest wisdom possible."¹ This broad notion of the role which forensics can be called upon to play is a large task for easy accomplishment. Certainly a variety of methods must be employed in meeting a goal so encompassing. Not only is the goal large, but the people involved in any forensics program in any nation may also represent a diverse group of individuals. When we address the notion of forensics in the Pacific Basin, the single obvious fact that stands out is again the diversity. In designing forensics programs to fit diverse groups, Osborne noted, "The educational program which attempts to approximate a diverse societal process must itself be flexible and diverse."²

This paper is written in an attempt to provide one means for meeting the diversity which exists in the international forensic community. This means is termed "The Limited Research Debate Tournament" (LRDT), and will be outlined in the following manner: (1) A brief definition; (2) Contrast with current debate practice (U.S.); (3) Goals of the LRDT; (4) Examples of LRDTs in the United States; (5) Application of the LRDT to Pacific Basin programs.

It is the thesis of this paper that the Limited Research Debate Tournament is an excellent means to teach analytical skills to forensic students. The LRDT is quite simply a debate tournament which uses a special topic for that tournament and for which the research and evidence is specifically provided to contestants a short time prior to the beginning of the tournament. The topic and evidence may be given out as short as two hours prior to the first debate or as long as four weeks in one example. The point of the tournament is to provide students with an identical set of evidence and a short amount of time to prepare. Given these conditions, students are called upon to use powers of analysis to wage excellent arguments rather than powers of extensive research. It is the feeling of many that current debate practice, especially in the United States, puts the premium upon the amount and uniqueness of the research and resulting evidence.³

Current Practice

At the recent Speech Communication Association convention in San Francisco, several prominent directors of major forensics programs in the U.S. commented at one session that the main value of debate was to

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teach research skills and the contest was really to test the depth and sophistication of a team's ability to conduct research. For that reason, "unusual" cases on the outer fringes of the topic were perfectly justifiable in that they challenged the debater to push to the extreme the research related to the topic and, at the same time, challenged the opposition to follow in this research game. The widespread acceptance of this philosophy has given us the very broad topics of recent years as well as the tolerance for marginal cases reflected by a reluctance of critic-judges to vote on the topicality issue.

Empirical support for the above conclusions can be seen readily by looking to the reprinted final debate from the National Debate Tournament.⁴ Not only have more words been used (in the same amount of time), but the numbers of sources cited has risen and the affirmative cases tend not to be ones which come readily to mind upon initial analysis of the topic. This paper will not again review the oft-cited ills other writers have pointed out in connection with current practices⁵ for the alternatives offered by the LRDT have independent justification for their inclusion in the options offered to contemporary forensic students.

The real problem stems from the overwhelming presence of "traditional" debate offerings.⁶ The danger of having the preponderance of tournaments so nearly alike is that the "system" of intercollegiate debate tends to close, cutting short possibilities for growth, change or renewal. Smith points out, "The massive presences of the orthodox format causes a 'forest of tree' syndrome whereby the format is sometimes overlooked as a possible factor for some of the debate activity problems."⁷ This notion, from systems analysis, tends to support any attempt at opening up the system through experimental or non-traditional events and formats. Smith concludes that intercollegiate forensics, as a system, needs "diverse tournament experiences" for its health and ability to adapt to changing conditions.⁸ The call for variety in our offerings was emphasized by the National Developmental Conference on Forensics.⁹ Yet three years later, in spite of many exhortations to implement the recommendations of the Sedalia Conference, the variety in tournament offerings and formats has not been forthcoming.¹⁰ Perhaps the goals of the alternative program need to be clearly defined first¹¹ as the rationale might make the option more attractive.

Goals of the LRDT

The LRDT has as its major goal the teaching of analytical skills. Based on the idea that competition can be a healthy and motivating factor, the LRDT focuses the energies of the student on thinking about a narrow range of issues and evidence in depth. With the knowledge that all other advocates will be given the identical materials and have the identical time frame, the emphasis is upon the depth, quality and sophistication of analysis without any temptation to think that one can succeed by surprising an opponent with new or exotic material. The goal is echoed in the Sedalia report when the conferees urged forensics programs to train students "to analyze controversies" and communicate that analysis to a variety of audiences.¹² Clevenger indicated the prominent place which analysis should have in forensics when he noted,

"... the principal thing a student debater should gain from his experience is the ability to generate a well-knit and carefully reasoned set of arguments supporting a proposition of some importance, and defend these arguments against determined opposition on short notice."¹³ The place of the LRDT in this process is pointed out by Semlak when he observed that "... the traditional format tends to stress content judgements, while the Protagoras format (limited research) tends to stress judgements in argumentative skills."¹⁴ If forensics were training students in analysis and argumentation as at least a primary goal, we should make an attempt to provide formats which then test and enhance these skills as primary reasons for the contest not merely convenient adjuncts to the conveying of research findings.¹⁵ Semlak was somewhat critical of the LRDT in his article,¹⁶ but only because he is looking within the "closed system" of debate as his standard.

The real analogous model for a LRDT is not the orthodox tournament, but rather, extemporaneous speaking. In extemporaneous speaking a student with a well-read background is called upon to analyze, organize and present limited material in a short amount of time. The speaker is encouraged to study events, develop skills of organization and presentation, and, above all, analyze the events of the day. The LRDT is an attempt to combine the best features of extemporaneous preparation with the best aspects of debate, including working closely with another person, testing analysis against worthy opponents, and offering room for extensive feedback and development of ideas. Perhaps the clearest way to describe these benefits would be by describing some current examples of LRDTs being offered.

Examples of LRDT

One of the first major tournaments to be organized along these lines was the Protagoras Memorial Debate Tournament, first held in April 1970 at the University of North Dakota. This tournament was supported by a grant from the Midwest Forensics Association and developed as a reaction to over emphasis on possession of evidence.¹⁷ 120 debaters, entered as two-person teams from 29 different colleges and universities, participated in the two-day event. There were two topics employed, one for each day, and teams were given identical packets of evidence and statements of the proposition. After a two-hour preparation period each team debated one round of affirmative and one round of negative. The procedure was repeated on the following day and the best teams were selected to participate in the final round. At that point a "coin-toss" was conducted, the winners could select from either of the two topics in use at the tournament, the losers then elected which side they wished to defend. While not without some problems, the tournament enjoyed support and was offered again in subsequent years, both at the University of North Dakota, and later at the University of Illinois.

A second example of an LRDT has been sponsored by the Northern California Forensic Association and California State University, Hayward. This tournament is usually offered in the Spring as the final event of the NCFCA schedule and is often based upon a single court case or trial transcript. Students electing to attend are mailed materials relating

to the topic about 3 weeks prior to the tournament. They then analyze the material at their home school, develop strategies and arguments, and form two-person teams. This tournament allows students extended time to analyze the materials and to work with instructional staff members in preparing approaches. The teams then debate four or six preliminary rounds and two or three elimination rounds on the announced topic.

A third, more recent, example is the Protagoras West Tournament offered by California State University, Northridge. It is patterned after the original Protagoras Tournament noted above but with some significant alterations. First, debate colleagues are paired at random from among the various colleges attending. A new colleague is "drawn" for the second day; and a third colleague is paired for the finals. Two topics are used, one usually a policy question, the other usually a value question. Scores are tabulated by individual, not team, and top 8 persons are advanced into semi-finals. They are rematched at this point using a high/low system (#1 with #8, #2 with #7, etc.). After an additional 1 hour preparation time, the "coin toss" is again conducted to determine topic and sides. Thus it is possible to have 4 different schools represented in the finals.

Individual events are also offered on a similar, extemporaneous basis and include Impromptu, Oral Interpretation of Literature and Extempore. In the Individual Events all speakers must compete in all events. They are given specific, identical material or topics to speak on, and compete in three rounds (one of each type) each day. The top five to seven individuals are chosen for the finals, where a fourth event (Radio Speaking) is offered. Thus, the idea of limited preparation, identical material, and competitive motivation are incorporated into individual events as well.

Reflecting current offerings in American forensics, Protagoras West also includes Readers Theatre in an experimental format. Groups of four or five contestants are randomly formed from among the entries for Readers Theatre and are all given identical materials and individual rehearsal room. There the group, without faculty assistance, must analyze the material, form a script from the material, cut it, block it, and rehearse it. They compete in two rounds each day with new groups being formed the second day and new materials being provided. An intensive group experience is also built into this format. Braden and Brandenburg urge intelligent, responsible and effective group activity as a part of the forensic experience.¹⁸

Thus, in all these events students will have had an opportunity to work closely with others from different schools, providing them a cooperative as well as competitive experience. McGucken urges forensics to mirror this fact of human activity.¹⁹ Students often depart this tournament with several new friends from different schools and an appreciation for the styles and teachings from a variety of institutions.

These tournaments are not without their problems, however. In the debate area common to all three, Semlak warns that superficiality and unrealistic premises may result from either the necessary bias reflected

in the selection of evidence and topics or from the insufficient amount of time students have to consider their materials.²⁰ With care in the selection of a narrow topic--one that can be reasonably grasped and reasonably evidenced--these problems can be avoided. Pearce notes that there may be limited numbers of topics suitable for these tournaments, that the gathering of evidence may have practical problems finding someone with time and interest, and that the cost of duplication can be high.²¹ A minimum of two hours of preparation time seems to be needed.

Other areas of administrative difficulty are not to be overlooked: the dissemination of materials, particularly through the mails, may give one team a disadvantage due to circumstances of slow delivery. Also, the processes of gathering, duplicating and sorting material must be kept confidential. In addition to all of the above problems, the Protagoras West has to balance literary materials, topics, and facilities for the individual events, and incur all the additional research and duplication of effort for those events.

There seems to be support for these tournaments, especially if we measure by the criterion suggested by Braden and Brandenburg: "The test to apply to any of these activities is not who won, but whether the debaters improved as a result of the experience."²²

One questions whether the repeated experience in orthodox tournaments weekend after weekend produces any measurable improvement after, say, the 30th or 50th or 90th round of debate. Nobles and Cohen urge forensics educators to offer a "complete" program with a variety of experiences for our students.²³ Not only does there seem to be good reason for the LRDT in the U.S., there are also features which would make it attractive to the program of the Pacific Basin.

With over 400 forensics tournaments a year²⁴ the United States has a highly structured forensics system which allows for intensive forensic practices. With the exception of only one weekend, the entire time from late September through May finds many debate tournaments. In contrast, many of the forensics activities of other Pacific Basin countries have far fewer tournaments. Fewer tournaments, however, may actually mean more potential variety in the quality of experience. If a nation were to sponsor only one tournament a month, they could each be an LRDT, each using topics of current interest for that month, each allowing every school to have equal research and preparation. Thus, a school could participate in only one tournament during the middle or latter part of the year and not be at any disadvantage. Programs which participated at all the tournaments would keep the interest of the students by keeping the topics of lively interest.

It might be possible to vary the topics around some special regional problem, thus allowing students to understand topics of concern in a particular area. A student who debated at several of these tournaments would have a well-rounded understanding of various regions within the nation. These topics might also be adapted to provide audience interest and provide students the opportunity to speak in front of community groups.

On an international scale, this system is already partly in practice. Under the international exchange program sponsored by the Speech Communication Association, often a short list of topics is offered and hosting institutions choose that one which is the most interesting to that locality. By including common evidence, international debates might be more attractive to participating teams. It might even be possible to have a regular International Debate Tournament, choosing topics with international focus. If such a tournament were to combine the "random paired colleagues" described above at the Protagoras West Tournament, students would have an opportunity to debate with colleagues from several different lands, in an atmosphere of combined cooperation and competition for excellence. None of the problems of difference in research facilities, size of team, research assistants, or multiple opportunity to debate the topic would occur. Without major funding, such a project must remain only an idea, but the Limited Research concept makes such an idea viable. In a diverse world, a flexible tournament format such as the LRDT opens up new possibilities to promote international exchange, cooperation, understanding, and, as Haiman noted at the beginning of this paper, wisdom.

The concept of the LRDT is not new, but current forensics practice in the United States especially has given new energy to its implementation. By focusing on analytical and argumentative skills, the LRDT can meet several important goals set forth by forensics educators. The examples cited in this paper give several definitions to build upon, adapt or use as presented. While the LRDT has some problems in choosing the research and in administration, the potential for becoming a valuable option is great for a highly organized system as well as one with few tournaments. The international implications are profound to contemplate. If Marshall McLuhan was right when he noted that we shape our tools and then our tools shape us, then a new tool in the form of the LRDT may eventually have large impact on the shape of forensics in the future. To avoid stagnation, forensics must heed the warning issued by Pearce six years ago:

The integrity, value and vitality--and perhaps even the continued existence--of intercollegiate debate may well depend on the innovation of coaches and tournament directors.²⁵

The LRDT is one such innovation which could be adapted usefully to a variety of programs, circumstances, topics and even nations. Hopefully, more innovation along these lines will be found in forensics programs of tomorrow.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Franklyn S. Haiman, "A Critical View of the Game of Forensics," Journal of the American Forensic Association, I (May, 1964), 63.

² Michael Osborne, "A Blueprint for Diversity in Forensic Programs," Speech Teacher, XIV (March, 1965), 110.

³ Russell R. Marks and W. Barnett Pearce, "The Protagoras Memorial Debate Tournament," Journal of the American Forensic Association, VII (Spring, 1971); and Robert P. Newman and Keith R. Sanders, "A Study in the Integrity of Evidence," Journal of the American Forensic Association, II (January, 1965); and James A. Benson, "The Use of Evidence in Inter-collegiate Debate," Journal of the American Forensic Association, VII (Spring, 1971).

⁴ For example, see "The Final Debate of the National Debate Tournament," Journal of the American Forensic Association, IV (Fall, 1967) and "1974 National Debate Tournament Final Debate," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XI (Summer, 1974).

⁵ In addition to items cited in note 3 above, see J. Micheal Sproule, "Constructing, Implementing and Evaluating Objectives for Contest Debating: A Critique of Critiques on Debate," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XI (Summer, 1974), 8-9.

⁶ See Donald W. Klopff, "Practices in Intercollegiate Speech Tournaments," Journal of the American Forensic Association, I (May, 1964), 48-52; and Jack Howe, Intercollegiate Speech Tournament Results, privately published, any issue; or the "Calendar of Tournaments," Jack Howe, ed., published each Spring in Journal of the American Forensic Association.

⁷ Thomas E. Harris and Robert M. Smith, "A Systems Analysis of the Current Debate Controversy," Journal of the American Forensic Association, IX (Winter, 1973), 357.

⁸ Harris, p. 360.

⁹ The recommendations of the Conference are published in James McBath, ed., Forensics as Communication: The Argumentative Perspective (Skokie, IL: National Textbook Co.).

¹⁰ See items in note 6 above.

¹¹ Sproule, p. 10.

¹² McBath, above, note 9.

¹³ Theodore Clevenger, "Toward a Point of View for Contest Debate," Central States Speech Journal, XII (Autumn, 1960), 22.

¹⁴ William D. Semlak, "The Protagoras Memorial Tournament: Some Theoretical Considerations," Journal of the American Forensic Association, VIII (Winter, 1972), 118.

15 See Henry McGucken, "Better Forensics: An Impossible Dream?" Journal of the American Forensic Association, VIII (Spring, 1972), 182-185.

16 Semlak, p. 119.

17 Marks and Pearce, p. 284.

18 Waldo Braden and Ernest Brandenburg, Oral Decision Making (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955), p. 377.

19 McGucken, p. 184.

20 Semlak, p. 120.

21 Marks and Pearce, p. 286.

22 Braden and Brandenburg, p. 377.

23 W. Scott Nobles and Herman Cohen, "The Disjunctive Premise About Forensics," Speech Teacher, VIII (November, 1959), 316-320.

24 Howe, cited above.

25 Marks and Pearce, p. 286.

ANALYZING AND DEBATING PROPOSITIONS OF VALUE IN ACADEMIC FORENSICS

by Ronald J. Matlon*

We cannot help but argue values and value propositions. In market place situations, "we are faced with more issues of values in our daily lives than any other kind."¹ In tournament debates, Bruce Gronbeck notes that "too often debaters fail to realize that the focus of their disagreement may lie in their conceptions of values."² Unfortunately, very little has been written regarding argumentative analysis for questions of value, whether the analysis be applied to every day argument or specifically to the tournament debate setting. Wenzel and Hample recently made the following point regarding theory-building in this area of study: "Despite widespread recognition of the importance of value propositions . . . scholars in argumentation have provided little guidance for the person caught up in arguing about them."³

The following discussion has four parts on analyzing and debating values and value propositions to it: (1) a consideration of the controversy over the way in which issues can be decided when analyzing argumentative propositions, (2) an evaluated application of two existing analytical schemes for propositions of value in particular, (3) a proposed compromise scheme for determining arguments on a value proposition, and (4) some concluding remarks on debating propositions of value in tournament settings. In sum, the lurking questions here are: What system of analysis for propositions of value will do justice both to the demands for respecting the integrity of subject matter and to the demands for recognizing the audience and situation as the grounds of argument? Should that system (and other systems) be tested in the tournament debate setting?

The Controversy Over the Nature of Issues in the Process of Analyzing Argumentative Propositions

Although there is a vast body of philosophical, sociological, and psychological writing on value propositions, that material is not surveyed here.⁴ The literature which is examined comes largely from the field of argumentation and debate. Within that body of literature, there seem to be two theories of analysis for all types of argumentative propositions. One of these theories focuses primarily on the message approach to analysis; the other theory stresses audience adaptation. Since both theories take an issues approach to argumentative analysis, it is best to start with a discussion of issues.

Nearly all the writers examined agree on three characteristics of issues in general. First, it is necessary to have issues in argument. In the limited tournament setting, Ehninger and Brockriede claim that

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"unless a debater finds the actual issues and builds his entire discourse around them he cannot hope to gain a decision from a critical observer."⁵ For lay audiences, Mudd and Sillars advise the advocate that he will "need to find arguments that deal with . . . real attitudes, motives, and values. . . . Before you can find these arguments, you will need to see where your attitudes and motives are likely to conflict with his."⁶ In other words, an issue is vital to an advocate's cause. It is "crucial or essential to the meaning of that proposition"⁷ and the proposition, in fact, "cannot be resolved until its issues are discovered, formulated, studied, and advocated."⁸

Second, issues provide an organizational structure for a debate. "If a disputant does not comprehend just what are the few vital points of his case, around which all the lesser facts must be grouped, his proof will almost certainly lack the unity and coherence that are indispensable for clearness and force in presentation."⁹ Thus, "issues are the central points of organization upon which the controversy resolves."¹⁰

Third, issues determine areas of clash or possible clash in a debate. These points of tension are either "the basic questions upon which the two sides differ . . ."¹¹ or questions "to which some respondents might answer 'yes' and others 'no.'"¹² Therefore, issues are potentially or actually controversial.¹³

There is, however, considerable disagreement over one remaining characteristic of issues. Are issues endemic to their propositions? Those who say "Yes" (what Steven Shiffrin calls "the objectivist position")¹⁴ insist that issues are discovered vis-a-vis the application of classificatory analytical schemes. Those who say "No" insist that issues are uniquely invented for each different argumentative situation. This is precisely the point where the stock issues or message approach and the audience adaptation approach to argument diverge. Let us now examine the objectivist approach more closely.

A sizeable number of argumentation theorists apparently perceive issues as being universal in application. The objectivist method of analysis focuses on messages. All sides in a controversy deal with the same issues; "points are always the same in the same question: they exist independently of the wills of the disputants."¹⁵ Although the labels for analysis may change from author to author, the most common classification scheme seems to be the use of stock, potential, waived or admitted, and actual issues.¹⁶ The actual issues are vital, controversial central points of organization in an argumentative setting. All the advocate does to discover issues is to ask critical questions about the proposition whose responses will determine the outcome of the debate. The questions "are implicit in the statement of the proposition; one need only locate them."¹⁷ Objectivists have called popular or audience standards of proof "shoddy analysis"¹⁸ and conclude that the belief of the audience "must be disregarded"¹⁹ in this process.

Those who find this classification scheme unsatisfactory do so both because of its rigidity and its dominant focus on the substance or message

in an argumentative situation. Inasmuch as "no writer on the subject has ever denied that argumentation is an aspect of human communication,"²⁰ Sillars asks us to "reject the objectivist position and assume that meanings are in people, not messages . . . and that argumentation is a communication phenomenon requiring consideration of audience."²¹ Although he gives us no means by which to determine issues in an argumentative setting, it seems as though traditional modes of audience analysis would cause issues to surface.²²

It is against this controversial backdrop that we now consider a process of issue determination specifically for propositions of value.

An Application of Two Systems of Analysis to Propositions of Value

A proposition of value is a qualitative judgment about a person, object, act, situation, program, institution, concept, or idea. It is an "assertion about the worth of a thing,"²³ and, therefore, it cannot "be an objective statement of fact, assessable in terms of truth or falsity."²⁴ For example, "Julius Erving is now the best player in the National Basketball Association" is a debatable proposition of value, regardless of the setting in which it occurs. To really understand where value propositions fit into the entire scope of propositions, two characteristics should be noted about them.

First, value propositions evolve from the recognition of cognitive phenomena, even though claims made about those phenomena may be subject to dispute. In other words, "statements of value assume the existence of certain facts. The assertion that Mr. Doe is good assumes the existence of Mr. Doe."²⁵ Therefore, it is important to examine underlying propositions and sub-propositions of fact before considering any propositions of value. It is possible that a value proposition never gets the chance to evolve in a dispute if the opponents are only arguing over the "direct evidential support"²⁶ for one or more underlying statements of fact (e.g., "Does Mr. Doe actually exist?"). When we carefully analyze and argue the concrete, factual underpinnings to value propositions, we discover "no criterion of good or bad, only 'is' and 'is not.' . . . The standards involved are cognitive. Valid cognitive beliefs constitute knowledge."²⁷ As one source puts it: "A normative generalization expresses a value judgment, not a statement of fact, and as a result, it cannot be verified empirically."²⁸ Thus, when we argue a value premise such as "it is wrong to charge students so much money for higher education," we might be able to have a much more meaningful argument over the supporting factual proposition that "the cost of higher education denies qualified students the opportunity of fulfilling their potential" than we would over the supporting value proposition that "denying qualified students the opportunity to fulfill their potential is wrong." It is "immeasurably easier to convince people of the facts than it is to convince them to change their values."²⁹ That is not to say we can or should avoid arguing values; it is only to say that we should first be aware of disagreements over and ascertain truth and falsity within statements of fact before we argue the more abstract values head-on.

Second, value propositions often lead to or are embedded in policy suggestions. The rhetoric surrounding federal aid to education proposals frequently finds value propositions at work, especially by the opposition to such proposals:

The proponent of federal aid may often, of course, assert certain values--such as the value of equal educational opportunity and the value of quality education--and apply these to the approval of federal aid. But the form most prominent in such speeches incorporates analysis of serious deficiencies in the American educational system and the proposal that federal aid to education will ameliorate these deficiencies. Similarly, the opponent of federal aid may deny either the existence of a problem or the adequacy of federal aid to meet the problem. But his most prominent form is likely to be based on certain values--as shown in such assertions as "The power of government, and especially the federal government, should be limited," or, "The Federal government is growing too rapidly," or "Federal control over education would move this nation closer to socialism, which is a bad thing."³⁰

Thus, value propositions act as "intermediates between the world of fact and the world of advice."³¹

Although nearly all contemporary textbooks treating issues recognize the existence of propositions of value as described above, few offer their readers assistance in issue determination.³² Using the two systems of analysis noted earlier, we can now illustrate how they might be used to uncover the most appropriate actual issues.

If we follow first the objectivist position that issues are endemic to their propositions, we begin with stock issues. "The stock issues in a debate over a proposition of a value derive from the moral, esthetic, or other value judgment areas applicable to the proposition."³³ Two such stock issues prevail. The definitive stock issue is "a statement or justification of the standard or measure to be used, whether criteria, a model, an ideal, or desirable aims or objectives."³⁴ The cost of solar energy cannot be shown to be too high until some standards of high cost are identified. The designative stock issue determines "whether the subject of the evaluation meets the criteria defined."³⁵ If I were upholding the proposition, "Julius Erving is now the best player in the National Basketball Association," it is necessary after establishing standards or criteria for good basketball playing to apply those standards to Julius Erving and any other NBA player my opponent wishes to mention. Thus, the stock issues for that particular proposition are:

Definitive: What standards can be used to establish "good basketball playing?"

Designative: Does Julius Erving better meet those standards than any other player now in the National Basketball Association?

We move to potential issues. The potential issues which answer the definitive question on "good basketball playing" might be (1) scoring, (2) rebounds, (3) blocked shots, and (4) the player's effect on attendance. The criteria are usually derived from the specific subject matter of the controversy. These basketball criteria come from NBA record books. By the same token, one could turn to Judaic-Christian theologians and philosophers for moral criteria, to political and physical scientists for costs of alternate energy sources, etc. In the basketball example above, the criteria were rather easily established. If one were arguing that Carl Sandburg was a "great poet," no single book would identify what constitutes a great piece of poetry. No matter how difficult it is to determine the criteria, potential issues for the definitive question are supposed to clarify the proposition and "guard against the confusion which results from giving the same value words different meanings."³⁶ If agreement on the potential definitive issues "cannot be reached, we have a debate on what are the criteria rather than on the basic proposition."³⁷ At times, getting past the definitive issues and into the designative issues is a very difficult task because "values are peculiarly personal things."³⁸

If and when all parties in the dispute agree that the value definitions are acceptable, then we can transfer our debate to the potential designative issues, which, in our example above, would be to look specifically at Erving's (1) scoring, (2) rebounds, (3) blocked shots, and (4) effect on attendance, as compared to other NBA players. To argue these issues "convincingly usually calls for evidence."³⁹ The number of potential designative issues is therefore equal to the number of potential definitive issues.⁴⁰ Thus, we have eight potential issues within our basketball proposition. Or, to look at it another way, we have four separate criteria and applications to each criteria which can be argued.

Should a proponent decide to drop any of these issues or should the opponent decide to agree with any of these issues (e.g., all definitive claims), then those issues become waived from the debate. They may be waived because of a lack of convincing supporting material or on account of time, interest, and vulnerability. What remains are the actual points of clash.

Those who defend the objectivist's approach to analyzing value propositions do so because they believe they have arrived at issues which are (1) vital to the advocate's cause, (2) central points to the advocate's organization, (3) points of actual clash and (4) inherent or endemic to the resolution. Mills believes that the stock issues starting point has not been too restrictive because they were "used only as broad questions which serve as guidelines to suggest areas for further study. Thus, they are not the end of analysis. They do not commit anyone to a position before he has studied the proposition thoroughly."⁴¹ This author sees some validity in this point of view.

On the other hand, there is also validity in the point of view which suggests that the stock issues approach as constituted above "provides no mechanism for the analysis of the underlying values of

the proposition."⁴² As advocates, we would either try to appeal to or re-enforce existing values or attempt to alter the way conflicting values should be balanced.

For adapting to audience values, Bryant and Wallace suggest the following analytical general questions:

1. What values are relevant to the situation?
2. Among relevant values, which ones have priority?⁴³

The answer to their first question leads us to arguments appropriate to different occasions and subjects. "What is important at one time and place may not be significant at another time and place. Peace seems more important when we are threatened with war than when war is not in prospect."⁴⁴

The answer to the second question leads us to arguments which interest audiences. Values are "the real sources of attention and interest; values sustain interest until the decision is made and problems are resolved. After the decision has been taken, they endow it with significance."⁴⁵ A speaker or writer can discover the appropriate audience interests by doing a careful job of research to discover what is good or bad for the involved parties. Having done that, the advocate can use a number of lines of argument in trying to intensify that value in his audience.⁴⁶ He might try to show that the value has produced desirable effects in the past (e.g., the Greek belief in freedom as related to their civilization). He might try to show that the best people accept this value, whereas less admirable ones do not (e.g., John Kennedy revered a certain value and he is worthy of emulation). He might use "betterness statements" to demonstrate how the value fits the personal, social, or economic needs of the audience (e.g., the speaker guarantees genuine happiness as opposed to the audience's existing and uneasy neuroticism with only brief moments of gratification). He might heighten "civilizing values by contrasting them with their brutalizing opposites."⁴⁷ Or he might justify the value by logical reasoning (e.g., "X" value is a means to "Y" and "Y" is a good end or "X" value is consistent with "Y" value and "Y" value is a good one).⁴⁸ Throughout all these approaches, "examples, slogans, stereotypes, testimonials, and arguments . . . are the specific mechanisms by which the connection between proposition and wants and values is made cogent."⁴⁹ In short, if an advocate wishes an audience to believe that Julius Erving is now the best NBA basketball player, his ultimate definition of "best basketball player," must not be divorced from his audience's concepts of these same critical value terms.

There are situations where an advocate will not try to intensify currently held audience values because the advocate believes that those values are incorrect or too highly cherished. In these settings, it is the duty of the advocate to alter audience values. In order to achieve value congruence with an audience, it is essential for an advocate to have a good working knowledge of the application of value theory to argumentative settings.⁵⁰ Probably the most important point to remember

is that although core values do not readily change, they do shift in positions of dominance along a value hierarchy. According to Perelman, "value hierarchies are, no doubt, more important to the structure of an argument than the actual values."⁵¹

To alter a value hierarchy, an advocate might try one of two strategies.⁵² He may try to create dissatisfaction in the audience's value structure. For example, an audience who gives high priority to the value of collectivism (social good and a strong government) may begin to shift that fundamental value to a position of lesser importance if an advocate stresses the growth and development of a terrifying dictatorship under the present collectivistic government. An attempt is therefore made to raise the value of democracy, liberty, and freedom to a higher level. A second strategy which can be used is to develop dissatisfaction in an audience by showing how their attitudes are inappropriate expressions of their values. Opposition to our recent policy in Vietnam, for instance, can encourage individuals to shift from collectivism (humanitarian aid) to isolationism.

Changing the value hierarchy of an audience is a challenging analytical process. Perhaps the most comprehensive treatise on this subject has been written by Milton Rokeach.⁵³ His value approach to human problems has far-reaching insights for answering questions in any audience-situation analytical scheme. Rokeach's general theme is: "If values were completely stable, individual and social change would be impossible. If values were completely unstable, continuity of human personality and society would be impossible."⁵⁴ Rokeach claims that values are social indicators of the quality of life in America, taking into account shifts in the hierarchy of values according to sex, income, education, race, age, politics, religion, and other cross-cultural variables. His discussion of values and value differences has considerable practical value in terms of selecting actual issues (arguments) for audiences.

A Proposed Scheme for Analyzing Propositions of Value

The belief that one must use either an exclusive stock issues (objectivist) approach or a pure situation-audience approach for determining issues for value propositions is rejected. Yet neither approach, both quite valid, should be totally abandoned because a workable and valuable analytical scheme can be obtained by combining the best of both approaches. The stock issues approach affords logical structure; the situation-audience approach affords the use of appropriately adapted values.

Here, then, is a recommended procedure for transcending the two previously noted systems of analysis. The procedure should be adopted keeping in mind that prior to and during its implementation, the advocate is constantly aware of the underlying propositions and sub-propositions of fact which may be in dispute between the advocate and his opponents.

Step I. Determine the definitive and designative stock issues which are endemic to the proposition.

Step II. Determine the potential issues which are all of the possible answers to the two stock issue questions. Since the uniqueness of the potential definitive issue focuses on the establishment of standards (values) to be applied in the case in question, the standards may be derived in any of the following ways:⁵⁵

- A. Use your own personal values as standards.
- B. Ascertain as best you can the values held by your judges or audience.
- C. Adopt what appears to be values held by the majority of people (public opinion).
- D. Adopt the values held by experts or persons of recognized competence in the area under discussion.

Once the standards are fixed, they are applied within the development of the potential designative issues.

Step III. Determine which potential issues should be waived or admitted and which ones should be kept as actual issues. This is done by answering some or all the following questions:

- A. Which potential issues have the least vulnerable supporting material and reasoning?
- B. Which potential issues can be developed within the time allowed?
- C. Which potential issues include values which are particularly relevant to the situation?
- D. Among relevant values, which ones have priority for this audience?
- E. If conflicting values are to be altered, should dissatisfaction in the audience's value hierarchy be shown or should dissonance between values and attitudes be created?

All three steps in the above procedure clearly make use of the structured objectivist approach. However, after one finishes the preliminary analysis in Step I, the final two steps demonstrate how a reconciliation between the two approaches occurs. The message receiver is considered both in determining the possible or potential message and in separating waived and admitted matter from actual issues. Step I finds issues endemic to the propositions. Step II and III have issues determined by the situation and the belief states of the audience, but maintain the structure of the objectivists in finding those issues.

Sillars' attack on the objectivist approach to analysis was based on fundamental differences in epistemology. As a result, Sillars would

have us believe that the philosophical assumptions of the objectivist approach are incompatible with his audience-centered approach. However, the above model suggests that a natural union may be possible and, in fact, desirable. The objectivist's subject-oriented position gets the advocate started on the road to issue determination. The audience-centered position adapts that analysis to the immediate situation and thereby helps the advocate finish off the analytical process. This analytical merger attempts to give the advocate some direction for his arguments and stresses the critical importance of societal values.

There is one remaining element in the question about debating value propositions which is still unanswered. Is the tournament setting a place to test schemes for analyzing and debating value propositions? The following material answers that question.

Debating Propositions of Value in Tournament Settings

Unfortunately, during most of its history, interscholastic and intercollegiate debate has not been the ideal place for analyzing and arguing value propositions.⁵⁶ Although, as noted earlier, value sub-propositions are embedded in "ought to" statements, they tend to get lost in our persistent effort to debate only propositions of policy. There are those who would have us believe that no sufficient body of theory exists for analyzing and arguing propositions of value. For instance, Thomas Kane says that we must have a theoretical basis for what we teach and do and that our understanding of propositions of value is in a never-never land. We have a consistent set of judging standards for propositions of policy, says Kane, but on value propositions, tournament judges would only vote on instinct.⁵⁷ Agreeing with Kane, Bernard Brock advised tournament debaters not to argue propositions of value because:

... the concepts which apply to debate all assume that questions of policy will be debated. For example, presumption, inherency, stock issues, practicability, and advantages all relate to questions of policy. One does not even know in theory what the affirmative should do to fulfill its burden of proof on questions of ... value.⁵⁸

To follow the advice of Kane and Brock assumes that all our theories of argument must be written down before we allow our students to experiment with them. This ignores two realities in the practice of argumentation. One reality is that people argue and judge values in the marketplace all the time while social psychologists, anthropologists, logicians, economists, and rhetoricians such as Wenzel and Hamble are periodically investigating "the constructs and categories used by ordinary men in their handling of value statements."⁵⁹ Even in the tournament debate setting, we know that judging standards often include value orientations of a judge. The other reality is that practice often determines theory. Comparative advantage, alternative-justification, conditional counterplan, and attitudinal inherency theories appeared in intercollegiate debating before anything was written about them in our

argumentation literature. Therefore, the position that we ought not to argue value propositions in academic debate is one which contains little merit according to this observer.

There are some signs that we may arguing propositions of value in academic debate at some point in the near future. One such sign is the endorsement such a practice received from the National Developmental Conference on Forensics.⁶⁰ Another sign is that non-policy propositions have appeared on recent final selection lists for annual intercollegiate debate resolutions. Just this summer, the Committee on Intercollegiate Discussion and Debate asked the forensics community to consider the proposition, "Resolved: That legal protection of accused persons in the United States unnecessarily hinders law enforcement agencies." A much more subtle sign is found when one examines the contest debate ballot now most commonly used. Sillars noted that tournament debate judges were forced to be objectivists by deciding "which team did the better debating" according to "rules" of evidence and reasoning prescribed on the debate ballot.⁶¹ However, the marking boxes on most ballots have now disappeared and the language on the ballot now reads: "In my opinion, this debate was won by the _____ team." What judging standards are to be employed? A judge can still be a message-centered evaluator of logic if he wishes, but a judge also has the opportunity to say that a certain team "wins" the debate because their arguments best suit that judge's own personal value system or best alter the way conflicting values should be balanced.⁶²

William English has argued convincingly that there is much to gain by adopting a proposition of value in some future tournament debate year.⁶³ Certainly the academic debate community can be pioneers in theory-building if we would courageously vote for and adopt a non-policy proposition when one appears on some future ballot. The Sedalia Conference sadly recognized that "little theory has been developed regarding what an affirmative or negative ought to do to fulfill its burden of analysis on non-policy propositions."⁶⁴ Surely the tournament setting is a suitable place where paradigms of value analysis can be put to the test so that we can expand our knowledge of argumentation theory.

Conclusion

Although no single formula is a panacea for communicating arguments, I have presented here one possible system of analysis in argumentation. This proposed system attempts to do justice to the objectivists' demands for recognizing the audience and situation as the grounds of argument. One place for testing theory has always been the tournament debating setting and it is recommended here that proposed schemes for analyzing value propositions be utilized in that setting by adopting in some future year an intercollegiate resolution which has no explicit policy ramifications. This suggestion is offered because only through the testing of certain "formulas" do we move closer to the truth regarding what persuades and what tends not to persuade. If valuing "shapes our behavior in the same way that axioms illuminate constructions in geometry,"⁶⁵ then we should clearly apply value theory to our theory of arguing debate resolutions.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ Charles R. Gruner, Cal M. Logue, Dwight L. Freshley, and Richard C. Huseman, Speech Communication in Society (Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon, 1972). p. 205.
- ² Bruce E. Gronbeck, "From 'Is' to 'Ought': Alternative Strategies," Central States Speech Journal, XIX (Spring, 1968), 38.
- ³ Joseph W. Wenzel and Dale J. Hample, "Categories and Dimensions of Value Propositions: Exploratory Studies," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XI (Winter, 1975), 121. Since the writing of their article, one textbook has been published with some insight into debating values. See George W. Ziegelmüller and Charles A. Dause, Argumentation: Inquiry and Advocacy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1975).
- ⁴ The reader is encouraged to examine the materials in particular: Ethel M. Albert, "Conflict and Change in American Value: A Culture-Historical Approach," Ethics, LXXIV (October, 1963), 19-33; Gert M. Inlow, Values in Transition: A Handbook (New York: John Wilby, 1972); Clyde Kluckhohn, "The Evolution of Contemporary Values," Daedalus, XXXVII (Spring, 1958), 78-109; Clyde Kluckhohn, Mirror for Man (New York: Whittlesey House, 1949); Ray Lepley, The Language of Values (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957); Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), Chapter 2; Chaim Perelman, "How Do We Apply Reason to Values?" Journal of Philosophy, 52 (December 22, 1955), 797-801; Jurgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson, Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry (New York: W. W. Norton, 1951), Chapter 4; James L. Spates and Jack Levin, "Beats, Hippies, the Hip Generation, and the American Middle Class: An Analysis of Values," International Social Science Journal, XXIV (1972), 326-353; Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944); Charles L. Stevenson, Facts and Value: Studies in Ethical Analysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); Otto Von Mering, A Grammar of Human Values (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1961); and Robin M. Williams, Jr., American Society: A Sociological Interpretation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), Chapter II.
- ⁶ Charles S. Mudd and Malcolm O. Sillars, Speech: Content and Communication (New York: Thomas Y. Crowel, 1975), p. 48.
- ⁷ Glen E. Mills, Reason in Controversy (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1968), p. 96.
- ⁸ Russel R. Windes and Arthur Hastings, Argumentation and Advocacy (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 78.
- ⁹ Craven Laycock and Robert L. Scales, Argumentation and Debate (New York: Macmillan, 1904), p. 32.

¹⁰ Charles W. LaGrave, "Inherency: An Historical and Critical Study," unpublished Master of Arts thesis (University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1971), p. 8.

¹¹ Wayne N. Thompson, Modern Argumentation and Debate (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 56.

¹² Donald K. Smith, Man Speaking: A Rhetoric of Public Speech (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1969), p. 64.

¹³ In his recent article on values and argument, Malcolm O. Sillars notes that many textbooks in debate identify issues only as revealed by the actual clash. I agree with him when he states on p. 294 that "Affirming that issues are to be found in a debate makes argumentation narrower than it needs to be. When one speaks, he gives arguments and answers objections he would have to answer if members of the audience were subsequently to speak in opposition; he does act in a significantly different way than if an opposing speaker were physically present. Thus, while an opposing speaker is a help in finding issues, he is not essential." Sillars, "Audiences, Social Values, and the Analysis of Argument," Speech Teacher, XXII (November, 1973). Glen Mills, note 9 above, p. 95 also writes: "If the critic considers as issues only those points on which a clash occurred, he will of necessity ignore any potential issues which did not become actual, and he cannot judge whether a case is prima-facie or logically adequate." This is why I include both actual and potential controversies in this third characteristic of issues.

¹⁴ Sillars, p. 292.

¹⁵ Laycock and Scales, p. 30.

¹⁶ Stock issues are preliminary, generalized, and universal questions used in the early stage of analysis. Potential issues are all of the possible answers (and, in turn, all of the possible arguments) to the questions posed by the stock issues. Waived or admitted issues are all the potential positions explicitly or implicitly agreed to by the advocates in a debate. Finally, the actual issues are the potential positions upon which the advocates in a debate disagree.

¹⁷ Windes and Hastings, p. 82.

¹⁸ Mills, p. 96.

¹⁹ Ehninger and Brockriede, p. 211.

²⁰ Sillars, p. 291.

²¹ Sillars, p. 293.

²² "Arguments addressed to audiences of Blacks, women, young people, Catholics, Mormons, George Wallace supporters, or policeman differ in their natures if they are to be effective." Sillars, p. 295.

23 Robert B. Huber, Influencing Through Argument (New York: David McKay Co., 1963), p. 43.

24 Clive Beck, "Utterances Which Incorporate a Value Statement," American Philosophical Quarterly, IV (October, 1967), 296.

25 Ronald F. Reid, "Analysis of the Proposition," in James H. McBath, ed., Argumentation and Debate (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), 49-50.

26 David L. Torrence, "Need Issue Includes Value Judgment," Speaker and Gavel, IV (November, 1966), 6.

27 Robin M. Williams, American Society: A Sociological Interpretation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), p. 443.

28 Gerald R. Miller and Henry E. Nicholson, Communication Inquiry: A Perspective on a Process (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1976), p. 95.

29 Hugh G. Petrie, "Practical Reasoning: Some Examples," Philosophy and Rhetoric, IV (Winter, 1971), 40.

30 Smith, p. 92.

31 Gronbeck, p. 31.

32 A somewhat novel approach for the public speaker can be found in Chapter 6 ("Values") in Otis M. Walter, Speaking Intelligently: Communication for Problem Solving (New York: Macmillan, 1976).

33 Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1970), p. 54.

34 Arthur N. Kruger, Modern Debate (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 211.

35 Ehninger and Brockriede, p. 222.

36 Kruger, p. 26.

37 William A. Behl, Discussion and Debate: An Introduction to Argument (New York: Ronald Press, 1953), p. 63.

38 James H. McBurney and Glen E. Mills, Argumentation and Debate: Techniques of a Free Society (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 47.

39 Harold F. Graves and Bernard S. Oldsey, From Fact to Judgment (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 246.

40 A particularly good example of this theory can be found in Russel R. Windes and Robert M. O'Neil, A Guide to Debate (Portland, Maine: J. Weston Walch, 1964), pp. 45-46. The proposition used is, "Resolved: That Communism constitutes a threat to the security of the United States."

41 Mills, p. 97.

42 Charles A. Dause, "Analysis of a Debate: Two Perspectives," Central States Speech Journal, XXIII (Summer, 1972), 90.

43 Donald C. Bryant and Karl R. Wallace, Fundamentals of Public Speaking (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 40.

44 Bryant and Wallace, p. 40.

45 Karl R. Wallace, Understanding Discourse (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), p. 80.

46 See Otis M. Walter and Robert L. Scott, Thinking and Speaking (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 236-240.

47 Virgil L. Baker and Ralph T. Eubanks, Speech in Personal and Public Affairs (New York: David McKay Co., 1965), p. 107.

48 "X is consistent with Y value and Y value is a good one" might be particularly useful reasoning when any or all of the following conditions exist: (1) Y is a more abstract value than Z, (2) Y is of higher priority than X, (3) Y is better established or more intensively held than X, and (4) Y is a more widely held value than X.

49 Wayne C. Minnick, The Art of Persuasion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), p. 226.

50 One of the few discussions in argumentation and debate literature which can help the advocate better understand the role of value systems in decision-making can be found in Richard D. Rieke and Malcolm O. Sillars, Argumentation and the Decision Making Process (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975), Chapter 6. Social psychologists and philosophers also can provide us with useful information about the nature and varieties of value judgments, their logical and epistemological status, the grounds for their justification, the value hierarchies, etc. For instance, Kluckhohn surveyed upwards of fifty books and monographs and two hundred articles on American values. He concluded:

In broad outline there is remarkable agreement as to what American values are or have been and agreement upon their stability through more than a hundred and fifty years. The words vary somewhat with the fashions of the time of writing and with the language associated with the writer's field. One analyst will include one or more central values that another omits or expressly rejects. The shadings, the historical derivations, the linkages vary appreciably in some instances, but the agreements and overlappings on central points are vastly more striking than the disagreements, stated or possibly inferable on grounds of omission. See Clyde Kluckhohn, "Have There Been Discernable Shifts in American Values During the Past Generation?" in Elting E. Morison, ed., The American Style: Essays in Value and Performance (New York: Harper and Brothers,

1958), p. 149. The works of Edward Steele should also be examined if one wants a description of core values and their application to arguments. Edward D. Steele, "Social Values in Public Address," Western Speech, XXII (Winter, 1958), 38-42 and Edward D. Steele and W. Charles Redding, "The American Value System: Premises for Persuasion," Western Speech, XXVI (Spring, 1962), 83-91.

51 Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argument (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), p. 81.

52 For a further discussion of these strategies, see Daniel Katz, "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIV (1960), 163-204.

53 Milton Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values (New York: The Free Press, 1973).

54 Rokeach, pp. 5-6.

55 See McBurney and Mills, pp. 47-48.

56 Only once has a non-policy proposition been accepted as the annual topic for intercollegiate debate. In 1921-1922, the proposition was, "Resolved: That the principle of the 'closed shop' is unjustifiable."

57 Thomas Kane, "Should the National Intercollegiate Debate Topic be a Non-Policy Proposition? A Negative Statement," a paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention (Houston: December 28, 1975).

58 Bernard L. Brock, "New Criteria for Selecting National Debate Questions," Journal of the American Forensic Association, V (Spring, 1968), 46.

59 Wenzel and Hample, p. 122.

60 James H. McBath, Forensics as Communication: The Argumentative Perspective (Skokie, IL: National Textbook Co., 1975), p. 29. "A variety of propositions should be used in academic debate, including the occasional use of propositions that do not call for a change in policy. On a personal and societal level, we often find it meaningful to argue values without offering specific advice or plans of action related to those value judgments."

61 Sillars, p. 293.

62 Judging philosophy booklets have been issued to all the participants at the 1974, 1975, and 1976 National Debate Tournaments. Why could not those booklets contain a discussion of each judges' values orientation in the event we might someday use a value proposition at that tournament? The judge then serves as the audience in the analytical model this author proposes.

63 Two suggestions for propositions by English are: "Resolved: That the present administration in Washington is effectively doing its job" and "Resolved: That moral relativism has had a positive effect on America." William B. English, "Should the National Intercollegiate Debate Topic be a Non-Policy Proposition? An Affirmative Statement," a paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention (Houston: December 28, 1975).

64 McBath, ed., Forensics as Communication, p. 29.

65 Bryant and Wallace, p. 34.

CROSS-EXAMINATION DEBATING

by John K. Boaz*

In September, 1974 the National Developmental Conference on Forensics, a group proposing to chart future directions for forensic education in the United States, recommended that "the NDT [National Debate Tournament] Committee should adopt the cross-examination format of debate for the NDT as soon as practicable. . . ." The Conference rationale for this recommendation was that the NDT ". . . exerts considerable influence on practices in other tournaments . . .," and "the cross-examination format is specifically recommended for early adoption because its use is expected to sharpen the contest among arguments in debate."¹ As a result of this recommendation the NDT utilized a cross-examination format for the first time in its history in April, 1976.

This paper seeks to explain the antecedents of cross-examination in contemporary American academic debating; to identify the purposes, strengths, and weaknesses of cross-examination in academic debating; and to outline some techniques for preparing and conducting cross-examination.

Antecedents of Cross-Examination in Contemporary American Academic Debating

Audience debating once flourished in American universities. More recently spectator sports, movies, radio, television, and a multitude of campus activities have conspired to diminish the audiences for academic debates.

Even before these competing activities mushroomed, however, J. Stanley Gray of the University of Oregon proposed in 1926 an alternative style of debate which he hoped would redouble waning audiences and more importantly correct some of the problems of standard debate procedure. Gray was primarily concerned with the shortcomings he felt were inherent in decision debating, and accordingly he introduced a plan for non-decision, cross-examination debate. The Oregon Plan consisted of an affirmative and negative constructive speech of twenty minutes each, cross questioning of the first affirmative speaker by the second negative, cross questioning of the first negative by the second affirmative, and a ten minute summary-rebuttal by each side. In this method Gray said,

. . . we have combined all the benefits of both the decision and no-decision debate and yet we have retained none of the evils. We

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have no judge prejudice; no over emphasis of winning; no refusal of a debater to admit a fact because it may cause him to lose a judge's vote; no sacrificing of the welfare of the student for the sake of winning a debate; no dry academic, and technical speeches; and finally, no shirking in preparation. Aside from the first two speeches, memorized speaking is impossible. The debater must learn to adjust himself and his ideas to the new situations which every debate presents.²

In 1952 the National Forensics League adopted cross-examination debating bringing a cross-examination format into widespread use at the high school level.

A theoretical base was readily available for cross-examination practice in the literature of classical rhetoric and modern legal education. Those familiar with the history of rhetorical theory will have noted the similarity between modern cross-examination debate and the ancient Greek and Roman tradition of dialectic. The Socratic dialogues of Plato spring to mind as the primogenitor of the cross-examination procedure. Plato's purposes in dialectic continue to be those of debate cross-examination, namely, to expose truth and to expose sham and sophistry. Hance enumerates the methods of questioning used by Plato to accomplish these two ends.

First, he uses the rather short and simple question, unequivocal and of such nature that it can be answered by a "yes" or "no" or a short phrase. Secondly, he shows the need of the questioner's controlling the respondent's answers by checking lengthy discussion or replies which are beside the point. Thirdly, he uses the method of "similarities" to seek the establishment of the necessary conclusions. . . . Further, Plato uses the question and answer form to establish premises of a syllogism which will have as its conclusion the proposition which the questioner wishes to have admitted by the respondent.³

Aristotle in the Topics presents a number of principles fundamental to dialectic. Like Plato, Aristotle recommends the method of comparison or similarity to establish premises from which a syllogism may be drawn. The method of comparison keeps the objective of the questioner concealed ". . . until the dialectical process has exposed it to view."⁴ Cicero similarly describes the method of induction or analogy. "Induction is a form of argument which leads the person with whom one is arguing to give assent to certain undisputed facts; through this assent it wins his approval of a doubtful proposition because this resembles the facts to which he has assented."⁵ From analysis of De Inventione Hance concluded,

Cicero is suggesting essentially the following three principles: first, ask questions that must be answered as the interrogator wishes and that are related to the ultimate question as similes; secondly, ask the question relating to the argument being discussed (if the foregoing questions, using the method of similes, have been well constructed, the answer to this question will be assured); thirdly, point out the conclusion being sought, and the need of

carefully relating the particular argument to the universal.⁶

The literature of legal education constitutes another antecedent to cross-examination in academic debate from which appropriate principles and techniques can be drawn. "Dean Wigmore, in his incomparable work on evidence, says that cross-examination was an accepted feature of the common law as early as 1670."⁷ The purpose of cross-examination in law apply equally in academic debate, except that in academic debate it should not be a purpose of the cross-examiner to discredit the witness, that is to say, the opponent, but rather to discredit the source of authority cited by the opposition. Hence, the debater can and should consult books on trial practice and trial technique for examples of cross-examination in law.

Purposes, Strengths, and Weaknesses of Cross-Examination in Academic Debating

The general purposes of cross-examination are two. The interrogator should strive to build his or her own case and to undermine that of the opposition, or ". . . break the force of the adverse testimony. . . ."⁸ More specifically, cross-examination functions (1) to establish areas of common agreement and admissions favorable to your position, (2) to clarify statements of the opposition through explanation, qualification, or supplementation, (3) to demonstrate the inadequacies of the evidence used by the opposition, (4) to point out fallacies in the reasoning of the opposition, and, in sum, (5) to accomplish the objectives of any good rebuttal speech.

The advantages of using cross-examination in debate are several. First, it introduces an element of variety which stimulates interest both in audience and participant. "The inescapable conflict, the give and take, the pitting of mind against mind, the measuring of wit against wit find eager and responsive listeners."⁹ Second, cross-examination debate places emphasis on thorough preparation. The crux of the matter is that "there is little chance of concealing the fact of inadequate preparation from a cross-examiner who is alert and himself prepared."¹⁰ Third, if the goal of academic debate is to train the student to think on his or her feet, if indeed the goal of speech communication skills pedagogy is to induce a flexible and extemporaneous manner of delivery, then cross-examination debate is particularly well suited to bring about these ends. "The use of the cross-examination is a safe-guard against failure on the part of the speakers to reach a definite clash of opinion."¹¹ Fourth, facts can be clarified and issues discovered more quickly than in the orthodox style which forces a five or ten minute wait before a reply can be given.¹² Finally, Fuge and Newman remind us, "cross-examination is a great deal more like that of the courtroom and the legislative chamber than is the traditional style. Since we claim to be training some of our students in techniques they will use in law and politics, we cannot dismiss this advantage lightly."¹³

Among its disadvantages ". . . cross-examination tends to limit the number of points that can be covered effectively. The examiner must not only spend more time developing a point but must cope with the evasive

tactics of the examinee. The result is that frequently only one point can be covered in the time that three or four points can be covered in orthodox debating."¹⁴ Moreover, Kruger continues, "... cross-examination tends to emphasize the personal conflict in debate, to provoke undesirable attitudes, and to stress showmanship instead of the academic values of debate."¹⁵ To these might be added a third observation, that cross-examination debate is significantly more difficult to master than is the standard debate form and should, therefore, be used advisedly in the training of novice debaters.

Techniques for Preparing and Conducting Cross-Examination

Fundamental to any form of academic debate is the accumulation of knowledge of the subject. Certainly this is no less true of cross-examination debating. An acute understanding of all available facts relating to the proposition and the various possible lines of argument is the inevitable prerequisite to adroit conduct of cross-examination. "No cross-examination can realize its full potential unless there has been an exhaustive pre-trial investigation of the case."¹⁶ This advice to lawyers should instruct the debater as well.

Busch points out that a clear understanding of both his own and his adversary's pleadings will aid the lawyer in charting lines of questions both for attack and defense.¹⁷ This should suggest to the debater that both his own case and that of the opponent contain materials for cross-examination. The novice debater will find the kinds and tests of evidence and argument likely to comprise such cases enumerated in any good textbook on argumentation and debate.

Having accumulated the necessary knowledge of pertinent materials, the next task for the debater is to arrange and organize those materials. Planning the purposes of the cross-examination is a first step. "There is a purpose in everything and cross-examination is no exception. . . . If you decide to cross-examine a witness you should definitely have in mind what you hope to gain by cross-examination."¹⁸ Research of the proposition enables the advocate to plot lines of inquiry by suggesting which are the most important issues. By the same token, knowledge of the important issues will aid the debater in limiting objectives, in focusing on main points. "Most cases turn upon one or two main points; always keep them clearly and prominently before the jury. . . ."¹⁹ Similarly, Fuge and Newman suggest to the debater: "He should limit the number of objectives he tries to reach; a series of at least five questions probing a single issue of the debate thoroughly and following up the leads which the witness' answers provide, is preferable to a miscellaneous assortment of questions lacking interrelations and adaption to the witness' answers."²⁰ To assure that the plotted objectives will be reached, it has been widely recommended that the advocate block out several lines of questions in advance, adapt them while the opponent is speaking to the specific case advanced, and make notes of new questions suggested by the presentation of the opposition.²¹

The planning process involves not only limiting the objectives sought but also limiting the questions asked to those whose answer the

advocate can anticipate with some degree of assurance. Cutler admonishes the advocate,

. . . the only questions you should use in cross-examination are those to which the witness can give only the answer you anticipate. . . . It is far safer to ask no question except where you are sure the answer must follow a pattern that cannot hurt your side of the case. . . . If you cannot frame such questions, refrain from asking them.²²

Cornelius vivifies the importance of planning with the following comparison: "Cross-examination is like a game of chess; you cannot hope to win it unless you understand the full value of every move."²³

What should the debater cross-examine and what should the debater not cross-examine? First, it should be quite clear that it is advisable not to cross-examine where no damage has been done to your position. Goldstein's warning to the attorney should alert the debater, too, that "any questions asked may evoke a harmful answer or may suggest to opposing counsel additional subjects to explore that will harm you."²⁴ Your audience will appreciate the fact that you have not wasted their time, and their feeling that the opposition has said nothing damaging will be confirmed in your refusal to cross-examine that which has not diminished your case.

Conversely, it is not only futile but positively harmful to attack in cross-examination those points established by the opposition which are unassailable. "Some of the points of the respondent's case will probably be so well established as to be irrefutable. An unsuccessful attack on them will merely make their strength more obvious to those who render the decision. The questioner should focus his attack on those points he can carry."²⁵ This point is roughly equivalent to Goldstein's injunction to legal practitioners: "Do not cross-examine a truthful witness."²⁶ An obvious disadvantage of attacking the strongest points of the opposing case in cross-examination is that it ". . . serves only to double the effect of the testimony by its repetition, and always holds the possibility that the witness will clarify obscurities in his previous testimony or add something to it to make it worse."²⁷

It is often a problem to determine just how to begin the cross-examination. Suggestions of authorities differ from one to the next, but perhaps it will be helpful to consider some of these suggestions. Cicero suggested that "the first rule to lay down is that the statement which we introduce as a basis for analogy ought to be of such a kind that its truth must be granted."²⁸ Fuge and Newman similarly remark that the debater "should begin with common ground on which agreement may be expected, and proceed to areas in which disagreement develops. . . ."²⁹ In any event, the important thing to remember is that "you should never hazard the important question until you have laid the foundation for it in such a way that, when confronted with the fact, the witness can neither deny nor explain it."³⁰ Goldstein suggests that the cross-examiner start "in a sort of fumbling, casual, rather purposeless

manner."³¹ The aim is to keep the questioner's purpose hidden.

Sometimes, on the other hand, it is advisable to deal the witness a stinging blow with your first few questions; this, of course, assumes that you have the material with which to do it. The advantage of putting your best point forward at the very start is two-fold. First, the jury have been listening to his direct testimony and have been forming their own impressions of him, and when you rise to cross-examine, they are keen for your first questions. If you "land one" in the first bout, it makes far more impression on the jury than if it came later on when their attention has begun to lag, and when it might only appear as a chance shot. The second, and perhaps more important, effect of scoring on the witness with the first group of questions is that it makes him afraid of you and less hostile in his subsequent answers, not knowing when you will trip him again and give him another fall.³²

Having launched into the cross-examination, the next task is to build the inquiry both logically and emotionally to a successful conclusion. For the debater, even more than for the attorney, this is a real test of adroitness and acuity, since the debater works under the relentless pressure of the clock. With few exceptions authorities agree that one of the most fundamental principles to the successful building of a line of questions is that the objective of the questioner be hidden from the witness or opponent. The ramifications of the principle are several. First, by keeping the objective hidden the witness is not so likely to evade the questioner. Moreover, damaging answers will have less effect if their full import is hidden from view.

The most cautious cross-examiner will often elicit a damaging answer. . . . If you show by your face how the answer hurt, you may lose your case by that one point alone. . . . With the really experienced trial lawyer, such answers, instead of appearing to surprise or disconcert him, will seem to come as a matter of course, and will fall perfectly flat. He will proceed with the next question as if nothing had happened, or else perhaps give the witness an incredulous smile, as if to say, "Who do you suppose would believe that for a minute?"³³

Conversely, you should make important questions seem unimportant. "When you know something or all about a subject, you act as though you know nothing about it. . . . You may want to ask ten unimportant questions for each important one. It must be pointed out that the one important question is put as though it was the least important."³⁴

Beyond keeping the objective hidden, the examiner should strive to "develop one major point at a time and not jump around from issue to issue."³⁵ At the same time, the questioner must be wary of attempts of the witness to side-track him. The aim should be to build a line of questions to a fitting climax.

The common mistake of the inexperienced is to put a question or two in which he includes all of his ammunition. The answer he received may be a weak, ineffectual return on the supposedly good point that he thought he had. The successful trial lawyer takes the same fact, but builds up that fact until it assumes unusual importance through the medium of a series of questions that lead the witness into a trap from which he is unable to extricate himself.³⁶

Still there is the danger of over-cross-examining. Attendant are the dangers of weakening by repetition, touching on the trivial, and permitting the witness "to think up something that will enable him to extricate himself from the trap."³⁷

Control of the witness is essential to the successful building of a line of questions. A number of techniques to avert evasion by the witness and to reduce the force of their testimony are relevant to this matter of controlling the respondent. First, "never ask a question why or how. This gives the witness the opportunity to dwell on everything he can think of to hurt your case, and may open the door that you will wish you had permitted to remain shut."³⁸ It is readily apparent that a question which allows the respondent to repeat a telling point from his constructive speech can only court disaster. Thus, questions calling for clarification and explanation should be carefully considered in advance for possible harmful ramifications. Only when the witness is in such a position that he or she cannot possibly offer a rational explanation should "how" or "why" queries be put. Next, "the cross-examiner should phrase his questions so clearly that there is no doubt about their meaning. He should speak distinctly and compel the examinee to do so. The cross-exam period, like the speeches, is for the audience's or judge's benefit." Finally, control of the witness may be insured by confining cross-examination "so far as it is possible to do so, to leading questions which demand a 'yes' or 'no' or other unqualified short answer."⁴⁰ "The examiner should be allowed to insist that answers be brief and to the point. He should be allowed to interrupt a long-winded answer which threatens to usurp his time, though in fairness the opposing speaker should be allowed a reasonable opportunity to explain his answers."⁴¹ Under no circumstances should the advocate argue with the witness under cross-examination. The law prevents this in American courts and common sense should prevent it in debate. The proper place for the examiner's argument is in the summary or rebuttal speech.

Before turning to the subject of concluding the cross-examination, it may be worthwhile to briefly consider the form of questions. It has been mentioned that questions which elicit a short response are desirable. Questions should be clearly stated in a positive fashion. A negatively phrased question such as "You don't hold . . . , do you?" is likely to bring a confusing rejoinder whether it be "yes" or "no." Fuge and Newman illustrate the proper form of phraseology. The debater "should phrase questions with the verb first, then the subject, and finally the object or modifying phrase, e.g., 'Do you admit that Joseph R. McCarthy is the Junior Senator from Wisconsin?'"⁴²

In concluding the cross-examination a number of possible methods are at the disposal of the debater. Debaters may point out the conclusion admitted by the respondent and relate it to the issue involved; or they may let the audience draw the conclusion; or they may let the audience draw the conclusion in the cross-examination period and later make the conclusion explicit in the summary or rebuttal speech. Further, the debater may use the technique of repeating an earlier question which in light of the respondent's intervening answers now requires a difference reply in order to preserve consistency or reasonableness. An example of this technique might be, "In view of . . . , do you still believe . . . ?" Ideally the cross-examination is ended when the respondent is in such a position that he or she cannot refuse to answer without appearing ridiculous, cannot answer as you wish without conceding your point, and cannot answer otherwise without appearing foolish or inconsistent. Having brought the respondent to such a point it is usually wise to let the audience draw their own conclusions, for to do otherwise seems merely to be kicking the witness when he or she is obviously down and beaten.

Attention should be paid to the use of appropriate style in cross-examination. In short, the criteria of directness, clearness, and terseness should be adhered to. "Directness is obtained by putting questions in leading form, which is permissible in cross-examination. Clearness is accomplished by using short, common words within the understanding of the witness. . . . Terseness is effected by avoiding repetition and unnecessary words."⁴³

As with style the delivery of the cross-examiner should conform to the same standards as apply to public address. With regard to the examiner's demeanor a few simple rules should be followed: (1) don't be ruffled, (2) avoid sarcasm, (3) don't assume a superior attitude, (4) be fair (particularly when quoting a witness), and (5) do not consult your colleague during the cross-examination period. Both questions and answers should be directed toward the audience.

Both the questioner and the respondent should bear in mind that they are not conducting a private conversation, but are asking questions and giving responses designed to have an effect upon the judge and audience. To facilitate communication with the audience, both speakers stand and face the audience during the question period.⁴⁴

Wellman sums up the qualities of the superior cross-examiner in this way:

It requires the greatest ingenuity; a habit of logical thought; clearness of perception in general; infinite patience and self-control; power to read men's minds intuitively, to judge their characters by their faces, to appreciate their motives; ability to act with force and precision; a masterful knowledge of the subject-matter itself; and extreme caution; and, above all, the instinct to discover the weak point in the witness under examination.⁴⁵

Since the cross-examiner in academic debate will also be cross-examined during the course of the encounter it is appropriate to mention briefly some guiding principles for the examinee. The following are the combined suggestions of Freeley and Kruger: (1) The respondent must bear in mind that each question is designed to destroy his or her own case or to advance the case of the opponent. Consequently the respondent must be constantly on guard. (2) The respondent must answer any reasonable question. (3) The respondent may refuse to answer an ambiguous or "loaded" question. (4) The respondent should promptly admit it if he or she does not know the answer to a question. (5) The respondent should not attempt to defend an indefensible point. It is better to yield a point immediately than to allow the questioner to wring an admission from you in a series of questions that will only fix the point more firmly in the minds of those who render the decision. (6) The respondent should answer as briefly and as directly as possible. (7) The respondent may ask that a question be clarified, or he or she may rephrase a question and ask if the examiner concurs with the rephrased version. (8) The respondent may exert some influence on the question period by slowing down his or her answers if the respondent feels he or she is being rushed. The respondent may also speed up the tempo of the cross-examination if he or she thinks the examiner is too slow in asking questions.⁴⁶

The weapon of cross-examination is a powerful one, but as Goldstein warns, it must be used with care. "Effective cross-examination will win many doubtful cases, but with improper use it can destroy the lawyer. It is truly a 'two-edged sword.' The injudicious use of cross-examination will always help to strengthen an opponent's case."⁴⁷

FOOTNOTES

¹ James H. McBath, ed., Forensics as Communication (Skokie, IL: National Textbook Co., 1975), p. 28.

² J. Stanley Gray, "The Oregon Plan of Debating," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, XII (April, 1926), 179.

³ Kenneth Hance, "The Dialectic Method in Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXV (April, 1939), 246.

⁴ Hance, p. 245.

⁵ Cicero, De Inventione, Book I, trans. H. M. Hubbell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Press, 1949), p. 93.

⁶ Hance, p. 246.

⁷ Francis X. Busch, Law and Tactics in Jury Trials (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), p. 473.

- 8 Francis L. Wellman, The Art of Cross-Examination (New York: Macmillan, 1923), p. 123.
- 9 Darrell R. Parker, "The Use of Cross-Examination in Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVIII (February, 1932), 99.
- 10 Parker, p. 98.
- 11 Parker, p. 98.
- 12 Dwight L. Freshley, "A Case for More Cross-Examination Debating," Journal of the American Forensic Association, II (January, 1965), 23.
- 13 Lloyd H. Fuge and Robert P. Newman, "Cross-Examination in Academic Debating," Speech Teacher, V (January, 1956), 66.
- 14 Arthur Kruger, Modern Debate: Its Logic and Strategy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 390.
- 15 Kruger, p. 390.
- 16 Busch, p. 508.
- 17 Busch, p. 509.
- 18 A. S. Cutler, Successful Trial Tactics (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1949), p. 15.
- 19 Asher H. Cornelius, The Cross-Examination of Witnesses, pp. 33-34.
- 20 Fuge and Newman, pp. 67-68.
- 21 Irving Goldstein, Trial Techniques (Chicago: Callaghan, 1935), p. 555; Freeley, p. 308.
- 22 Cutler, p. 121.
- 23 Cornelius, p. 39.
- 24 Goldstein, p. 358.
- 25 Freeley, pp. 308-309.
- 26 Goldstin, p. 562.
- 27 Busch, p. 528.
- 28 Cicero, p. 95.
- 29 Fuge and Newman, pp. 67-68.

- 30 Wellman, p. 105.
- 31 Goldstein, p. 335.
- 32 Wellman, p. 108.
- 33 Wellman, p. 13.
- 34 Goldstein, p. 362.
- 35 Kruger, p. 389.
- 36 Goldstein, p. 368.
- 37 Goldstein, p. 364.
- 38 Cutler, p. 121.
- 39 Kruger, p. 389.
- 40 Busch, p. 549.
- 41 Parker, pp. 100-101.
- 42 Fuge and Newman, p. 68.
- 43 Busch, p. 540.
- 44 Freeley, pp. 307-308.
- 45 Wellman, p. 8.
- 46 Freeley, p. 309 and Kruger, p. 389.
- 47 Goldstein, p. 487.

FIAT POWER: ITS USES AND LIMITATIONS

by Austin J. Freeley*

"Fiat power" is the contemporary term for an old established concept, i.e., the affirmative may argue that the proposition "should" be adopted and is not required to prove that it "would" be adopted. Thus, it is pointless for the negative to argue that public opinion or a majority of the members of Congress oppose the affirmative's proposal and that it would not be enacted. The affirmative is required only to prove that their proposal should be enacted. Indeed, it is pointless, in educational debate, for the negative to prove, even if they could, that the affirmative's proposal is unconstitutional. The affirmative may fiat the enactment of their proposal and through their fiat power amend the Consitution and enact such enabling legislation as may be necessary, provided that they prove their proposal should be enacted. The affirmative is not required to prove what will be done in the future; rather they must establish what should be done.

We must note that the negative, too, has fiat power. During the 1976-1977 academic year the nature of the national proposition lent itself to counter plans and we saw more counter plans than in any other academic year in recent history.¹ In presenting its counter plan the negative has the same fiat power as the affirmative.

The ability to fiat the enactment of a plan or counter plan is not unlimited. Central to the concept of fiat power is this constraint, ". . . they may stipulate anything for which there is a reasonable warrant or a relevant analogy."²

This modest requirement that the use of fiat power be reasonable and relevant leads us to a consideration of the limitations of fiat power. Fiat power may not be used to block legitimate negative attacks. To illustrate this point let us consider some examples of abuses of fiat power from actual debates on the current and recent national debate propositions.

I. Attitudes cannot be fiated. In certain circumstances the negative may be able to build an effective block of arguments to demonstrate that the attitudes of certain people, e.g., government officials, police officers, the general public, etc., are such that the affirmative plan, although enacted, will not, because of these attitudes, work in the way the affirmative wants it to work and thus will not produce the advantages the affirmative claims. In an apparent attempt to insure that the government officials charged with carrying out their plan would have the "right" attitude one affirmative stated that the commission would be

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"appointed by the affirmative team and their coach."³ This attempt to evade legitimate negative arguments clearly goes beyond the limitations of fiat power. Never in the history of this nation have a President and Congress deferred to the wishes of a college debate team and their coach in the appointment of members of a federal commission. The affirmative may stipulate reasonable provisions for their plan. For instance, they may stipulate that their administrative body be bipartisan or non-partisan; they may stipulate geographic representation; they may provide that members of the body be lawyers, physicians, or accountants or meet various professional standards. But the appointment and confirmation of the administrative body would be subject to the normal political process and their virtues and abilities would be equal to, but not greater than, those of similarly constituted commissions.

The same affirmative team in an apparent attempt to insure that their "right thinking" board would always have successors with the same attitude stated that "the commission will be self-perpetuating."⁴ This, too, clearly goes beyond the limitations of fiat power as there is no relevant analogy for such a stipulation. Self-perpetuating agencies do exist in the private sector, *i.e.*, the boards of trustees of some private colleges, but they do not exist in the federal government. The affirmative cannot use their fiat power to amend the Constitution to provide for a self-perpetuating board in this special case--the use of fiat power is predicated on the establishment of "a reasonable warrant or relevant analogy."

Another affirmative, debating the 1976-1977 national proposition, cited alcohol as a dangerous consumer product and sought to ban it by reinstating prohibition. Anticipating a negative workability argument, the affirmative fiat that the public would have a law abiding attitude. Of course, there is a presumption that the public will obey the law; but if the negative introduces evidence that the public is attitudinally opposed to this law and offers the reasonable analogy of widespread law breaking when this plan was tried previously the issue must be argued not fiat.

In the same plan the affirmative fiat that Congress would appropriate sufficient monies to hire sufficient numbers of law enforcement agents to make their plan work (apparently they didn't quite believe their own fiat that the public would have a law abiding attitude). The attitude of Congress to appropriate such monies is an issue to be argued not fiat. If the negative can show that Congress and their constituents oppose a particular law and point to the analogy of low funding when a similar law was tried in the past the affirmative cannot fiat away the real world--they must meet the issue head on and argue it in the debate. The affirmative may fiat their policy into existence--but fiat power ends there. Once the policy is in existence it is subject to the normal political process. It must compete with status quo programs for funding and it must bear the vicissitudes of hostile legislators and lobbyists.

II. Workability cannot be fiat. A common negative strategy is to develop a block of arguments designed to prove that the affirmative

plan will not work. Affirmative naturally try to anticipate many of these arguments and build in provisions in their plan which will defeat these negative attacks. Workability, however, is a subject for debate if the negative raises the issue and it cannot be fiated.

In debating the 1976-1977 national proposition a common affirmative case called for the federal government to mandate that manufacturers build air bags into all cars. One negative sought to use a counter plan against this case by fiating that "all 50 states mandate the wearing of seat belts at once" and claimed the advantage of saving more lives and sooner as under the affirmative's plan it would be years before all of the cars on the road would be equipped with air bags. The negative's advantage hinged on the workability of all 50 states enacting identical legislation immediately. Such a fiat is prima facie unreasonable and should be rejected out of hand. Such a proposal could be established only if the negative could provide analogies where the 50 states had enacted identical laws within a time span of months--the "at once" is totally unrealistic. A real world analogy of states enacting identical legislation may be found in the enactment of Constitutional amendments--and these infrequent enactments require the action of only two-thirds of the states and the time span for Constitutional amendments is measured in years. The 55 mile an hour speed limit law is not a useful example for the negative as it was enacted only under federal coercion and the states have demonstrated a low propensity to enforce this law.

Another affirmative, on the same proposition, using a slightly different air bag case, sought to insure the workability of their plan by fiating that their requirement for air bags would be in force in perpetuity. This was an illegitimate attempt to prevent the negative from arguing that a few years ago the seat belt interlock system had been enacted and when it proved to be unpopular public opinion forced Congress to repeal the law. Such a proposal is prima facie unreasonable and should be rejected out of hand. The affirmative plan may be fiated into existence, but once enacted the plan is subject to the normal political process and that process necessarily includes the possibility of repeal.

Sometimes the affirmative's plan requires that the persons who administer their agency have great expertise in highly specialized matters. Sometimes the negative may reasonably argue that the number of persons with the requisite expertise are few, that they are highly compensated in the private sector and thus it may be difficult to attract them to serve on the agency necessary to carry out the affirmative's plan. The affirmative may not seek to block this plan attack by fiating "munificent" salaries.⁵ Reason requires that the affirmative's hirelings be compensated on the same salary scale as other comparably situated government employees.

In this paper we have considered the use of fiat power to enact the affirmative's plan or the negative's counter plan. We have considered the limitation of fiat power--it can be used only to provide things for

which there is "a reasonable warrant or a relevant analogy." We have considered examples of the limitations of fiat power as they apply in the area of attitudes and workability. These two examples are chosen as they are the areas in which fiat power has been most abused in the 1976-1977 academic year. With another proposition we may expect that teams will attempt to fiat their way around other inconvenient counter arguments. When teams attempt to extend fiat power beyond its limitations their opponents must be alert to expose a bogus fiat and judges must hold the teams to the real world standards of reasonableness and relevancy.

FOOTNOTES

¹ The 1976-1977 national intercollegiate debate proposition is, "Resolved: That the federal government should significantly strengthen the guarantee of consumer product safety required of manufacturers."

² Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1976), p. 183.

³ Stanley G. Rives, ed., "1976 National Debate Tournament Final Debate," The Journal of the American Forensic Association, XIII (Summer, 1976), p. 2.

⁴ Rives, p. 2.

⁵ Rives, p. 2.

THE STATUS OF PRESUMPTION

by Robert Rosenthal, Raymond Yeager, and Martin Feeney*

For years, the traditionalist's position of the concept of presumption has been considered a solid foundation upon which to rest argumentation theory. Some recent theoretical stirrings have attempted to redefine this notion for modern debate practices. In light of this trend, this paper centers upon a logical progression from presumption as a fixed entity through its reformation as a dynamic theory to a final suspension of presumption for the purposes of academic debate.

Traditional Theory

In the Elements of Rhetoric, Whately presented a definition of presumption which has, in general, endured until the present.

There is a presumption in favor of every existing institution. Many of these may be susceptible of alternation for the better, but still the "Burden of Proof" lies with him who proposes an alternation; simply, on the ground that since a change is not good in itself, he who demands a change should show cause for it.¹

Traditional debate theory advocated the original Whatelian position that, "... men are not to be expected to abandon the prevailing belief till some reason is shown."² Unfortunately, traditionalists have neglected to follow the development of the theory through all of Whately's editions of the Elements. J. Michael Sproule advanced the notion that the final Whatelian position differs from that of the traditional theorist. It is not a totally fixed position, but it is a dynamic concept:

In sum, whereas Whately's presumption is audience-determined, the textbook presumption is fixed according to rules; whereas Whately's audience determined the effect of presumption through novelty and deference, textbooks prefer an orderly application of presumption by the assigned debate judge.³

Therefore in attacking traditional theory, we are not so much concerned with Bishop Whately as with the deviation from his position. In light of this, there are some basic problems with the traditional concept of presumption. First, as will be seen in the presentation of Zarefsky's views later in this paper, the presumption underlying the status quo is more than mere stability. Even the advanced Whatelian position recognizes that fact. The negative is not defending a totally static position.

Second, traditionalists suggest that because something exists, it has presumption in its favor. This approach seems to imply the value

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judgment that existence equals "goodness." Common sense tells us that existence is equal to nothing more than itself (I think, therefore I am). It relates nothing about the relative worth of the present structure; it only admits that existence "is." Aside from the numerous philosophical questions as to "isness," why must we presume that tradition, as demonstrated within the status quo, is good merely because it has survived for a period of time? Institutions must continually appraise and re-appraise their goals and functions to remain relevant; thus the concept of change is evident within the present system. If we characterize the traditional theory of presumption as rooted in stability, we must categorize the evolved Whatelian and, more recently, Zarefskian position as being fluid.

Reformation

David Zarefsky of Northwestern University attempted to update traditional theory by stating what he considered to be the three basic functions of presumption in academic debate:

First, it furnishes a rule for determining which party must initiate a controversy--namely, the party who does not have presumption. . . . A second function of presumption is to sort out the responsibilities and options of the advocate. The party lacking presumption must shoulder the burden of proof. . . . The party holding presumption must clash with the arguments of his adversary. . . . Presumption also fulfills the third function of giving to the decision-maker a principle for action in the unlikely event that he perceives conflicting arguments as balanced equally, yet must choose between them.⁴

Having justified presumption, Zarefsky directly tackled the task of critiquing traditional theory. In a retort to the argument of a static presumption, he wrote, ". . . there is no way for a theory of argumentation to choose a presumption of stability and a presumption in favor of change. Both tendencies (sic) are inherent in human nature, and who is to say which tendency (sic) is primary?"⁵

After presenting the case for both stability and change, Zarefsky defined his position on presumption. Presumption is ". . . not in favor of maintaining the present system, but against a specific resolution being made."⁶

The major consequence of the Zarefskian definition lay in its implications for the negative. In redefining presumption as being against the resolution, the negative is given an overwhelming advantage. If the affirmative team presents "Case X," then the negative may argue the universe minus "Case X" and still claim presumption. This means that the negative may counterplan--propose a massive change in the present system, which, is essentially an affirmative action, albeit non-topical--and still claim the benefit of presumption. Not only is this a double-standard, but also it is a logically indefensible position. It allows the negative to "have their cake and eat it, too." The negative may

choose to admit the inherency and significance arguments of the affirmative and then present their own extratopical solvency arguments. However, they may still maintain the presumption that, in case of a "tie," the negative should win because they have the advantage of the status quo. The burden of proof still lay with the affirmative, despite the fact that the negative has abandoned the present system for another position. This seems to be the logical progression of Zarefsky's theory. It also appears tilted in favor of the negative.

Progression: Suspend Presumption

We believe that the debate world has advanced to the point where presumption should no longer be an advantage granted to the negative. In an article entitled, "Critique of Zarefsky on Presumption," Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer present arguments questioning the justification of the theory of presumption forwarded by Zarefsky.

First dealing with the initiation of the dispute argument, they wrote that, "Clearly, the individual whose policy would not be adopted when there is no discussion, i.e., the advocate of change, has the strongest possible incentive to initiate an argument."⁷

The affirmative will still present a case in an attempt to win the debate upon the traditional arguments of Propositionality, Inherency, Significance and Solvency. If they fail to do so, they will lose.

Lichtman and Rohrer then move to the concept of presumption as assigning responsibilities and options to the debate participants:

The responsibilities of the advocates are perfectly clear under a decision rule which grants no presumption and breaks ties randomly. Each advocate knows that in order to guarantee himself the decision he must demonstrate some superiority of his policy system.⁸

Two implications result from this attack: (1) We should not keep the present system under consideration in the debate if it cannot be defended. This seems rather obvious, but flowing from this is a more important position. (2) Both the negative and the affirmative now have the burden of proof. The affirmative, per usual, must demonstrate significant inadequacies in the present system and topically provide solutions. The negative has the responsibility to prove that either the status quo or a counterplan is advantageous in relationship to the affirmative case.

The implications of traditional theory were that mere existence was enough to benefit from presumption, and the affirmative must demonstrate otherwise. Zarefskian theory expanded this view, in that presumption lay against the proposition, therefore granting the negative an enormous advantage. This liberalization leads logically to the evolutionary position advanced by Lichtman and Rohrer that both the negative and the affirmative must now justify their relative value vis à vis each other.

The third argument presented by Lichtman and Rohrer attacks presumption's place in decision theory.

This statement does not offer a positive reason to impose presumption. It simply states the fact that the presumption does act as a tie-breaker when two systems prove equally advantageous. The fact, however, does not suggest any advantage to consistently choosing the same side.⁹

The argument that presumption is necessary to break "ties" is an abdication of judicial responsibility. It allows a judge to avoid making judgments in very close, critical arguments; to call the debate a draw and then to award it to the negative. Academic debate is essentially a logical attempt to persuade the judge as to the strength of one argument in relationship to another, or a counter-argument. Giving one side of the debate an outright advantage seems quite illogical. Presumption may indeed be necessary in the courtroom, but it has no place in modern academic debate.

By suspending presumption for the purposes of tournament debate, more stress is placed upon the arguments advanced by the affirmative and negative teams. In essence we have developed a theory of justification. The fact that both sides in a dispute must now demonstrate their relative worth in relationship to each other and to what should be does not give the negative the advantages of traditional presumption, nor does it allow the negative presumption and counterplan, as does Zarefsky. If Zarefsky argued that the status quo is dynamic ("... the only thing constant is change . . ." "10") then both sides of the proposition must justify themselves.

We must suggest that it is time to change the presumption in favor of presumption.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Richard Whately, "Elements of Rhetoric," The Rhetoric of Blair, Campbell, and Whately, James L. Golden and Edward P. J. Corbett (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968), p. 344.

² Whately, p. 344.

³ J. Michael Sproule, The Psychological Burden of Proof: Or Deviations from Whately's Theory of Presumption in Modern Texts on Argumentation and Debate, unpublished paper (Speech Communication Association Convention, Dec., 1974), p. 13.

⁴ David Zarefsky, A Reformation of the Concept of Presumption, unpublished paper (Central States Speech Association Convention, April 7, 1972), pp. 1-2.

⁵ Zarefsky, p. 3.

⁶ Zarefsky, p. 4.

⁷ Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, "Critique of Zarefsky on Presumption," Proceedings: National Conference on Argumentation, eds. Trade and Luck (Texas Christian University, Aug. 4-5, 1975), p. 39.

⁸ Lichtman and Rohrer, p. 40.

⁹ Lichtman and Rohrer, p. 40.

¹⁰ Zarefsky, p. 3.

SELECTING AND DEFENDING POLICY
OPTIONS: A LINEAR MODEL FOR THE NEGATIVE SIDE

by Glen W. Clatterbuck*

The issue of inherency has been one of the least understood of the concepts in argumentation because it is one of the issues which is the most abstract and the most difficult to illustrate from public discourse. For example, if we wish to illustrate the concept of presumption, the judicial system stands as a clear model. If we wish to discuss principles relating to the cost-benefit analysis of a proposal, legislative debate can be our source. But the issue of inherency is often only implicit in any public discourse. In addition, the discussion of inherency by argumentation theorists has been fragmented and conflicting, often lacking consensus as to what phenomena are to be studied, much less how to interpret them. The emergence of a paradigm for judging and teaching debate which views the activity as a comparison of policy systems has contributed an additional layer of confusion to the difficulty with inherency. A brief history of the theoretical development of the inherency issue will set the stage for an attempt to harmonize traditional views of inherency with modern trends and theories in forensics.

Inherency is a relatively new issue in forensics, with the term being identified in its modern context around the turn of this century.¹ Roots of the inherency issue are implicit in the theory of presumption, a confusion in interpreting Whately which has not yet disappeared.² Studying the evolution of inherency, LaGrave isolated three major themes which appear in inherency theories up through 1963.³ First, inherency has been viewed as an effort to locate the causes of the problem under discussion. The position is still widely held that in order to be successful, solutions should be directed at the root cause of a problem. If multiple causes exist, then it is the responsibility of the advocate either to isolate those causes which are to be dealt with and to weigh the effect of a partial cure of the problem, or else to deal comprehensively with all potential causes.

Second, inherency has been viewed as a discussion of the permanence of the problem under discussion. Isolated occurrences or unintended effects of an existing policy are not considered justification for action to change policy. Only an inevitable and unavoidable consequence of a policy is considered serious under such analysis. But how is the phrase "inevitable and unavoidable"⁴ to be interpreted? The notion for some time was that a "structural barrier" must physically or legally preclude response to the problem, but modern theory will also accept a deep and pervasive set of individual attitudes (e.g., the profit motive among corporate managers or racial prejudice) as possible sources of persistent

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social problem. But such an analysis freezes the policies of the status quo in a given instant of time, when clearly many social systems are quite flexible in response to difficulty. Therefore, the final issue in inherency will concern itself with this capacity for internal reform.

The third aspect of inherency, as identified by LaGrave, is the capability of reform. Does the status quo have the capacity to solve the problem at hand, given suitable expansion or reform of existing practice? The assumption implicit in such an analysis was that the only legitimate comparison was between the affirmative proposal and the current policy in its optimum (i.e., reformed) state. Such analysis had the effect of using inherency arguments to minimize the potential benefits gained by adopting the plan of the affirmative in comparison with the system defended by the negative.

In practice, a broad interpretation of these inherency theories gave a range of options to the negative. They could defend the present system, at least in philosophical terms. They could propose specific expansions of the status quo as "inherent" changes. They could propose "minor repairs," or specific and often hypothetical reforms or additions to the status quo. They could even argue that the affirmative failed to "justify" the resolution, in the sense that some change other than the resolution (no matter how extensive that change) could produce the affirmative advantages. Such a justification argument could be illustrated as a "conditional counterplan," a broad outline of a counterplan which was given only partial defense, but which was asserted to produce the same advantage as the affirmative plan. The justification for adoption of any of these strategies was not clearly defined by any standard other than the criteria that the negative proposals could not be topical or otherwise adopt the resolution. The standard that the negative team could not advocate "structural change" was neatly circular, and usually reduced to the assertion that the changes proposed by the negative had to be less extensive than the changes demanded by the resolution.⁵

Modern critics of these three clusters of ideas concerning the nature of inherency have been numerous, although criticism has not by any means exterminated those viewpoints. In the first area of causal reasoning, critics have centered on the complexity of the contemporary socio-political system. Klumpp, Brock, Chesebro, and Cragan wrote in 1974 that:

The assumption of multiple causation rejects belief that one factor may be properly isolated as the cause of another. Instead, a number of conditions, all occurring simultaneously contribute to a complex causal relationship.⁶

The same authors added additional dimensions to this problem when they argued that different groups of causes may have similar effects and that multiple effects of any single causal relationship also abound. Such analysis emphasizes studying effects over causes.

In the second area of traditional inherency theory, critics are troubled by the difficulty in characterizing the nature of the status quo. Unless the underlying or core motives and values of a system are understood, it is difficult or impossible to interpret peripheral behaviors (e.g., laws, policies, and procedures) which are society's implementation of these motives.⁷ But which is more important, the law as "symbolic representations" of social priorities, or the law as an imperfect bureaucratic structure with inconsistent success in solving social problems?⁸ Either of these two critical positions, the argument that structure is less important than intent in judging the adequacy of social or the position that effects and outcomes now are an existential statement of inherency, offer less rigid analytical frameworks than traditional "structural" inherency.

The preceding two sets of criticism of traditional inherency theories flow from a view of academic debate as systems analysis, or the comparison of policy systems.⁹ A survey of coaches and guest judges at the 1974 National Debate Tournament disclosed that almost 43 percent responding characterized themselves as a "chooser of policy systems,"¹⁰ a percentage which has steadily increased over the last three years. The primary thrust of systems analysis in forensics, according to its proponents, has been to move to holistic comparison of the policy alternatives defended by each team, based on a weighing of the probability and value of each effect produced by each system. "This weighing argument displaces the [causal] inherency argument at the center of the decision making model."¹¹ The implications of the systems analysis position for the third area of traditional theory, the area of reform, has been unclear. Although the systems analysis approach should be capable of dealing with a model of present social systems which is dynamic, many judges of debates who use the systems approach strongly prefer that the negative team defend only a single policy option so that a binary comparison of policy options can take place.¹²

But the issue of inherency has not become obsolete with the rise of policy comparison as the paradigm for academic debate. Even advocates of systems theory would concede that inherency continues to have a role, if not the central role, in everyday competitive debating at all levels of forensic experience. This survival of inherency may in part be attributed to the failure of systems theorists in argumentation to translate their theoretical dismissal of inherency into active opposition to it as a practice.¹³ The survival of inherency might also be attributed to the reluctance of negative debaters to give up a position favorable to themselves in favor of the generally unfavorable systems approach where all policy systems are subject to the same standards of proof and burdens of argumentation. But perhaps most importantly, in spite of the initial appearances, inherency as an issue continues to play a vital role in the analysis of policy even in a systems paradigm.

In order to understand the continuing role of inherency in argumentation, it is necessary to update and reinterpret the traditional theoretical definitions of that concept before examining its practical application. Inherency should be viewed today as the range of policy options open to the opponent of the policy representing the resolution.

In actual decision-making discourse, the roles of advocate and opponent shift back and forth as the various aspects of the problem at hand are studied and as the various proposed solutions are scrutinized.¹⁴ In academic debate one side, the affirmative, plays the role of a particular advocate in such a dispute while the negative team is permitted to select from the remaining positions the role which is the best-matched opposition for the debate at hand. Such a decision process by the negative is not at all unlike the process by which any advocate or decision-maker screens the available options for those which are desirable. The academic debater merely articulates a process which any advocate exercises in a silent and intrapersonal process.

In a debate with a fixed topic, such as the propositions of policy used in academic debate, the position of the affirmative team as advocate of some example of that resolution is relatively clear. But how does the negative team choose its stance on the issue at hand from the remaining policy options not preempted by the affirmative? Traditional practice (as opposed to theory, which was observed earlier to be silent on this problem) treated the various types of negative position as undifferentiated groups of types. All repairs were treated as if the same standards of proof applied to each specific example. The same equal treatment was applied to any argument labeled as a defense of the status quo, as a justification argument, or as a counterplan. This rigid labeling of classes led negative teams to label arguments in such a way as to put them into the class which offered the most attractive characteristics. For example, once negative teams began to assert consistently that expansion of funding for existing programs, no matter on what scale, constituted only an expansion of the inherent capability of the present system, negative teams soon began to apply this reasoning to the expansion of any experimental social program (with billions in funding) for universal application.¹⁵ If a single state possessed a particular law, this lone precedent became grounds for a "minor repair" to induce the remaining forty-nine states to do likewise, because "minor repairs" were by definition not "structural changes" in the present policy. The only concession to policy systems analysis in these practices, in many cases, has been a limitation of the options advocated to a logically consistent combination, or what is referred to in debates as "a consistent policy system." The holistic analysis envisioned in systems analysis theory has therefore often failed to materialize.

But there is a more realistic manner of dealing with the problem of selecting negative policy options to be found within a framework which pictures policy options in terms of a linear or sequential model of policy choices. This model is more realistic in the sense that it corresponds more closely to the manner in which real policies are selected. But the model is also more realistic in that it eliminates the classification of negative policy options into groups and requires that each change be placed under scrutiny individually as well as within the confines of a policy system. Figure 1 (below) represents the distribution of the traditional groups of inherency arguments along a linear scale or continuum. The designated titles do not represent a division of the scale into equal or discrete intervals, but represent only an ordinal scale of measurement where the steps of the scale are ranked in order of




Figure 1. Linear Model of Policy Options

their difficulty or of the energy they require to implement. The least energy is required by the strategy of direct refutation or denial, where the negative advances no claims of its own, but only denies the claims of the affirmative. The scale progresses upward in energy; the expansion of the status quo is seen as more difficult than allowing an established status quo to continue its inherent functioning, but it is seen as less difficult than to scrap the entire system in favor of some counterproposal. However, no policy is arbitrarily placed within the various zones of the scale. Instead, each policy proposal is placed on the scale individually. For example, a moderately large expansion of funding for a particular social program (see Figure 2, below) would not be placed arbitrarily into a class called "inherency" or "minor repairs."




Figure 2. Example of Scale Placement of a Policy

In the same way, a negative policy can be studied as a unit and compared with other policies (see Figure 3) by using a weighted average of the number and degree of difficulty involved in each proposal. In Figure 3, policy A is clearly simpler in structure and requires less effort than B.



Figure 3. Example of Scale Comparison of Two Systems

Of course one need not utilize an actual numerical scale and compute actual weighted averages of the effort involved in the adoption of specific policies in order to utilize this linear model of inherency, any more than one must draw the arrows of a Toulmin model in order to identify warrants and conclusions in arguments when using that model. This diagram, like Toulmin's, serves foremost as a visual analogy to aid in visualizing the relationships among policies. In the same way, exact quantification of "effort" or "energy" in implementing a policy is not necessary in order to conceptualize the relationships among policies, just as cost-benefit analysis can be carried out in general or qualitative terms without the benefits of quantification. The concept of effort or energy is also broad. It may be the resources expended, the alternatives foregone, or even the psychological strain or resistance of attempting to induce changes in behavior in the face of counter attitudes. The question asked is simply how difficult, compared to other alternatives, is the proposed change?

The relationship between the linear model and either the traditional or the systems model for interpreting the outcome of individual arguments in forensics is generally consistent. Figure 4 compares the criteria which would be applied by each of these paradigms in evaluating inherency positions. Traditional theory would place presumption in opposition to the resolution and therefore in favor of existing systems. A low burden of proof would be applied to individual negative arguments in this framework. As the changes proposed by the negative system increase in number and scope, traditional theory places a greater and greater burden of proof on the negative advocate, culminating in the counterplan pole of the scale where the entire protection of presumption is lost and a negative team has a burden of proof equal to the affirmative's.




Figure 4. Comparison of Systems and Traditional Criteria for Judging Negative Policies

Analysis of different policies in systems theory depends on the probability of the future effects in the proposed system.¹⁶ Lichtman and Rohrer, after extended discussion of the decision rules used in forensics and traditional rationale for those rules, call for a presumption against uncertainty because of the risks which it imposes.¹⁷ The result of such a presumption, although systems analysis specifically refrains from granting presumption to any system under comparison, can be to favor existing policies systematically. The knowledge we have concerning existing policies is concrete, while the information we have

concerning proposed changes in policy is only theoretical. Thus in many cases we can assign greater risk to policies which are only proposed. For the negative advocate, this position means that the greater the deviation from the existing policy, the greater the risk and hence the greater the proof required to overcome that risk.

The linear model, therefore, offers a way of viewing negative policy positions which is consistent both with traditional and with systems approaches to academic debate. The fundamental premise of the linear model is the assumption that greater effort, or greater risk, is associated with greater deviation from existing policies. Such an assumption fits well with the cost-benefit analysis implicit in any comparison of policy systems. Such an assumption is also consistent with traditional analysis and its concern with the difficulty of change due to structural or attitudinal barriers. The most significant deviation of the linear model from traditional models is that it replaces the arbitrary classes of argument such as inherency or repairs with a proof requirement which is linked to the degree of change proposed. The linear model is not a formal mathematical system, nor is it a system dependent upon diagrams or other artificial aids. However, both empirical approximations and diagrams can be used as teaching aids with this model to provide students with a clearer picture of what it means to compare policies.

This analysis has not been intended to reformulate the basic theory of inherency, nor to defend either a tradition or systems approach to that issue. However, this analysis has contained the basic rationale for a system of choosing options for the negative from a pragmatic basis, recognizing the burdens of proof which will be imposed by any theoretical paradigm. This interpretation of the nature of reform also indicates that the traditional analysis of forensics and modern systems theories may not be so incompatible in practice as theory might suggest, because each system would impose equivalent proof requirements on the advocate. Such a synthesis of divergent paradigms can be of obvious utility.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Charles W. LaGrave, "Inherency: An Historical View," Advanced Debate: Readings in Theory, Practice and Teaching, ed. David Thomas (Skokie, IL: National Textbook, 1975), p. 48.

² J. Michael Sproule, "The Psychological Burden of Proof: On the Evolutionary Development of Richard Whately's Theory of Presumption," Communication Monographs, XLIII (June, 1976), 122-129.

³ LaGrave, pp. 49-50.

⁴ James O'Neill and J. H. McBurney, The Working Principles of Argument (New York: Macmillan, 1932), p. 37.

⁵ Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, Decision by Debate (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1963), p. 225.

⁶ James F. Klumpp, Bernard L. Brock, James W. Chesebro, and John F. Cragan, "Implications of a Systems Model of Analysis on Argumentation Theory," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XI (Summer, 1974), 2.

⁷ David Zarefsky, "Causation and the Analysis of Motives," paper presented at the convention of the Speech Communication Association, Houston, Texas, December 30, 1975, p. 9; and David Zarefsky is quoted in the Booklet of Judges of the 1974 National Debate Tournament as follows: "Inherency involves relating observed conditions to the core, or necessary, features of a system, rather than to its peripheral, or accidental, features. Since core features reflect motives, all inherency is ultimately attitudinal. Similarly, a change in law is not necessarily a structural change, since laws do not always define the core of a system."

⁸ Tom Goodnight, Bill Balthrop, and Donn W. Parson, "The Problem of Inherency: Strategy and Substance," Journal of the American Forensic Association, X (Spring, 1974), 231-232.

⁹ See Bernard L. Brock, James W. Chesebro, John F. Cragan, and James F. Klumpp, Public Policy Decision-Making: Systems Analysis and Comparative Advantages Debate (New York: Harper and Row, 1973) for a discussion of this model of competitive forensics.

¹⁰ J. Robert Cox, "A Study of Judging Philosophies of the Participants of the National Debate Tournament," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XI (Fall, 1974), 62.

¹¹ Klumpp, et al., p. 6.

¹² E.g., William Southworth, in National Debate Tournament, Booklet of Judges, 1977, n. pag.: "I view myself as a policy maker, because it maximizes the seventy-two minute debate process by limiting the analysis of policy options to a reasonable number--Two."

¹³ Cf. Klumpp, et al., pp. 3-7, with Brock, et al., pp. 156-157, for the mild but inconsistent antagonism between inherency and systems analysis.

¹⁴ E.g., Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), and other participants in decision-making during the 1962 Missile Crisis have commented on just such a procedure in weighing options.

¹⁵ Goodnight, et al., pp. 232-233.

¹⁶ Klumpp, et al., p. 5.

¹⁷ Allan Lichtman and Daniel Rohrer, "A Systems Approach to Pre-sumption and Burden of Proof," Advanced Debate: Readings in Theory, Practice and Teaching, ed. David Thomas (Skokie, IL: National Textbook, 1975), pp. 36-38.

IN DEFENSE OF THE STATUS QUO: STRATEGIES FOR
DEALING WITH PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE IN PUBLIC POLICY ADVOCACY

by James Benjamin*

The fundamental idea that the burden of proof rests upon an advocate who calls for change in the current system was accepted even before Richard Whately's description.¹ For example, if I seek to change the way we allocate funds in school, I bear the burden of proving that my system is better than the current method. If I fail to do so, we may presume that the current method is acceptable.

This concept could lead us to assume that a defender of the status quo (e.g., the negative side in a debate) holds an advantage because he can assume an audience, critic, or judge will side with him unless the advocate for change presents a reasonable case for change. But over the years this advantage has been eroded. Richard Weaver, a rhetorician and social critic, lamented that contemporary minds seem to be hypnotized by the fascination of change for change's sake.² We can see this in the recent concept of zero-based budgeting. Under zero-based budgeting, we are not allowed to assume that a policy works because it exists. Instead, each program must periodically justify itself or suffer extinction. The change is clear. We presume the status quo guilty of ineffectiveness until it proves its effectiveness.

We can see a similar distaste and distrust of the status quo in public advocacy training. Student debaters prefer to argue the affirmative side because they can set the subtopic, define the terms of the proposition, establish their proof and develop a plan well in advance of entering the arena. Experts, too, seem to prefer the affirmative. As one coach put it, "I hate to talk about the negative. There are too many 'ifs' involved." Indeed, there are at least seven "new" affirmative strategies, but the discussion of negative strategies seems limited to gainsaying new affirmative strategies.

My purpose here is to counter the laments by examining the strategies available to those who defend the status quo. As we shall see, the cause is not hopeless.

Before considering specific strategies, three propositions must be clearly understood.

1. Despite the current practices, the negative still retains presumption. The concept of presumption is often overlooked in practice. Defending the status quo does not mean that one is claiming that the current system is perfection incarnate. Just as a prosecutor must demonstrate guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt," so too must an advocate for

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change demonstrate that the proposed change would be a significant improvement over the status quo. Giving one indigent family \$100,000 a year would undoubtedly benefit that family, but such a proposal would not be a significant improvement over the status quo even though it is reasonable to assert that that family would now be able to afford life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. As Richard Rieke put it, the duty of the negative is not to prove "no" to a proposition but only "not yes."³ In other words, all proposed changes must withstand rigorous tests and prove themselves significant.

2. Saying it is so doesn't make it so. Those who advocate change must prove their case. A case must, of course, pass the tests of sound evidence and cogent reasoning,⁴ but there is another theoretical presumption for the defenders of the status quo: by definition all affirmative cases are hypothetical, whereas the status quo is factual. Thus, an affirmative case cannot be demonstrably proven. I am using "demonstrable" in a technical sense.⁵ Demonstration deals with those propositions which can be shown to be true. The advocate of change cannot show that the change necessarily will produce the benefits; he can only hypothesize. A defender of the status quo, on the other hand, has at his disposal the actual conduct and effect of the current policy. As an illustration of this point, consider the following situation. If you were to argue that we ought to shift our emphasis from oil exploration to research in solar energy because such a move would solve the energy crisis, you are advancing a hypothesis. You cannot demonstrate that the solar energy research would be successful because it has not been conducted; you are necessarily limited to advocating that such research is likely to produce benefits. On the other hand, I, as a defender of the status quo, can demonstrate that oil exploration has produced results in the past. Thus, negative teams should recognize that their resources are more likely to be demonstrably true and they should take full advantage of the necessarily hypothetical nature of any affirmative contention.

3. A new case is not a new strategy. Any given proposition yields a variety of possible cases. Examination of a year's debating clearly reveals that a plethora of cases stem from the single proposition. The difficulty arises when crafty affirmative debaters employ the argot of debate and mislead both the opposition and the judge. Rather than call their case a comparative advantage case, they will utilize a term like "alternative justification" which, as we shall see, does not differ in substance from a comparative advantage case. The point is that advocates speaking in defense of the status quo must look beyond the label attached to a case. Given the limitations of human ingenuity, there will be weak points in any proposed case. It is the task of the negative debater to find the holes in the affirmative case and not to be dismayed by the coverpatch of jargon.

With these principles in mind, we can consider the newly emerging affirmative cases from the negative's standpoint. In the 1976 edition of Communication, Professor Donald Klopf described "The State of the Affirmative Case" by outlining seven types of affirmative cases.⁶ The following pages take up each of these in turn and explore what can be said for the negative side. The cases to be explored are the need-plan case, the comparative advantage case, the goals-criteria case,

the effect-oriented case, the on-balance case, and the comparative need case.

I. The Need-Plan Case

For years this was the typical approach to academic debating. An affirmative case argued that some harm or harms exist in the status quo and a plan was offered which eliminated those harms.

The negative traditionally had three possible response strategies: direct refutation, defense of the status quo, or counterplan.

Direct refutation consists of countering each of the affirmative's propositions.

Since the affirmative has the burden of proof, theoretically the negative wins if it succeeds in blocking the opposing arguments. The outline of the negative in direct refutation is the same as that of the affirmative except for the insertion of not in the phrasing of each contention.⁷

Defense of the status quo is the second traditional strategy. Here the negative goes beyond sheer gainsaying of the affirmative's contentions. The negative supports the status quo by claiming benefits overlooked by the affirmative case. "Support for the status quo may be a defense of its present, precise form, a defense of it as repaired [through minor changes], or a position between these two extremes."⁸

The counterplan strategy involves accepting the affirmative's contentions for a need for change and offering a genuinely different plan for resolving those needs. Since the need for change is therefore accepted by both sides, the debate focuses on the question of which plan is better.⁹

To develop these strategies, the negative has a set of stock issues or general questions applicable to any affirmative case:¹⁰

1. Does some harm(s) result from or some desired benefit fail to result from the status quo?
2. Is the status quo, even with modification, incapable of eliminating the harm(s) or of producing the desired benefit(s)?
3. Is there a plan in keeping with the proposition that can eliminate the harm(s) or produce the desired benefit(s)?
4. Can the plan be implemented?
5. Will the advantages achieved by adopting the plan outweigh any disadvantages caused by the adoption of the plan?
6. Will the plan more effectively eliminate the harm(s) or produce the benefit(s) than any other possible policy?

Three strategies coupled with half a dozen stock questions constituted the standard negative approach to debates until a new type of affirmative case emerged in the 1960s.

II. The Comparative Advantage Case

This case quickly became popular and today constitutes the majority of affirmative case strategies. In a comparative advantage case the affirmative does not argue some significant harm is caused by the status quo. Instead, the affirmative proposes a plan which is not currently employed and seeks to prove that advantages will accrue to the plan which would not accrue to the current way of doing things. The key difference, then, is that a comparative advantage case does not argue harms but rather focuses on arguing that the proposed plan is advantageous compared to the status quo. The warrant for change stems from benefits in the new proposal rather than from correcting detrimental defects of the status quo.

The popularity of the comparative advantage case stems from the difficulty of proving real and significant damage inherently caused by the status quo. Since no harms are alleged by affirmative contentions in a comparative advantage case, the negative cannot employ a denial strategy. Since no defects (except failing to adopt the plan) are cited in the current system, the strategy of defending the status quo becomes impossible. But theorists were quick to point out new negative strategies for dealing with a comparative advantage case. David Thomas and Jerry Anderson are representative of the scholars who suggest negative strategies for comparative advantage cases. They listed four lines of analysis.

1. The negative may offer a counterplan which must be shown to be significantly different from the affirmative's plan, which must accrue all of the benefits of the affirmative's proposal and which will accrue additional benefits in the form of results, workability, or cost of implementation.
2. The negative may attack the plan in isolation either because it does not represent a genuine change from the status quo or because it has disadvantageous effects overlooked by the affirmative.
3. The negative may attack the advantages in isolation either by showing the advantages are not of positive value or by proving the advantages are not sufficiently significant to warrant changing the status quo.
4. The negative may attack the causal link between the plan and the advantages by denying the advantages will result from the plan, by demonstrating that the advantages can be obtained from the status quo, or by proving that the advantages stem not from the plan but rather from "an extrapositional plank of the plan."¹¹

III. The Goals-Criteria Case

The goals-criteria case is a recent development. Here the affirmative outlines either specific or generally accepted goals within the status quo, establishes that a plan is called for because these goals are not being met under the status quo, proposes a plan and asserts that the plan would meet the criteria established by the goals.¹² The fundamental difference between a comparative advantage case and a goal-criteria case is the reasoning. In a comparative advantage case the argument is that implementing the plan would, post hoc, accrue certain benefits; the goals-criteria case, on the other hand, reasons that goals exist, a priori but unmet by the status quo, and that meeting these goals warrants the adoption of the plan.

Because this type of case is relatively new, there exists no standard strategy for the negative. However, there are some generally agreed upon attacks.

1. The negative may offer a counterplan.
2. The negative may attack the goals.¹³
 - a. The goal is being met by the status quo.
 - b. The goal is not precluded from attainment under the status quo.
 - c. The goal is not a true goal of the status quo.
 - d. The affirmative's goal is in conflict with other more important goals.
 - e. The goal is shortsighted and will soon be replaced by a long range goal.
 - f. The goal is not a new goal and therefore the case does not propose a real change from the status quo.
3. The negative may attack the criteria.
 - a. The criteria derived from the goal are faulty because they are vague, idealistic, or do not derive from the stated goal.
 - b. The criteria are insufficient and must be supplemented by additional goals which would preclude the affirmative's proposal.¹⁴
4. The negative may attack the plan.¹⁵
 - a. The plan does not meet the criteria.
 - b. The plan is not an improvement over the status quo in meeting the criteria.
 - c. Disadvantages would result from implementing the plan.
 - d. The plan is unworkable.

So far we have outlined negative response strategies for three materially different forms of cases. The need-plan case takes its argumentative substance from some harm that exists as a result of the status quo, the comparative advantage case takes its substance from the assertion that new advantages will result from a plan, and the goals-criteria case takes its substance from pre-existing goals which serve as the

criteria and warrant for adopting the plan. Negative strategies for dealing with each of these have been outlined. The remaining four types, as we shall see, are all simply variations of these three fundamental forms.

IV. The Alternative Justification Case

The alternative justification case was described by Alan Lichtman, Charles Garvin, and Jerry Corsi in 1973 thus:

The alternative justification affirmative extends the logic of the parallel advantages case. An affirmative team employing this approach explicitly recognizes that a given proposition is sufficiently broad to encompass different policy systems. It offers in a single debate, two or more parallel affirmative plans, each of which is a legitimate, if narrow, interpretation of the debate resolution.¹⁶

Thus, the alternative justification case is structurally but not substantively different from the three previously described case forms. It relies on the same forms of analysis as described earlier but differs in that it proposes several plans each of which has unique advantages. Indeed, we might call this notion a "shotgun affirmative" for the presumption is that any one of the plans remaining after negative attack would be sufficient to carry the affirmative resolution. Just as a parallel advantages case can warrant the adoption of a policy system on the basis of any one of its advantages, the alternative justification case can warrant the adoption of the resolution on the basis of any one of its policy systems.¹⁷

Since the alternative justification approach does not differ in substance from the previous forms, the negative strategies outlined earlier are salient to this type of case. However, the structural difference does lead to unique structural duties for the negative.

1. The negative must discard the usual division of labor between the first negative speaker and the second negative speaker. Rather than having the first negative deal with needs, advantages, or goals and having the second negative focus on plan attacks, the team must be prepared to refute each of the justifications as a separate unit. So, for example, the first negative may deal with both the plan and advantages of justifications #1 and #2 while the second negative refutes justification #3.

2. The negative must seek to condense whenever possible. Rather than scattering their attention across all of the issues, it may be possible to condense the affirmative's case down to manageable proportions without misinterpreting the case.

3. The negative must provide focus. Some of the plans may require developed refutation whereas others may be dismissed relatively easily. The negative must use its available time wisely so that the more salient and persuasive attacks are given the greatest advantage in promoting the negative proposal.

4. Since theoretically the affirmative side is carried if even one of the justifications remains standing, it is necessary for the negative to touch on all of the cases. Presumably the negative's failure to do this would allow the affirmative to carry the resolution.

In meeting the alternative justification case, then, it is important that a negative team be flexible enough to adopt a structural change in their usual strategy. While the affirmative may seem to have an advantage in the sheer number of policy systems they can propose, negative speaker should realize that the affirmative is under a very restrictive time constraint; therefore, the affirmative is not likely to be able to squeeze in much support for the various plans they propose and this provides a distinct advantage to the negative speakers.

V. The Effect-Oriented Case

In Argumentation: Inquiry and Advocacy, George Ziegelemueller and Charles Dause identified another approach. They suggest that an effect-oriented case may be constructed whereby the advocate "eliminates the ills of the present system without removing the philosophical or structural cause of those ills."¹⁸ This type of case seems to be akin to a physician treating the symptoms of a disease rather than the cause of those symptoms. This sort of "stop gap" plan does not differ from a need-plan or a comparative advantage case: "The ill and blame analysis of an effect-oriented case may be developed in terms of either a traditional or a comparative advantage approach."¹⁹ Therefore, it is not substantively unique as are the need-plan, comparative advantage, or goals-criteria cases nor is it structurally unique as is the alternative justification case. It is simply a specific variety of need-plan or comparative advantage case, but one which focuses on measures to resolve specific ills within the parameters of the current policy system.

As a subtype of traditional or comparative advantage case, the negative may utilize the strategies discussed earlier, but there are some additional adaptations that may be called for.

1. The usual negative strategies and plan attacks apply, but unless a counterplan is going to be proposed, negative speakers should avoid the trap of charging that the affirmative has not gotten to the root of the problem. By saying that the affirmative is treating the symptoms not the disease, a negative speaker would give the impression that the status quo is disease ridden.

2. The negative may attack the alleged effects by arguing they do not exist or by proving they are not significant disadvantages.

3. The negative may attack causality by indicating if the effects exist, they are not the result of the cause cited by the affirmative.

4. The negative may attack on the grounds of the affirmative's failure to consider multiple causes for a single effect. For example, an affirmative speaker might advocate a monetary plan for improving the health of indigent citizens and the negative strategy might be to

point out that ill health may have multiple causes including, but not limited to, lack of health services, poor geographic distribution of health services, no possible services (as in the case of incurable disease). The negative could then go on to demonstrate that while providing money would enable a person to afford health services, it would not alleviate any of the other prevalent causes of ill health.

VI. The On-Balance Case

Ziegelmueller and Dause illustrated yet another case in their description of the "on-balance case." Here the affirmative focuses specifically on a cost factor under the status quo and argues that present policies are either unnecessary or ineffective, that the benefits of the status quo could be achieved in other, less expensive ways.²⁰ It should be evident that this type of case, like the effect-oriented case, is not really different from our three primary case strategies. Therefore, the negative strategies for dealing with a need-plan, comparative advantage, or goals-criteria case will apply to an "on-balance" case. The odd slant of the on-balance case seems to be that it advocates eliminating some policy the status quo is pursuing rather than the usual approach of advocating the status quo is failing to pursue a desirable policy.

Although there are no negative strategies specifically applicable to an on-balance case but not applicable to one of the three unique strategies, there are at least two strategies that seem to be emphasized.

1. Since the on-balance seeks to have us abandon an operant policy in the status quo, the negative will probably seek to pursue a defense of the status quo rather than a denial strategy.

2. A counterplan may be called for to reduce or eliminate the cost argument of the affirmative.

We have noted that the "effect-oriented" and "on-balance" cases are just subtypes rather than unique types of cases. The final case to be described is the comparative-need case.

VII. The Comparative-Need Case

In a comparative-need case:

the affirmative recognizes that a degree of harm exists in the status quo and though that harm is not so great as to cause immediate disastrous effects, it nevertheless exists and will continue to do so or even become a "significant" harm unless the status quo is changed. Or, the affirmative recognizes that a harm could occur in the future unless the status quo is changed.²¹

Apparently this case rests upon the premise that the status quo permits a clear and present danger even though the danger has not yet materialized in a tangible form. The rationale for change, then, is that an advantage would accrue to adopting the plan in that a danger would be avoided.

An example of this case would be advocating abandoning nuclear power plants because they are not safe even though no major disaster has occurred yet.

It should be evident that the comparative-need case is not materially different from a comparative advantage strategy. Indeed, it is a specific subtype of a comparative advantage case in which the advantages consist of avoiding a future danger rather than accruing a positive gain. As a variation of the comparative advantage case, the negative strategies described in Section II, above, directly apply to the comparative-need case.

We began with a plethora of new affirmative approaches to argumentation and debate, yet close examination of these forms reveals that there are three fundamental strategies the negative must be prepared to meet: the need-plan case, the comparative advantage case, and the goals-criteria case. The negative may additionally encounter a structurally unique case in the form of an alternative justification case. Specific strategies for dealing with these cases were outlined. The "effect-oriented," "on-balance," and comparative-need cases were seen to be subtypes of the three major case strategies.

Defenders of the status quo must face their responsibility of meeting affirmative proposals. To do so requires a thorough understanding of current policies. Defenders of the status quo must also be prepared to adapt to particular case structures by making maximum use of the strategies available. However, the matter is not as complex as it might seem for there are only three case strategies employed by those who advocate change in the status quo.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, ed. Douglas Ehninger (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), p. 112.

² Richard M. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 60.

³ Richard Rieke, "Case Construction in Debate," Directing Forensics: Debate and Contest Speaking, eds. Don Faules and Richard Rieke (Scranton, PA: International Textbook Co., 1968), p. 180.

⁴ Roy V. Wood, Strategic Debate (Skokie, IL: National Textbook Co., 1974), Chs. III and VI.

⁵ See David Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen & Co., 1966), Ch. III.

⁶ Donald Klopfer, "The State of the Affirmative Case," Communication: The Journal of the communication Association of the Pacific, IV (June, 1976), 49-70.

- 7 Wayne N. Thompson, Modern Argumentation and Debate: Principles and Practices (New York: Harper & Row, Pub., 1971), pp. 88-89.
- 8 Thompson, pp. 89-90.
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- 10 Donald Klopff and James C. McCroskey, The Elements of Debate (New York: Arco Pub. Co., 1969), pp. 80-86.
- 11 David A. Thomas and Jerry M. Anderson, "Negative Approaches to the Comparative Advantages Case," Speaker and Gavel, V (May, 1968), 153-157.
- 12 John Lewinski, Bruce R. Metzler, and Peter Settle, "The Goal Case Affirmative: An Alternative Approach to Academic Debate," The Journal of the American Forensic Association, IX (Spring, 1973), 458-463.
- 13 In the list item a, b, and c are from Lewinski, et al., p. 42, items d and e are suggested by Daniel J. O'Neill and Charles Wigley III, "Negative Approaches to the Goals Case," Advanced Debate: Readings in Theory, Practice and Teaching, ed. David A. Thomas (Skokie, IL: National Textbook Co., 1975), pp. 152-153, item f is suggested by Clark Kimball, "A Critique of the Criteria Case from a Negative View," Modern Debate Case Techniques, ed. Donald R. Terry (Skokie, IL: National Textbook co., 1970), p. 70.
- 14 Allan Lichtman and D. M. Rohrer, "The Role of the Criteria Case in the Conceptual Framework of Academic Debate," Modern Debate Case Techniques, p. 53.
- 15 Lichtman and Rohrer, p. 54.
- 16 Allan Lichtman, Charles Garvin, and Jerry Corsi, "The Alternative-Justification Affirmative: A New Case Form," Journal of the American Forensic Association, X (Fall, 1973), p. 60.
- 17 Lichtman, Garvin, and Corsi, pp. 60-61.
- 18 George W. Ziegelmuehler and Charles A. Dause, Argumentation: Inquiry and Advocacy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975), p. 166.
- 19 Ziegelmuehler and Dause, p. 166.
- 20 Ziegelmuehler and Dause, p. 166.
- 21 Ziegelmuehler and Dause, pp. 167-168.
- 22 Klopff, "The State of the Affirmative Case," p. 65.

THE EARLY DEBATES

by Otto F. Bauer*

Defending one's Alma Mater in debate is perhaps one of the most trying and least rewarded activities on the campus. No press agents seek the debater's photograph, no enthusiastic gatherings of fans practice "nine rahs" and locomotives for the big clash. He works month in and month out to perfect his knowledge of the question and his ability to put it across while all the campus is oblivious to his effort.¹

This plaintive note, which is occasionally heard on American campuses nowadays, was sounded by the Northwestern University school newspaper in 1917. But this certainly was not always the case.

On April 6, 1894, an audience of 1500 students was present in Ann Arbor, Michigan, to hear a debate between Northwestern University and the University of Michigan on whether it ought to be the policy of the federal government to bring about the annexation of The Hawaiian Islands. Excitement was intense with the audience sensing the closeness of the debate. When the decision was announced in favor of Northwestern, the audience was understandably disappointed, and the Michigan band, which had been waiting in the hall to lead the celebration, slipped away without playing. The three judges awarded 1,614 points to Northwestern and 1,610 to Michigan.²

A return engagement the following year in Evanston, Illinois, proved to be even more dramatic. The presiding officer for the debate was Adlai E. Stevenson, Vice President of the United States. Judging the debate were F. C. Winkler of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a leading member of the bar association, Chancellor Emlin McClain, Dean of the Law School of the University of Iowa, and General O. O. Howard, former head of the United States Army. The full house of spectators applauded as the contestants took the stage to debate whether the United States Government should own and control the Nicaragua Canal. Before the decision of the judges was announced, Vice President Stevenson commented that:

The interest and honor of these two great Universities are safe in the hands of those students who represented them in this debate. I am satisfied that the race of lawmakers in the country is not to die out.³

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Northwestern was awarded the decision by a score of 1,628½ to 1,539½. The audience went wild with excitement. Eight hundred or more students put on a big celebration all over the campus. There were horns, songs, speeches, marching, yells, and many other displays to praise a hard-earned victory. Incidentally, Northwestern University lost its next two debates to the University of Wisconsin and did not win another debate until 1903.

The first intercollegiate debates in the United States, however, did not occur between two university-sponsored teams. The literary and debating societies, which dominated early campus life, initiated the first contests. These societies came into existence in the colonial chartered colleges early in the eighteenth century and flourished with vigor until the middle of the nineteenth century. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the societies were virtually extinct. David Potter, in his excellent study of Debating in the Colonial Chartered Colleges, described the "tightly knit and closely regulated" life of the early students.⁴ While their schedule was not particularly strenuous, it was carefully prescribed and did not include the usual avenues of escape available to present day students. In the eighteenth century, organized athletics, "dating," or even being in the company of ladies was either not available or considered inappropriate behavior during a college session. Few, if any, contemporary books or novels were available in the college library or used in the classical curriculum.

Debating in the colonial chartered colleges was an integral part of the curriculum and public programs. As a direct carry-over from medieval-European universities, the Latin syllogistic disputation was the accepted form. This consisted of a respondent defending a proposition before a series of opponents with the outcome judged by the president of the college or the tutor. After defining and limiting the subject, all arguments were stated in strict logical format with the categorical syllogism the preferred model. Opponents denied a major or minor premise or challenged the definition of terms. The respondent answered the opponents until "truth" prevailed; the side of the question on which "truth" presided was usually predetermined by the president or the tutor. At a public program, such as a commencement, the president of the college would also exhibit his knowledge of the subject with a special presentation. All speeches were delivered in Latin. Some of the topics debated included:

Logic is the most general of all arts. Harvard, 1643, 1708.

When we apprehend, we apprehend by the mind alone. Harvard, 1689.

The end of Logic is the perfecting of human reasoning. Yale, 1718.

Rhetoric is the art of illuminating the truth fully and elegantly. Princeton, 1750.

Is it right to resist by force and arms kings who invade the rights of the People? Princeton, 1759.

The rights of the people are as divine as those of their rulers.
Brown, 1763.

All power of maintaining laws and inflicting penalties is derived from the people; therefore, for a legislative body to impose taxes upon people who are not represented in that legislature is unjust.
Brown, 1769.

An orator must be convinced himself in order to convince others.
Yale, 1793.⁵

In the latter half of the 1700's, the Latin syllogistic disputation gave way to the forensic disputation. Initially, this meant the use of English rather than Latin, but later it involved the admission of emotional proof as well as logical proof and the virtual elimination of the syllogistic form. Some of the subjects disputed were the following:

Whether any can be Saved without a Divine Revelation. Yale, 1747.

Whether the Mind is always determined to will by the greatest apparent good. Yale, 1747.

Neither Virtue nor Vice receive their proper Rewards in this life.
Princeton, 1761.

Civil Liberty is necessary to give Birth to the Arts and Sciences.
Princeton, 1766.

Whether female Academies would be beneficial. Yale, 1782.

Whether Representatives are to act according to their own Minds or the Minds of their Constituents. Yale, 1782.

That the tendency of federal governments is rather to anarchy among the members, than tyranny in the head. Harvard, 1813.

Has the reign of Napoleon been advantageous to Europe? Brown, 1823, 1826.⁶

The literary and debating societies offered the students contemporary libraries, respite from the classical curriculum, extemporaneous debating, and friendly companionship. A great deal of enthusiasm and spirit developed in the societies as evidenced in an account by Northwestern University's first school newspaper, The Tripod:

... give me the society. Its high and stormy debates quicken the intellect, ever keeping the mind on the "qui vive" for the least flaw in an opponent's argument. The eloquent and noble speeches by some of the members, whose brilliant flashes of genius cause a glow to overspread their countenance like inspiration, make a person feel out of himself--the soul is kindled, and the blood courses through the veins faster than is wont. On such occasions the pleasure is much enhanced if the seminary guarantees sufficient beauty

to relieve the monotony of the view for those who participate in the exercises. The presence of ladies spurs with enthusiasm the most logy, and causes the heart of the nervous, excitable one to jump and palpitate with an everincreasing sensation of dread, doubt and delight.⁷

Because the literary societies were virtually the only campus activity, it was quite necessary for their programs to include more than debating. A typical meeting would begin with some kind of music, followed by an oration, a debate, sometimes a humorous reading, and another oration. After the program the societies usually held a brief sociable. Whenever an audience was invited, the school newspaper could always be depended upon to give a critique, not only of the debaters, but the music as well. Sometimes the comments were complimentary:

Miss Clara Willard, of Highland Park, next sang a charming solo. She has a sweet voice, and warbles like the feathered choristers of the wild-wood.⁸

But there were other times when the remarks were very uncomplimentary:

The music was furnished, we understand, by Nevins, and was about as poor as it well could be. In execution, and especially in the selections, it was simply execrable.⁹

Five exaggerated Teutons fiddled and blew and got red in the face when the programme called for music.¹⁰

In November, 1872, the Hinman and Adelpic Societies of Northwestern University held a joint literary and social meeting, but the evening had an unexpected outcome:

The chapel was filled at an early hour, although no invitation had been extended to the public. . . .

At the close of the literary exercises of the joint meeting of the societies, the chairman announced that a sociable would be held in the society rooms, and most of the audience availed themselves of the opportunity for enjoyment.

On arriving at the rooms some of the society members were surprised to find the floors cleared, and everything arranged for a dance. In less than no time the requisite number of couples were in their places, crowding everyone else to the wall, and running the machine according to their own sweet wills. Now we do not intend to enter into a long-winded discussion of the immoral qualities of the foolish amusement. We will grant that it was perfectly right in itself; but this much we will say--for a vapid, conceited few to turn the hall of a debating society into a ball-room, to pound their piano and grind their carpet, and that, too, during a sociable which followed a meeting to which the public was not invited, was conduct which could not have been expected from persons calling themselves ladies and gentlemen. It must be remembered that this

was done in the presence of the society members; and the dancers knew very well that fully three-fourths of those members were opposed to dancing from principle. For the society men who engaged in this ungentlemanly proceeding there can be no excuse. They cannot have forgotten the expression of the Adelpic society when their room was turned into a dancing-hall last year.

Let the town's-people remember, that when we invite them to a sociable we don't mean ball; and let no four or five men think, hereafter, that they can presume, on their "cheek," to act in direct opposition to the expressed will of the rest of the students, in a matter of this kind.¹¹

Some of the topics debated in the societies were:

Is matrimony advantageous to Men of learning. Athenian Society, Rutgers, 1782.

That a Rural Life was more agreeable than a City Life. Athenian Society, Rutgers, 1782.

Are virtue and happiness always connected? Clisophic Society, Princeton, 1812.

Ought Debtors to be imprisoned at the will of the Creditor. Linonian Society, Yale, 1813-14.

Has the revolt of the colonies been upon the Whole Beneficial. Linonian Society, Yale, 1813-14.

Would a repeal of the union with England be beneficial to Ireland. Philolixian Society, Columbia, 1832.

Ought women to enjoy the rights of citizenship? Linonian Society, Princeton, 1864.

Resolved, that Church property ought to be taxed. Clisophic Society, Princeton, 1875.

Resolved, that the purchase of Alaska by the U.S. was an unprofitable investment. Clisophic Society, Princeton, 1885.¹²

Before the literary and debating societies yielded to the encroachment of social fraternities, intercollegiate athletics, and university control of debating teams, they initiated a series of intercollegiate debating contests.

To the best of my knowledge, the first intercollegiate debate occurred in Evanston, Illinois, on November 29, 1872, between the Adelpic Society of Northwestern University and the Athanaeum Society of Chicago University.¹³ The "Chicago University" referred to is the old Chicago University which was opened in 1858 and closed in 1886.¹⁴ Here is a thorough account of this early debate:

The discussion of the tariff question by the Adelpic Society of the Northwestern University and the Athanaeum Society of the Chicago University, occurred at Lyon's Hall, in this place, November 29th. It is not usual that a discussion of this kind calls out so large an audience as was present on this occasion. The hall was completely filled by an attentive audience--a fact which rendered the speaking enthusiastic and entertaining, and enabled each speaker to do "his level best." The debate was not a contest, but merely a friendly meeting between the two societies. The meeting was presided over by Mr. Parks, of the Adelpic, and some excellent music was furnished by Misses Mattison, Lathrop, and Perry, and Messrs. Iott and Dorsey. . . . The meeting, on the whole, was a very pleasant one, and the audience was quiet and attentive. We hope that it will serve to continue and strengthen the good feeling which has ever existed between the students of the universities. It is a source of satisfaction for the members of one college to measure intellects with those of another, and compare their attainments with those possessed by others. We have no reason to feel humiliated by the comparison, nor to estimate less highly our friends from a sister institution.¹⁵

Representing Northwestern on the affirmative were Mr. McClish, Mr. Stout, and Mr. Martin, and the opposing Chicago debaters were Mr. Clendenning, Mr. Olson, and Mr. Ingham.

The first debate was just the beginning of intercollegiate society debating for Northwestern and Chicago. The second one took place in Evanston between the Hirman Society of Northwestern and the Tri Kappa Society of Chicago on October 10, 1873. This was another friendly contest in which "the decision as to excellency was to rest with each individual auditor." The proposition debated was "Resolved, that a monarchical form of government would be better for France than a Republican form."¹⁶

These four societies participated in a series of debates from 1872-1877. On May 1, 1874, they culminated the year with a joint meeting of all four societies. Each society brought to the meeting one orator, one debater, and a piece of music. The debaters discussed a proposition that is still of much interest today: "Should capital punishment be abolished?"¹⁷

Several of the early debates in which other institutions participated were the following:

May 5, 1881--Phi Alpha Society of Illinois College vs. Adelpic Society of Knox College at Illinois College. Phi Alpha winning.¹⁸

May 6, 1881--Peithessophian Society of Rutgers vs. Philomathean Society of New York Univeristy at New Jersey. Peithessophian winning.¹⁹

March 18, 1887--Peithessophian Society of Rutgers vs. Philomathean Society of New York Univeristy at New Jersey. Philomathean winning.²⁰

January 14, 1892--Harvard vs. Yale at Cambridge. Non-decision.²¹

March 25, 1892--Harvard vs. Yale at New Haven. Non-decision.²²

Actually, it was the Harvard-Yale debates that dramatized the activity and facilitated its spread throughout the United States. Today it is quite common for a debater to travel thousands of miles and to participate in 50-100 rounds of intercollegiate debate annually. Both classroom debating and intercollegiate competition continue to help the student develop the ability to investigate and analyze important public questions, evaluate evidence and reasoning, organize effective argumentative cases, and present arguments in an extemporaneous manner. The early debates were an important antecedent to the present objectives and activities of academic debate.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ Daily Northwestern (Evanston), January 13, 1917, p. 2.
- ² The Northwestern (Evanston), February 7, 1894, p. 6 and April 11, 1894, p. 1.
- ³ Ibid., May 2, 1895, p. 2.
- ⁴ David Potter, Debating in the Colonial Chartered Colleges (New York: Columbia University, 1944), pp. 64-65.
- ⁵ Ibid., pp. 16-23.
- ⁶ Ibid., pp. 44-53.
- ⁷ The Tripod (Evanston), January, 1871, p. 7.
- ⁸ Ibid., June 20, 1872, p. 71.
- ⁹ Ibid., February, 1878, p. 22.
- ¹⁰ The Vidette (Evanston), February 1, 1878, p. 14.
- ¹¹ The Tripod, November 20, 1872, p. 107.
- ¹² Potter, pp. 77-89.
- ¹³ The Tripod, December 20, 1872, p. 118.
- ¹⁴ Thomas Wakefield Goodspeed, A History of the University of Chicago (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1916), p. 17.
- ¹⁵ The Tripod, December 20, 1872, p. 118.

- 16 Ibid., October, 1873, p. 97.
- 17 Ibid., March 26, 1874, p. 33.
- 18 C. H. Rammeikamp, Illinois College; Century History, 1829-1929
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928), pp. 278-279.
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DEBATE SURVIVES FIFTY YEARS ON THE TOURNAMENT CIRCUIT

by Larry Norton*

How and why debate has survived and something about its present condition is the focus of my attention as I look back on fifty years of publications and personal involvement in forensics. The tournament age began in 1923 when Southwestern College of Winfield, Kansas held the first invitational debate tournament.¹ Fourteen colleges from Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas participated. The number, size and complexity of tournaments increased rapidly in the next few years, spreading throughout the country. In 1926, Pi Kappa Delta held the first National Debate Tournament in Estes Park, Colorado.²

Debate relied upon its traditional strength to endure the criticism and the obstacles of recent years. It had its roots well established in the disputations of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. The disputations, which closely resembled modern debate in form, developed from the scholastic debates which, in turn, were influenced by the works of Plato and Aristotle.³ This tradition was carried on in the literary societies of American colleges and universities, especially in the most prestigious schools. It manifested itself in the first modern inter-collegiate debate held between Yale and Harvard universities at Cambridge, January 14, 1892, with a former Governor of Massachusetts serving as the presiding officer.⁴

Dual debates increased and many developed into annual rivalries which helped to stimulate interest in the activity. Then came the triangular, quadrangular, and pentagonal arrangements. Cost became a factor with longer trips and the necessity of hiring judges. In the early part of the century the debate coach replaced the student director and with faculty supervision and training, argumentation and debate classes were formed. Speech departments came into being and educators continued to respect debate. Credit for intercollegiate activity added to academic acceptance. The forensic honor societies were formed for the purpose of giving additional and lasting recognition to those who were praised as the "best and the brightest." Delta Sigma Rho was the first to be formed, in 1906. Tau Kappa Alpha followed in 1908 and Pi Kappa Delta in 1913. Soon, each started publishing articles and information which helped to stimulate interest in debate. But even as this development was taking place, the problems of financial support, selection of judges, criteria for judging, small audiences and the emphasis on winning became the object of critical attacks.

Therefore, in 1923, when debaters set out for their first debate tournament, the heritage of a noble past went with them as well as a

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significant amount of growing doubt and criticism. Those who continued to support debate hailed the tournament idea as a new stimulus and revitalizing force in forensics. E. R. Nichols expressed it this way: "The most significant development in contest debating and the one most likely to perpetuate it in the face of all attack from debate theorists and critics and from non-decision practice is the debate tournament."⁵

The movement toward tournament debate received a major impetus from the declining audience. In 1925, Raymond Howes reported that the days of packed halls were over and that "only on rare occasions, such as contests with Oxford and Cambridge, do audiences, at least in this part of the country (Eastern states) reach similar (packed hall) proportions."⁶ His answer, like that of E. D. Schonberger, five years later, was to go off campus to the civic clubs because, "We must have an audience, if the participants are to receive full value out of the exercise."⁷ For several decades many coaches continued to look for audiences in the community. They also found a few on campus by requiring speech students to attend.

A major criticism of debate, long before the advent of the tournament, was directed at the decision. The quality of judging, criteria for evaluation and the philosophy of the decision contest itself were prime targets of educators and debate coaches from the time that intercollegiate debates became popular. One attempt to avoid this problem was the experimentation with non-decision debating. Records indicate that the first non-decision debate was held in Ohio in the year 1914-15. A 1916 survey by J. R. Pelsma reported that 32% of the schools replying indicated that judges were not essential to a debate.⁸ A survey by Mildred Berry in 1928 shows that one-third of the colleges in the Midwest Debate Conference used the no-decision open-forum type of debating the most frequently.⁹ Debates without decisions were common during the twenties and thirties in an attempt to place the emphasis on the debate and not on the decision. However, those who looked upon debate as a game were not satisfied with a no-win conclusion. Newspapers were likewise exerting pressure to report a winner.

The question of whether debate was a game or an educational experience arose early in the history of intercollegiate competition. As the activity expanded, the issue was debated over and over again in the literature. By the mid-thirties the number of tournaments, teams and annual debates per team had reached startling proportions. In 1933, Arleigh B. Williamson, past president of the Speech Association of America, spoke out, not against the virtues of debate, but in favor of intercollegiate forums in order to eliminate some of the extreme contentiousness in speaking. His position, as stated at this time, was representative of a significant number of speech educators:

The fault here, if it be a fault, which renders debate too generally socially inarticulate and ineffective, is not due to the coaches or the debaters, but rather to the essential nature of formal debate. . . . Generally speaking intercollegiate debate is essentially a game; its purpose is contest. The speakers are playing a game against their opponents, and are not primarily concerned with

influencing their audience, unless, in the case of audience-decision debate, their effort is to get the audience to decide on the winner of the game. Even the "no decision" debate, founded as it is on the traditional method of debating, becomes an anomaly, a game without a winner.¹⁰

A year later, Alfred Westfall expressed one of the few, if not the only justification ever made for the increasing number of debates on the same proposition:

Something may be said in defense of tournament practice of repeated debates on the same question. They lead to final perfection. This repetition is in line with the practice of later life. The doctor, by performing the same operation time after time, perfects his technique. The lawyer handles the same type of case time after time. The banker passes on the same type of security in loan after loan.¹¹

The number of debates per individual debater during one season was steadily increasing and as the star system developed in many colleges, speech educators became concerned. What values can be acquired by forty debates a year that can't be obtained by half that number is a question which remains unanswered today.

The criticism of debate during the first two decades of tournament activity was softened somewhat by continued experimentation with a variety of forms and procedures. The critic judge and the audience decision were early innovations. Debaters were judging each other in the thirties. American debaters attempted--without too much success--to imitate the style of the British debaters in audience situations. Variations of the forum debate were practiced to add variety and interest for the decreasing numbers attending audience debates. The debate format which attracted the most favorable attention, other than the orthodox or standard form, was the cross-examination or Oregon Plan as it was first described by J. Stanley Gray of the University of Oregon in 1926.¹² It was designed, according to Gray, "to get away from the decision debate and its attending evils." Today the cross-examination form has replaced the standard form in the major tournaments on both high school and college levels. However, the decision and the critic judge remain essential to the debate.

In 1934, Dayton McKean summarized the attitude of those who had observed a decade of tournament debating: "It is remarkable, in view of the attacks that have persistently been made upon debate, that it has survived as long as it has in American schools and colleges."¹³

The honor societies continued to exert an encouraging and stabilizing effect on debate. They not only conferred honors for achievement but they stimulated forensic activity in events other than debate. They sponsored speakers' bureaus as well as campus and community forums and discussions. Pi Kappa Delta, through its national and province convention-tournaments has always encouraged students to balance their forensic education by participating in more than one type of speech activity. Local chapter sponsors have attempted to follow through with this

philosophy. A significant step in this direction was made by Delta Sigma Rho in 1939 when it held the first national Student Congress in Washington, D.C. with nearly 150 persons in attendance. In the same year Tau Kappa Alpha organized the Forensic Experience Progression in Contest Form. The honor organizations were influential by encouraging ethical behavior in oral communication.

Travel restrictions, during World War II, returned much of the speech activity to the campus and the local area. There were fewer students participating but the change of pace was realistically refreshing. With the end of the war and restrictions lifted, all the pent-up enthusiasm burst forth with renewed vigor. The most significant development was the inauguration of the West Point National Debate Tournament in 1947. This was a natural result of the times which included expansion of the size and number of tournaments. The elimination and qualifying contests which became a part of the selection procedure added to the competitive aspect of debate and was to have far reaching effects on the nature of tournaments and on the attitudes toward debate.

In this same period, leading into the fifties, the honorary fraternities were supplementing the debate competition with the Student Congress and Discussion at the intercollegiate level. Pi Kappa Delta replaced its Legislative Assembly with the discussion event at the 1947 biennial convention and has continued this activity to the present time. Delta Sigma Rho resumed its Student Congress in this same year, after time out for war. Tau Kappa Alpha had added other speech events in 1946 and continued to hold annual conventions. Extemporaneous speaking and oratory, in which many debaters participated, continued to be popular contest activities.

A long smouldering and often erupting criticism of debate was the rapid and non-communicative delivery. Coaches were becoming more and more concerned about this aspect of debate, not so much in their role as a critic judge, but in their position as defender of the values of debate to their academic colleagues, especially those in the speech departments. In January 1952, E. C. Buehler, President of Delta Sigma Rho, wrote a detailed criticism of the debaters' delivery.¹⁴ He described the speaking manner of the debater as stilted and stamped by a stylized formality, as abnormally rapid in rate, suffering from high tension vocalization, often marked by an imposing, dogmatic and aggressive manner, and generally exhibiting a poor or inadequate concept of effective oral communication. He offered these four terse suggestions for improvement in delivery: "Get the communicative spirit. Be genuine. Speak with enthusiasm. Be human." How obvious it is that these remarks are much more pertinent today.

It is easy for many of us to identify with Robert Friedman, who, after years of active work in debate, discovered that he was an "incompetent judge."¹⁵ He states that five and a half years had elapsed since he directed a university debate program and now he cannot understand enough of what is being said to make a judgment. He suggests that tournament debate might be improved by using more "incompetent judges," that is, those who will demand a reasonable rate, an explanation of

technical terms, respectful behavior on the part of debaters and a sincere desire to communicate. At the 1975 Pi Kappa Delta national convention the students, taking a lesson from the policy of the National Debate Tournament, recommended that a rule be adopted requiring that all debate judges must have judged a minimum of ten debates on the national question to become eligible to judge in the national convention-tournament. The rule was not adopted.

The Forensic Calendar of the American Forensic Association for 1956-57 lists tournaments from the first week in October until early in May. A survey of the 1962-63 speech tournaments by Donald Klopff indicated that at least 210 intercollegiate tournaments were held that year, extending from October 1 to May 26.¹⁶ With the movement to the long season came the demand for the broader debate proposition and multiple (related or unrelated) topics so that debaters would not exhaust or become indifferent to a given subject. Some of the smaller colleges with limited instructional personnel and a small budget were at a disadvantage. Unless they could be prepared for the early tournaments and continue traveling frequently, with their best debaters, they became lost in the chase. This problem increased until more and more schools without the financial means and/or the desire for highly competitive programs decided to give up the "game." The rich grew richer and the poor were all but eliminated at the October starting line.

With the broader topic, designed to last for nine months, the natural consequence was an additional speed-up in delivery and an even greater use of jargon and abbreviation to enable debaters to present more material in the same amount of time. Quality gave way to quantity. With a broad subject, teams experimented with more surprise cases, squirrel cases and a variety of affirmative approaches, most of which had the tendency to avoid establishing inherency and thereby inviting the negative to watch for a prima facie case and to question topicality.¹⁷

New responses were now being made to the established principles of effective communication. A new public morality was developing which invited problems of unethical practices. In answer to these situations, codes of ethics were produced and rules committees were appointed to receive complaints arising during the course of a given tournament. A set of standards for tournament directors, judges, coaches and participants was adopted by the American Forensic Association on December 28, 1967.¹⁸ A 1974 revision of standards adopted in 1971 by the Professional Relations Committee was published in the Fall of 1976.¹⁹ This is a hard hitting effort to control the evils of tournament debate as expressed in so much of the literature of the last decade. As necessary as these standards appear to be, they can serve only as a stop-gap until the causes of such behavior can be brought under control. The legislation of moral and ethical behavior had its limitations and its dangers.

The broad and multiple topics also stimulated increased demand for debate materials. Supply attempts to meet demand and so quantity preparation and production were made more easily accessible to debaters. Of course the use of some professionally prepared debate materials far outdates the tournament--by about twenty years. The H. W. Wilson Co.

Inc., evolved the first debate handbook in Minneapolis in 1903.²⁰ The long season, the early start, the many long week-end tournaments, the need to catch up with class work and the increased incentive to win or at least make the octafinals, resulted in a deemphasis on research by debaters. Thus another traditional value of debate was opened for renewed attack.

On the tournament scene, debate had held the spotlight continuously. However, other events such as oratory, extempore speaking and discussion had complemented the debate program for many years. They offered debaters an opportunity to participate in one or more other events, requiring different skills. Some coaches insisted that debaters participate in at least one other event. For many years the author presented "four star awards" at the end of the season to those students who had made significant contributions in at least four different competitive activities. In the sixties many additional events were gaining in popularity. During the 1962-63 year, twenty-three different individual events were to be found in tournaments.²¹ Klopff reported that approximately thirty-five percent of the nations' intercollegiate speech tournaments included contests in individual events that year. A few of the activities sharing the debaters' spotlight were: after-dinner speaking, radio, television, interpretation, impromptu, salemanship, listening and interviews. With interest developing in these contests, debaters were participating less in individual speaking events.

In 1967 the National Debate Tournament decided not to return to West Point but to seek a host elsewhere. Some revisions in team selection procedures were undertaken. The significance of this move was that the idea of a national tournament for debate only, with a highly competitive selection format designed to produce one national winner was to remain as the image of supremacy in debate.

In this same year, 1967, John Gow summarized the views of many speech educators and coaches who still wanted to believe in the values of debate but were unable to justify its behavior.²² "Basic to tournament debating is the contest or game, which differs noticeably from real-life experience. This does not mean, of course, that contests are devoid of value." He goes on to quote Douglas Ehninger as saying, in 1958:

The plain fact of the matter, it seems to me, is that anything that can be taught by playing debating as a game can be taught, and taught better, by practicing it as a mode of "real life" oral discourse; and, in addition practicing it in this way will make a far greater contribution to the total development of the students who participate in it and to the salvation of the society in which they live.²³

Lester Thonssen wrote in 1939, "I do not believe that debating is a game. But if anyone makes it such, then it is up to us to watch it closely. For it becomes a game which it is, unfortunately, easy to play unfairly."²⁴ In 1968 John P. Swinney reports on a study pertaining to comprehension of tournament debate speeches and among his conclusions

is the statement: "The practice of tournament debate continues to give comfort to those who would eliminate it."²⁵

Robert Kully sums up what has to be the most serious problem facing debate as it moves into the seventies, that is, loss of support by speech communication scholars and teachers. Referring to the late sixties, he writes,

Not only has the relationship between speech communication and forensics cooled considerably during the past few years, but it will continue to deteriorate because: (1) there appears to be limited academic connection between the practice of forensics and the theory of and the academic courses in speech communication, (2) the apparent lack of academic relationship has led many academicians in speech communication to become alienated toward forensics as an intellectual field of study, (3) the discipline of speech communication is moving in a direction which will widen the split with forensics even more, and (4) many forensic coaches encourage an "isolated" forensic community and seem to discourage a close academic relationship with speech as a field of study and with speech communication scholars and teachers.²⁶

This point of view has been repeated in speech journals by an increasing number of scholars. Larry Ehrlich wrote in 1972, "Contemporary research has helped to support the thesis that interscholastic and intercollegiate debate have perverted an admirable heritage."²⁷ In looking toward the future he stated: "The future of the fraternity of the debate coach appears bleak."

No wonder debate was on the defensive as it entered the seventies. It continued to become more isolated from life experiences. But it was not neglected by critics or friends. Fortunately the two were often combined in one. The Western Conference on Forensics met in May of 1971 at California State College, Fullerton. Here it recommended that a national developmental conference in forensics "be convened for the purpose of exploring ways to improve forensic education as an academic resource for the American educational community."²⁸ In December 1971, the American Forensic Association, Speech Communication Association, and forensic honorary organizations endorsed the concept of a national conference on forensics. Plans were immediately underway leading to a National Task Force Assembly at Sedalia Retreat House near Denver, Colorado in September, 1974. Four years after the conference was first proposed, a full and final report was published.

In the interim, strong voices continued to be heard in constructive criticism. Trends having an adverse influence on the image of debate continued to develop. Communication departments moved farther away from forensic practice in their educational philosophy. The "recognized tournaments" moved in the direction of debate competition only. Individual events drew more participants to the "unrecognized tournaments." Thus debaters continued to broaden the gap between themselves and other forensic participants. In 1971-72 the number of students qualifying for membership in Pi Kappa Delta by participation in individual events

was nearly as large as those qualifying in debate. It was a trend which had been developing since the early sixties with notable acceleration starting in the academic year 1969-70. More colleges were switching emphasis from the lone weekends of twelve debate rounds, and all that was involved, to other events, or they were dropping the inter-collegiate program entirely. Some church affiliated colleges were among those discouraged by the practice of holding elimination rounds on Sunday.

Why it was necessary to add more rounds and extend tournaments into Sunday has never been fully understood by many. Supposedly, the movement from the four round tournament of the forties and fifties to the six and eight preliminary rounds of today was to increase chances that the best team would be the winner. A study of selected 1971-72 tournaments conducted by Kemp and Marr attempted to determine whether eight preliminary rounds would be more accurate than six in picking the best team to win.²⁹ They concluded, "That two additional rounds may allow for more merriment is not in question; that two additional rounds make a difference as to the eventual winner of the tournament and thus a rationale for those rounds cannot be supported by the data collected." Perhaps more research on this subject would indicate even fewer rounds were necessary to select a winner. But like the mountain you climbed because it was there, once at the tournament site, the more words the greater the achievement.

In the early tournament years it has been noted that considerable experimentation was carried on with different forms and procedures. Many innovations have been suggested in recent times but comparatively few of these ideas have been given a good trial. Harris and Smith, referring to the rigid tournament procedures, note that in the 1971-72 season 81 percent of debate tournaments offered the orthodox format.³⁰ It is probable that several of these also included at least one division of another format such as cross-examination. These authors suggest:

. . . that tournament directors determine their objective for their tournament and advertise it to the debate community. This assumes that once directors reflect on the objective they offer to the system, some will see the shortsightedness of 81 percent of the tournaments in the country using the same format. . . . Without the change of perspective by the tournament directors within the closing system of the orthodox tournament, there can be no change.

They quote Marshall McLuhan when he states: "We shape our tools then our tools shape us." The writers conclude: "Debate once shaped a tool to help satisfy the ideal goals of debate. The tool has been shaping debate almost ever since. The value of that tool is still there and should be retained. However, supplemental tools are needed to help achieve the goals of debate." A similar attack is made on the orthodox format by Brock and Fieldman.³¹ They present the suggestion of a case comparison format for eliminating some of the undesirable practices related to the structure of the traditional format. Making use of the

current practice of preparation time, they recommend a five minute conference period following the first two constructive speeches. This is followed by six rebuttal speeches beginning with a five minute negative. Then each team has a ten minute speech. The debate concludes with three five minute speeches for a total time of sixty-five minutes.

One of the most thorough evaluative summaries of present debate practices and criticisms, together with suggestions for improvement, has been presented by J. Michael Sproule.³² His discussion of objectives and performance evaluation is centered around the debate tournament. He leaves the door wide open for non-tournament debate experiences and states that: "It is possible that once performance outputs were established, debate practitioners and teachers might discover that the objectives of good debating could be equally well or better attained via non-tournament experiences."

In July, 1975, the full report of the National Developmental conference on Forensics was published.³³ The range of recommendations is broad, the list is long. It includes position papers on and responses to goals and roles, theory and practice, research and scholarship, professional preparation, status and rewards for forensic directors. In reviewing the report, Roger Nebergall writes, "This book is an ambitious effort to conceptualize forensic activities as they presently exist, to articulate a coherent rationale for them and to propose a series of guidelines to define their future."³⁴

The report is a major scholarly production by outstanding forensic educators. If some of the recommendations could and would be implemented, the goals of many critics would be achieved. Implementation is left to the directors of forensics, encouraged by the American Forensic Association, the Speech Associations and the honorary organizations. The tournament remains as the core of the forensic program and those who believe it has inherent weaknesses as a tool for teaching argumentation will expect more than minor changes. Annabel Hagood states, in her position paper which is part of the report (p. 104): "While agreeing that the tournament should be augmented by a variety of forensic experiences, I perceive no viable substitute for the debate tournament. The problems we experience with tournament debating seem to result from the ways in which we use the tournament rather than the tournament itself." We have to agree with Nebergall when he reminds us, in his review of the report, that debate tournaments are not "required" as a laboratory for the teaching of argumentation anymore than were the literary societies. Fifty years ago we did not perceive a substitute for inter-society debates and argumentation and debate classes as a way of learning theory and skills of argumentation.

Through the ingenuity of a new generation of academically oriented forensic directors, we may learn to use the tournament to achieve results acceptable to educators and scholars in the academic environment where debate really belongs. When that time arrives, the label "tournament" may no longer be appropriate to describe what is taking place. In the meantime, debate needs all possible help to break out of its isolated retreat and to develop a new perspective.

This is what I read and listen to as I watch debate surviving, but very confused and confusing, after fifty years on the tournament circuit. Perhaps this is what a past president of the Speech Association of America, a past president of Delta Sigma Rho and my graduate adviser was saying years ago: "Courses in argumentation, properly taught, and contest debating, properly conducted, provide valuable training for leadership in our society."³⁵

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THE AMERICAN NATIONAL DEBATE TOURNAMENT

by Stanley G. Rives*

On April 18 of this year Georgetown University debated the University of Southern California in the final round of the 31st Annual National Debate Tournament (NDT) at Southwest Missouri State University with the result that the debate team from Georgetown was awarded a trophy symbolic of the national intercollegiate debate championship of the United States. The purposes here are to describe briefly the history and character of the American National Debate Tournament, to explore the strengths of and concerns about a national championship tournament, and to comment very briefly upon the worthwhileness of this competitive tournament model for other nations. The commentary is from my experience and perspectives as a student participant in the NDT, as a former director of forensics coaching debate teams which participated in the tournament, as a member at times of both the National Debate Tournament Committee and Board of Trustees for the NDT, as the Tournament Director for the 1967 NDT, and, for the past decade, as editor of the published transcripts of the final round debates which appear annually in the Journal of the American Forensic Association.

History and Character of NDT

The National Debate Tournament began at the United States Military Academy (West Point, New York) in 1947. Debate teams from 29 colleges participated in five preliminary rounds followed by four elimination rounds--all over a three-day period in the initial tournament. Though the number of participating teams and the number of debate rounds have expanded over the years, the basic structure of the tournament has remained: a series of preliminary rounds in which all teams participate to reduce the total number of participating teams to sixteen to allow for a direct elimination sequence of octafinal, quarterfinal, semifinal, and final rounds culminating in the national championship. West Point cadets hosted and operated the NDT for its first twenty years with considerable advice and counsel from members of the forensic speech-communication community. In the early days, debaters took room and board with cadets in their barracks. Women were never excluded from the tournament, but few participated in the early years.

In 1967, the American Forensic Association assumed responsibility for the NDT and the tournament location was moved to the University of Chicago. This change resulted from reduced military budgets and from the feeling of Military Academy personnel that the tournament had matured to the point where its sponsorship should be assumed by the national forensic professional association. The tournament has moved to a different location about the nation each year since 1967.² The basic

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characteristics of the NDT are:

1. Participants. A serious attempt is made to identify the strongest debate teams in the nation as participants in the NDT. This is accomplished through a series of nine regional qualifying tournaments combined with at-large invitations of teams with outstanding prior tournament debate records. The effort is to ensure that the tournament reflects the highest quality of intercollegiate debate from the nation.

2. Policy. A National Debate Tournament Committee of 14 members (the elected chairpersons of each of the nine geographical districts which conduct the regional qualifying tournaments, the designated representatives of each of the four geographical--Eastern, Midwestern, Southern, and Western--divisions of the American Forensic Association, and the NDT Director) establishes general policy for conduct of the tournament. The NDT Committee, for example, introduced the cross-examination format in 1976.

3. Finance. An NDT Board of Trustees of 5 members designated by the American Forensic Association is responsible for the financial health of the tournament. The NDT is supported by three basic sources of funds: by subscription fees collected from all colleges and universities in the nation who wish to contribute (an institution must contribute, however, to qualify teams to participate in the NDT), by registration fees collected from teams participating in the NDT, and, in recent years, by a financial grant from the Ford Motor Company. The Board approves a budget for the tournament, establishes fees, and solicits financial support from other sources.

4. Tournament Format. Each two-person team debates both sides of the single annual national intercollegiate debate proposition using a cross-examination format allowing each speaker a ten minute constructive speech, a three minute cross-examination period, and a five minute rebuttal. A total of ten minutes of preparation time between speeches is allowed each team. The tournament covers four days, the first three of which allow for all 62 participating teams to debate eight preliminary rounds. These preliminary rounds are power-matched, meaning teams meet teams with similar win-loss records throughout the preliminary rounds. A panel of three judges evaluates each debate. On the bases of the best records in these eight preliminary rounds, the top sixteen teams are then selected--criteria are win-loss record, total judge ballots, and total adjusted speaker points in that order--for participation in the elimination rounds on the final day of the tournament. In these rounds, a team must win each debate to progress to the next round. The culminating event is then a final round debate to determine the national championship debate team.

5. Awards. Each debate team participating in the tournament receives a plaque commemorating NDT participation. The ten highest-rated speakers in the preliminary rounds are given awards, with the top two of these individuals and the four participants in the final round receiving watch awards. Permanent trophies are presented the top four teams in the tournament, and the top two teams also receive rotating trophies.

Strengths of the NDT

The following discussion of strengths of and concerns about the American National Debate Tournament is from two sources--my own observations of the tournament for the past twenty-six years and, more importantly, from conversations with ten highly respected directors of forensics at the 1977 tournament in Springfield, Missouri.³ Nearly every forensic director interviewed mentioned that a national tournament is a natural outcome of the competitive nature of American intercollegiate debate. If each debate must be "won" or "lost" and if most of the several hundred debate tournaments scheduled about the nation in any year declare a championship team, then it seems a logical outcome to have a national championship tournament at the end of the academic year. Several directors observed that if the American Forensic Association (the national professional organization) and not sponsor the tournament, then it would be held anyway under some, perhaps less desirable, sponsorship. The argument is really quite simple: the highly competitive nature of intercollegiate tournament debate as practiced by American colleges and universities leads inevitably to a process for determining the national championship. Though forensic directors are loath to compare their activity with athletics, the same logic pervades American sports as we annually declare national championships in intercollegiate basketball and football, perhaps emulating professional athletics as in football's Super Bowl. Of more substance, three major strengths of the National Debate Tournament are noted:

1. The NDT provides student debaters with a national experience in debate and, incidentally, in travel opportunity. Though many forensic directors commented that these opportunities can be provided by a well-funded program without an NDT, they indicate it is desirable to provide the opportunities for students from less well-funded programs too. A team from Illinois will normally meet competition from surrounding states (Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, and the other Midwestern states) in regular tournament competition. But--the argument goes--it is desirable to overcome geographical limitations by also competing against other teams with other ideas from other parts of the nation. So an Illinois team should also meet a California team (distance, 2,000 miles) and a Maine or New Hampshire team (distance, 1,000 miles) and, in the process, experience the West and East coasts of America as well as its prairie farmlands. A nation is stronger because of interaction, not isolation, among the people of its various geographical regions. A National Debate Tournament is good, then, to the extent it helps provide such interaction. Debaters might term this an additive advantage.

2. The NDT stimulates quality performance or excellence in debate. Simply stated, the observation is that the National Debate Tournament itself provides incentive for debate teams to perform to the limit of their potential in order to have the opportunity of participating in the national championship tournament. One coach put it quite clearly in stating: "My debaters work harder to construct arguments and find evidence on the proposition because they hope to participate in the National Debate Tournament. It provides motivation for improving quality." One coach observed that the NDT's at-large bid process

(inviting teams with outstanding win records at previous tournaments throughout the year) helps to stimulate higher quality debating throughout the year than would otherwise be achieved. While there is no way to quantify the claim, it does move closer to an inherent, good reason for having a national tournament.

3. The NDT strengthens the professional forensic community. The activity, claims one forensic director who is also a former president of the American Forensic Association, "strengthens forensics as a profession." It provides, that is, a focused activity which involves members of the forensic profession in the planning and conduct of the national tournament. An institutionally-sponsored tournament will be planned and conducted by the institution, whereas the NDT involves a truly national committee in policy determination. More importantly, the NDT can act as a national force to bring about change. A good example here is the adoption two years ago of the cross-examination format, a change previously advocated by the National Developmental Conference on Forensics to promote better clash in intercollegiate debate.⁴ The national force of adoption of this change by the NDT means defacto adoption of the change in numerous tournaments about the nation. It should be noted, however, that other forensic directors argue that the NDT acts as an inhibitor to change, that few significant tournaments about the nation will adopt formats different than that utilized by the NDT, and that the NDT therefore acts to inhibit diversity and change. There is probably little doubt that a National Debate Tournament sponsored by the national professional association (the American Forensic Association) does act as a focal point of professional concern and, by this means, strengthens the sense of community among the profession. Negatively put, there is an apparent consensus that an NDT not sponsored by the AFA would weaken that national professional association of forensic educators.

Nearly every forensic director interviewed commented in one way or another that a national debate tournament is probably inevitable in the United States, but that no great harm would be done were it eliminated. On balance, most preferred that it be continued to provide debaters national exposure and experience, to stimulate excellence in debate, and to help strengthen the forensic community.

Concerns About the NDT

However, forensic directors did express four major concerns about the National Debate Tournament.

1. The NDT may result in a focus on a limited number of participants in an institution's forensic program. The argument here, particularly in a low-budget program, is that the forensic director may be tempted to devote an undue amount of attention and resources on a single team, or perhaps two teams, in preparing them to participate in the NDT. Adequate preparation, that is, means a team will have had to participate in a sizable number of tournaments about the nation prior to the NDT, if it expects to receive an at-large NDT bid or compete effectively in regional elimination tournaments and do well against competition in the

NDT itself. That can and often does result in a "star system" in which most attention and resources are directed to two or four individual debaters, a possible distortion of resources resulting in fewer forensic program student participants than might otherwise be the case. In short, the argument is that too much time and money is spent gearing a few individuals to participate in the National Debate Tournament.

2. The cost of the NDT is quite high. A conservative estimate of the cost of the annual National Debate Tournament is in excess of \$50,000. This estimate includes all expenses associated with the tournament--travel of teams and their coaches to the tournament, travel of other guest judges to the tournament, housing and feeding the roughly 225 participating debaters and coaches and judges during the four days of the tournament, and the administrative costs of running the tournament, including awards and receptions. Some directors wonder aloud whether a single tournament is indeed worth that investment of resources. Over the years, the cost of the NDT has escalated as the number of participating teams has been increased from the original 29 to now 62 institutions. One forensic director also mentioned what he termed the "human cost" of the tournament, feeling there is too much pressure on a debate team to merit an invitation to the NDT in the first place and then do well in that single tournament once invited. Hence, a particular good debate team may feel it is a failure if either it does not participate in the NDT or, if participating, fails to win the so-called "national championship" final debate.

3. The NDT establishes uniform national procedures and, as a result, makes innovation more difficult. This argument is, of course, the counterpart of possible use of the national forum as an agent of change, as in the adoption of the cross-examination format. The countervailing argument here is that the NDT "freezes in" tournament procedures and formats. In fact, there is good evidence that the NDT formats (e.g., eight preliminary rounds, four elimination rounds, cross-examination format) are adopted by any number of prestigious individual tournaments, probably to provide a training ground for the NDT later in the season. This homogeneity, some argue, is not desirable. Rather than a single national tournament model, they would argue we should have a wide variety of argumentation experience available to students--one-person direct clash debates, debates using traditional format followed by extended oral critiques from judges, audience-judged debates, and many other innovations which, while not prevented, are inhibited to some extent by the pressure of a single NDT style and format.

4. The NDT encourages an artificial style of tournament debating. The purpose of providing students with intercollegiate debate experience, most indicate, is to teach students how to build sound arguments for or against a particular point of view and support those arguments with the best available evidence--to become, that is, effective advocates. The NDT-type format, some argue, encourages artificiality in directing arguments at the highly-specialized, extremely well-informed judges utilized in the tournament rather than general audiences, and in emphasizing speed in presentation rather than persuasiveness. The severe time limitations often result in uncommunicative delivery patterns,

incomplete documentation of evidence with an emphasis upon quantity rather than quality of evidence presented, and inability to deal effectively with the many arguments presented during the debate. My own analysis of the 1976 debate, for example, indicates an average speaking rate of 245 words per minute in that debate--contrasted with an average normal speaking rate of 125 to 150 words per minute, with at least one authority identifying a rate in excess of 200 words per minute as "unintelligible"--and a use of 148 separate pieces of evidence--better than two pieces of evidence per minute of debate--in the final round.⁵ The latter obviously means identification of sources of evidence is normally fragmentary. Thus, some forensic directors question whether the NDT-type format is the best training for development of "real world" argumentation skills by students.

One forensic director points out that the concerns (focus on too limited a number of participants, high cost, emphasis upon uniform national standards inhibiting innovation, and encouragement of artificiality) are not necessary inherent disadvantages. These things, he argues, could be changed if the forensic community thought they should be changed, and the National Debate Tournament could be used as a positive force to bring about such change. He also felt that the NDT could be eliminated with no harm to well-financed forensic programs about the nation. My own conclusion is that the NDT will continue and that change in its basic format will be slow to come.

The Utility of the Model for Other Nations

Is the American National Debate Tournament a model which should be considered by other nations? My answer is implicitly no, at least until some of the concerns about a National Debate Tournament are satisfactorily resolved in the American experience and the NDT has much more broad-based support among the forensic community in the United States. Another reason is that a national forensic experience in any nation should be based upon indigenous needs and nature of that society or nation. The American society is highly competitive, and an NDT structured much along present lines is probably appropriate to our society. There is, however, another dimension which we may only project something like the following.

In 2000, the United Nations University sponsored the first International Debate Forum, an event designed to promote cross-cultural communication among students in institutions of higher education of all nations. The expressed purpose of the event was to promote the application of reasoning and evidence to the resolution of problems facing humanity. Athens was selected as an appropriate location, and "Resolved, that the time has arrived to make the United Nations a federation rather than a confederated debating society" an appropriate focus of attention.

May I leave to your imagination and creativity the further details which may be worthy of all our attention. Can we begin planning for creation of a meaningful international forensic event?

FOOTNOTES

¹ Edited transcripts of the final round debates of the National Debate Tournament by the author are available in the Journal of the American Forensic Association (JAFA) as follows: "Should the Federal Government Adopt a Comprehensive Program to Control Land Use in the United States?" JAFA, XIII (Summer, 1976), 1-50; "Should the Power of the Presidency be Significantly Curtailed?" JAFA, XII (Summer, 1975), 5-41; "Should the Federal Government Control the Supply and Utilization of Energy in the United States?" JAFA, XI (Summer, 1974), 16-45; "Should the Federal Government Provide a Program of Comprehensive Medical Care for all United States Citizens?" JAFA X (Summer, 1973), 16-45; "Should Greater Control be Imposed on Gathering and Utilizing Information about United States Citizens by Governmental Agencies?" JAFA, IX (Summer, 1972), 235-60; "Should the Federal Government Adopt a Program of Compulsory Wage and Price Controls?" JAFA, VIII (Summer, 1971), 1-28; "Should the Federal Government Annually Grant a Specific Percentage of Its Income Tax Revenues to the States?" JAFA, VII (Fall, 1970), 159-87; "Should Executive Control of United States Foreign Policy be Substantially Curtailed?" JAFA, VI (Fall, 1969), 139-63; "Should the Federal Government Guarantee a Minimum Annual Cash Income for All Citizens?" JAFA, V (Fall, 1968), 115-41; "Should the United States Substantially Reduce Its Foreign Policy Commitments?" JAFA, IV (Fall, 1967), 118-39. Published critiques by judges of the final round debate were added for the first time in 1976: See JAFA, XIII (Fall, 1976), 65-76. For transcripts and critiques of NDT final round debates for 1949, 1950, 1952, and 1955 through 1960 see: Russell R. Windes and Arthur N. Kruger (editors), Championship Debating (Portland, Maine: J. Weston Walch, 1961). This source also contains a chapter on "The West Point National Debate Tournament" by Captain Herbert Y. Schandler tracing the early history of the NDT.

² NDT locations since West Point have been: (1967-1977): University of Chicago (Illinois); Brooklyn College (New York); Northern Illinois University; University of Houston (Texas); Macalester College (Minnesota); University of Utah; United States Naval Academy (Maryland); United States Air Force Academy (Colorado); University of the Pacific (California); Boston College (Massachusetts); and Southwest Missouri State University.

³ In these conversational interviews, the forensic directors were asked to identify the reason or reasons for having the National Debate Tournament. They were also asked what they considered to be strengths of the NDT and concerns about it. The interviews are not represented as a public opinion poll of directors of forensics, only as a source of commentary about the NDT.

⁴ Among the recommendations of the National Developmental Conference on Forensics (Sedalia, Colorado, September 1-6, 1974), subsequently adopted by the NDT Committee for the 1976 NDT was: "The NDT Committee should adopt the cross-examination format of debate for the NDT as soon as practicable and should consider using other formats in future years."

. . . The cross-examination format is specifically recommended for early adoption because its use is expected to sharpen the contest among arguments in the debate." James H. McBath, (ed.), Forensics as Communication: The Argumentative Perspective (Skokie, IL: National Textbook Co., 1975), p. 28.

⁵ See: "Technical Notes: Speaking Rates and Evidence Use" in "1976 National Debate Tournament Final Debate: Should the Federal Government Adopt a Comprehensive Program to Control Land Use in the United States?" edited by Stanley G. Rives, Journal of the American Forensic Association, XIII (Summer, 1976), 47-50.

SURVEY OF FORENSIC OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED BY STATE ORGANIZATIONS

by James E. Pfefferkorn*

Introduction

State forensic organizations in the United States of America tend to have contest speaking events which were formulated independently of similar formulation within the other states. The purpose of this paper is to examine the similarities and differences of state forensic organizations as they exist today within the various state organizations. No effort is made in this paper to secure a position either for or against unification of state speech contests.

Survey

Requests were made of all 51 state organizations (the District of Columbia is considered to have a "state" organization for the purpose of this paper) for complete information regarding the rules and regulations of their respective forensic contests ("forensic" for the purpose of this paper refers to human communication by means of the body and/or voice in a contest situation). The requested information was provided by 31 state forensic organizations. As some difficulty was encountered in obtaining many of the addresses for the various organizations, pertinent information concerning the sources is included in Appendix C.

About 61 percent of the state organizations are represented by this survey and virtually all geographic and cultural areas of the United States are represented. Consult Appendix A for a geographic representation of those states which responded.

The title a state chooses for its event can vary considerably from state to state. For example, Alabama's and Oregon's "After Dinner Speaking" event is very similar to "Original Comedy" in Illinois--and the same event in North Dakota is called a "Speech to Entertain." Appendix B compares states which have similar events along with their respective name for the event. Because of the tendency of name variation, 26 generic descriptors were devised for this paper to compare and contrast like or similar events.

Generic Descriptors

Events were first either categorized (for the purpose of devising generic descriptors for this paper) as "Interpretative events" or "Original events." Interpretative events are those contest events in which the speaker primarily uses someone else's words; for Original events the speaker principally uses his own words. Only one event (*viz.*, Storytelling) of those events surveyed could be described neither as an Interpretative nor as an Original event, but is a blend of both types of contest speaking.

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Finally, Original events were not subdivided in any way.

Each event, as designated by a generic descriptor, is examined, comparing and contrasting the variations between state organizations. In accordance with the outline which follows, Interpretative events are analyzed first, followed by the Original events, and finally the storytelling event.

I. Interpretative Events

A. Speaking

1. Choral Speaking
2. Declamation
3. Extemporaneous Reading
4. Impersonation
5. (Non-Original) Broadcast Announcing
6. (Non-Original) Oratory
7. Play Reading
8. Poetry Reading
9. Prose Reading
10. Reader's Theatre

B.

1. Solo Acting
2. Duet Acting
3. Play (a cutting or a one-act)
4. Improvisation Acting
5. Pantomime Acting

II. Original Events

- A. Analysis of Public Address
- B. Congress
- C. Creative Expression
- D. Discussion
- E. Extemporaneous Speaking
- F. Impromptu Speaking
- G. Informative Speaking
- H. (Original) Broadcast Speaking
- I. Original Oratory
- J. Speech to Entertain

III. Blended Events

- A. Storytelling

Limitations

Some limitations in the scope and nature of this survey should be noted.

One limitation of this research is that the debate event is not covered in this paper. While some states did include debate regulations in their responses to the mailed request for rules and regulations of forensic events, many states apparently have separate organizations designed for operating a state debate program.

While the debate event is not included, acting events receive less emphasis than other forensic events included in this paper. The scope of this paper does not allow for the many intricacies inherent in the descriptions of the five generic events within the acting descriptors.

Time Limitations for Generic Events

The necessity for each state to assign time limits is basic to all events in contest speaking. Penalties for failing to meet specified time limits range from no significant penalty to disqualification of the contestant, depending on the specific state regulation. For example, the time limits for the broadcasting events are much more strictly enforced. In most contests, disqualifying contestants for being as little as five seconds over or under the given time limit.

Analysis of State Forensic Events

I. Interpretative Events

A. Speaking

1. Choral Speaking

The Choral Speaking event is found only in the State of Hawaii. This event involves the interpretation of poetry or prose by a group (10 to 20 individuals) speaking together as a unit. Up to 15 minutes may be used for a performance.

2. Declamation

Declamation is a memorized cutting or selection from literature, excluding public speeches. Events fitting this description can be found in 18 of the 31 states surveyed.

Generally, a contestant is expected to present an extemporaneous introduction to a selected cutting and is further expected to provide transitions when presenting more than one selection. The time allowed by the various states differs from a minimum time limit of five minutes (some states specify no minimum limit) to a maximum time limit of 10 minutes. Costumes and props are disallowed by all states.

There are exceptions to the general rules between contest states. Monologues (in readings from a play) are prohibited specifically only by Alabama, Hawaii, and Illinois. Five of the states surveyed allowed the optional use of manuscript, but discouraged reading from the manuscript. Pennsylvania restricts selections to that of plays, while South Dakota allows only prose selections (no plays or poetry).

3. Extemporaneous Reading

Extemporaneous reading is defined as the oral interpretation of literature with a minimum of preparation time. Events fitting this description are found only in two state contests: those of Minnesota and North Dakota. It is notable that these two states are geographically adjacent.

A list of titles is provided in advance of the state contest by the state contest office. On the day of the tournament the contestant draws three topics and immediately chooses one. Preparation to speak (usually) takes place in a specified

room. Preparation time varies from 30 minutes provided for this purpose in Minnesota and 60 minutes provided to prepare in North Dakota. During this preparation period the contestant must prepare both the reading list itself and a suitable introduction to the reading. The maximum time limit allowed for the presentation is 5 minutes in both states.

States which include sightreading (extemporaneous reading to a limited degree) as part of their oral interpretation contests are Pennsylvania and Virginia. The oral interpretation events are examined later in this paper.

4. Impersonation

Impersonation as a contest event is found only in the State of Hawaii. It is defined as "the portrayal of a character other than one's self with appropriate use of voice and action" (Hawaii Handbook of Speech Activities, p. 40). As much as 10 minutes is allowed for presentation, which includes an appropriate introduction to and delivery of the performance, prepared and delivered by the contestant.

5. Non-Original Broadcast Announcing

Two types of broadcasting events exist today. The two events are Non-Original Broadcast Announcing and Original Broadcast Speaking. Non-Original Broadcast Announcing involved one person's oral interpretation (via the radio or television medium) of the copy provided for the contest event. Original Broadcast Speaking involves the creation and interpretation of original (self-created) copy. Non-Original Broadcast Announcing involves both reading and editing of the copy provided by the tournament. Although Non-Original Broadcast Announcing is primarily an interpretative event, it sometimes (e.g., North Dakota) does include an original commentary as a portion of the contestant's presentation. At least one type of broadcast event is found in nine of the 31 states responding. See Appendix B for more detail.

Most states surveyed included the following rules. The contestant is so situated that neither the judge nor his audience may see him. He is heard via a public address system.

Timing is crucial for any broadcasting event. There are always one or more timekeepers, and time signals to determine time remaining in the event are usually given to the contestant during the performance.

The principle event in the category of Non-Original Broadcast Announcing is that of Newscasting. Performance time for Newscasting varies from three, four, or five minutes. Preparation of news is completed by the contestant in 15, 30, or 45 minutes depending on the state. Some states (e.g., Illinois) include a 60-second prepared commercial as an additional requirement of Newscasting.

Multi-round broadcasting events are conducted in both Pennsylvania and Indiana. The Pennsylvania event consists of rounds: (a) a two-minute newscast, (b) 15 minutes of preparation to read a script, and (c) a round similar to the

second round. Four rounds are held in Indiana: (a) reading of a 60-second commercial (the same copy for all contestants) with 60 seconds of preparation time, (b) reading 60 seconds of "music copy" (comments which introduces a musical selection) with 60 seconds of preparation, (c) 30 minutes to prepare a 3-minute newscast, and (d) simulation of on-the-scene reporting of a news event (allowing the contestants no preparation time).

6. Non-Original Oratory

Non-Original Oratory consists of the reading of another person's public speech, or of a combination of speeches. The event is found in eight states. The following rules are stipulated by surveyed states.

Generally an introduction is required. Transitions should be extemporized where needed. Time limits of this event range from 5 to 10 minutes. Some states provide no minimum limits.

Most states warn contestants that this event is not to be construed as an event involving impersonation. No props or costumes are allowed by any states and the event usually involves a memorized presentation. Oklahoma limits competition to ninth and tenth graders.

Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Montana each have an event which includes Non-Original Oratory to a limited degree but which is chiefly an Analysis of Public Address (an Original Event described later in this paper).

7. Play Reading

Play Reading is the unmemorized oral interpretation of a cutting from a play by one performer. In most states surveyed Play Reading is not to be confused with the category of Acting in that Play Reading does not involve acting by the contestant. The reading is generally preceded by an expository introduction. No costumes or props are permitted. Thirteen of the 31 states have such an event.

In Massachusetts the event is specifically designed for those readings suited to children. In Michigan "Humorous Interpretative Reading" requires preparation of two different presentations, to be alternated round by round. Michigan's other Play Reading event, called "Serious Interpretative Reading," consists of three rounds, only one of which is Play Reading. The other two rounds are prose and poetry reading. Montana also has a multi-round event. The contestant chooses at least two selections from any two or more of the following areas: (a) drama, (b) prose, and (c) poetry. Oregon's events, "Humorous Interpretation" and "Serious Interpretation," consist of drama or prose selections. South Dakota also includes prose as well as Play Reading in the contest. Use of script is optional in only one state (viz., Minnesota); all other states require the use of a script.

8. Poetry Reading

This oral interpretation event can be found in most states surveyed in this paper. Poetry Reading consists of unmemorized

oral interpretation of poetic literature by one performer. The performer must hold a manuscript and at least appear to be reading from it. Only Minnesota allows optional use of a script.

An extemporaneous introduction is generally (although not always specifically) required. Extemporaneous transitions (for smooth flowing of presented material) are also usually required when necessary. Time limits from the various states range from a minimum of 4 minutes to a maximum of 12 minutes. Some states require no minimum time limit. Selection of the material is generally left to the contestant. Many states provide lists of suggested readings; at least one state (Texas) requires that the contestant choose from those lists. No costumes or props are allowed by any state.

In many states the contestant may choose one poem to present. Some states require more than one (e.g., Indiana and Texas) selection. In Illinois three separate programs of poems must be prepared. One program is drawn by lot to be performed. Many states have multi-round oral interpretation events in which combinations of prose, poetry, and play reading may occur.

Virginia and Pennsylvania have sightreading as a part of their poetry event. Virginia allows no preparation time; Pennsylvania allows 15 minutes.

Massachusetts has an event ("Children's Literature") for the reading of poetry appropriate to children.

9. Prose Reading

Prose Reading is the unmemorized oral interpretation of prose literature by one performer. The performer must hold a manuscript and at least appear to be reading from it. Only Minnesota makes the use of the manuscript optional. Time limits in the states surveyed range from a 5 minute minimum to a 12 minute maximum. Some states set no minimum.

Top selection is generally left to the contestant, although some states do publish lists of suggested selected prose literature. Texas is among those states which require the contestant to choose from a selected reading list. In Illinois, three selections by different authors must be prepared for the event. One selection is drawn by lot to be presented at contest. Many states combine prose reading with various combinations of poetry and/or play reading.

10. Reader's Theatre

Reader's Theatre, the unmemorized group oral interpretation of prose, poetry, or plays, is the last of the interpretative speaking events. This event can be found in seven of the 31 states responding to this questionnaire. Names for the event vary from state to state from (this paper's generic descriptor) "Reader's Theatre" to "Group Interpretation," "Group Interpretative Reading," "Multiple Reading," and "Interpreter's Theatre." Time limits vary from state to state from a minimum of 10 minutes to a maximum of 25 minutes. Some states set no minimum time limit.

This event is specifically an interpretative event as opposed to an acting event. No props or costumes are allowed in the contest. Manuscripts must be used by contestants. Tennessee does allow uniformity of dress as well as one stage prop and one hand prop per participant. Wisconsin is the only state to exclude plays as possible material for interpretation.

Size of groups for the Reader's Theatre event range from minimums of two or maximums of eight. Some states set no maximum.

B. Acting

Acting may be found in most state forensic organizations. Those states which do not include acting in their programs are most likely to have a separate acting contest sponsored by some other organization within their state.

1. Solo and Duet Acting

Solo and Duet Acting (the names indicating the number of performers permitted in each category) are generally performed without props or with a minimum number of props. Time limits range from 4 minute minimum for Solo Acting (8 minutes for Duet Acting) to maximums of 12 minutes Solo (and 15 minutes for Duet Acting). Some states set no minimum time. Solo Acting is found in five states; Duet Acting in 14 states.

2. Plays

Plays, either one act plays or cuttings from larger plays, are found in 17 of the 31 states. These are usually more elaborate productions with at least some amount of make-up, props, costuming, and lighting, and with a greater amount of time available for production. The shortest minimum time allowed by a state for Acting is 15 minutes. Some states set no minimum time limit. Maximum time limits range from 30 to 45 minutes. Various amounts of preparation and set-up time are provided by the contest rules in each state. Most states suggest that casts for plays may include as many as nine players. Some states set no maximum number of players. Minimum number of cast is usually limited to three.

3. Improvisation

Improvisation (impromptu acting) is found in only two states: Kansas and Utah. In Kansas it is called Duet Acting. Three members is the minimum number of members which can be used in Utah; Kansas states no minimum number. The maximum number in either state is seven. Utah allows up to 15 minutes for performance; Kansas, 4 to 7 minutes. Kansas allows 30 minutes of preparation time. Utah apparently allows no preparation time.

4. Pantomime

Pantomime is found as a state event in four of the states surveyed. In all cases it is an individual event with no oral material allowed. No props or costuming is allowed. Minimum time limits range from 0 to 3 minutes.

Maximums range from 5 to 10 minutes.

II. Original Events

A. Analysis of Public Address

Four states have an event fitting the description of Analysis of Public Address. Generally the event is described as an original speech about a previously delivered speech which must include various proportions of non-original material (quoted from the speech itself). Two of the names for the event are "Significant Speeches" and "Memorized Public Address with Analysis." No minimum time limits are set; maximum time limits are set at either 8 or 10 minutes by most states surveyed. In some states notes may be used, but the speech must not be read. The contestant may not be the author of the speech which is to be analyzed in the event.

B. Congress

Congress (also known as "Student Senate," "Student Congress," or "Student Legislation") provides an opportunity for high school students to meet in parliamentary assembly to propose legislative bills involving their own ideas on how to best solve current problems and to debate and vote on their bills. The event is conducted by state organizations in 8 of the 31 reporting states.

A congress of two chambers (sometimes more) is created with the top contestants in the "upper" chamber. Each congressman is allowed five speeches per congress day (3 minutes per speech) in the Indiana event, while there is no apparent speaking limit imposed upon congressmen in other states.

Indiana is rather typical in the judging arrangement. They employ three judges: (a) parliamentarian, (b) official scorekeeper, and (c) timekeeper.

C. Creative Expression

The Minnesota State High School League is the only state organization to have an event fitting this category. Creative Expression is an original presentation using any material and any performance style.

The contestant must make an original introductory statement as part of the 8 minutes maximum time limitation. No props, make-up, costumes, or music is allowed. Although a copy of the script must be submitted, the use of it is optional.

D. Discussion

The Discussion contest event is generally described as a small group, assembled for the purpose of problem/solution. Nine states have this event. One state, New Jersey, calls the Discussion event "Forum."

Numbers allowed in each small group vary from no specified minimums in some states, to minimums of five or eight contestants in other states. Maximum numbers are uniformly set

at eight. The event usually is carried through two, three, or four rounds, with total time for each round set at 60 minutes in most states, 45 in one state, 60 to 90 in one, and up to 90 in yet another. Group leadership is often not assigned. The topic of discussion frequently comes from the current national problem area for debate and discussion.

E. Extemporaneous Speaking

Extemporaneous Speaking is a contest in every state which responded to the survey. Generally it is called "Extemporaneous Speaking" with exception being "Extempore Speaking," "Extempore Speech," and in Texas either "Informative Speaking" or "Persuasive Speaking." In a few states separate divisions are created for male and female contestants.

Extemporaneous Speaking is an unmemorized, semi-formal (conversational) speaking event for the purpose of informing the audience. The speech is prepared in advance only to a certain degree. Most of the preparation takes place during a specified time just prior to speaking.

Topics for the speaking event are either furnished by the state organization in advance to speaking times or are items of current interest and are based upon a list of magazines provided by the state organization. The contestant draws three topics (five topics in Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Texas) and selects one, returning the unused topics.

Once the topic is selected, a specific room is provided for the contestants to prepare their speeches. The preparation time varies in state from 30 to 45 to as much as 60 minutes. Contestants may use any books and magazines either brought with them or provided by the school during the preparation period. They may (or may not, according to the various state organizations surveyed) use notes prepared ahead of time, and may not confer with any other person during this period.

No notes may be used in giving the speech in some states. In those states allowing notes, some allow 50 words (100 in Texas) or one notecard (3x5-inch, 4x6-inch, or 5x7-inch). Minimum time limits for speaking range from 3 to 5 minutes (or no specific minimum). Maximum time limits vary from 5 minutes to as high as 8 minutes.

Cross examination is part of the final round in at least one state tournament. In another state (viz., Oklahoma) the judge may ask one question following the contestant's presentation.

F. Impromptu Speaking

Impromptu Speaking is an original speech with a minimum of specific preparation time. This event is found in eight of the 31 states responding to the survey.

In at least one state (viz., Colorado) the state organization releases a general topic upon which specific topics may later be based. At the time of the contest each participant submits five specific topics, draws three from all those topics submitted, and selects one. In Indiana the topic for

each contestant is a word, a saying, or a current event. Montana bases their topic upon an editorial or cartoon.

Most states surveyed indicate that once the topic is drawn, the contestant is provided with a preparation period. The preparation period may be as brief as 30 seconds or as long as 5 minutes, depending on the state. In some states the speaker may make no reference to any written material during the preparation period but may write on a 3x5-inch card for speaking notes--other states allow no notes of any kind to be used in the contest.

Speaking time for this event ranges from a 2 minutes minimum to a 6 minute maximum depending on the state. Minimum time in Hawaii is not specified.

In Michigan this event is part of a special multi-round state sweepstakes.

G. Informative Speaking

Informative Speaking is also called "Demonstration Speaking," "Public Speaking," "Expository Speaking," and "Public Address" in the nine various states having an event within this category. This event can be described as providing a learning experience to the speaker by extemporaneous presentation of new information in a skillful manner. Those states which call the event Demonstration Speaking place a limit on topic selection in that the speech must explain a process.

Time limits vary from state to state, some having no minimum to those having 5 minute minimums; maximum limits in speaking times vary from 7 minutes to 8 1/2 minutes.

Visual aids are required in some states (e.g., Hawaii), "encouraged" in Pennsylvania, restricted to inanimate aids in two states (viz., Michigan and Oregon), and disallowed in others (e.g., Kansas).

In most states speaking notes may be used in this contest event. Kansas and Oregon require memorization of material to be presented. In Pennsylvania, an outline must be submitted to the state office in advance of speaking. Michigan limits participation to only ninth and tenth grade students.

Wisconsin has two events (other than Demonstration Speaking) which may or may not fit into the Informative Speaking category. One is the "Four Minute Speech" which may be either informative or persuasive in nature. The other similar speaking event is the "Public Address" contest which is limited to answering a question and may also be either informative or persuasive, depending on the nature of the question.

H. Original Broadcast Speaking

This original (as contrasted with the Non-Original Broadcast Announcing event) broadcasting event is found in five states. Original Broadcast Speaking is the presentation of material authored by the speaker and specifically adapted for the electronic media. Various names which states surveyed have selected for this event are "Expository Speaking on Television," "News Commentary on Radio," "Radio Commentary," "Radio Speaking,"

"Broadcasting," and "Radio Programming."

Expository Speaking on Television (in Iowa) has a maximum time limit of 5 minutes, with no minimum time established. The presentation must be manuscripted including two copies (for the directors of the television production). Visual aids (adapted for the television medium) must be prepared by the contestant.

Both Iowa and Oregon have events specifically dealing with a news commentary. Each specifies a 5 minute maximum with no minimum time limit for the event. North Dakota includes an original commentary (with the same time limitations) as part of their newscasting event. Iowa regulations specify that the script may be memorized or the contestant may read from the manuscript.

Louisiana has an event called "Radio Speaking" in which the contestant interviews someone (on the air) who is professionally active in broadcasting. Five minutes of preparation time is provided for the 5 minute interview.

The Pennsylvania High School Speech League has a team event entitled "Radio Programming" which involves preparing and submitting in advance of the state tournament a 14 1/2 minute program of various types (drama, documentary, etc.). The type is specified by the League office and varies from year to year.

I. Original Oratory

The Original Oratory event (also known as "Persuasive Speaking" or simply, "Oratory") is usually persuasive in nature, but in some states may be informative. It is prepared in advance. Nearly all (29) of the 31 states have this event.

Time limits in this event vary from no specific minimum time limit to a 6, 7, or 8 minute minimum. Maximum time limits range from 7 to 10 minutes.

In most states the oratory is presented as a memorized speech; a few states permit notecards to be used during the event. In some cases the manuscripts must be submitted as much as a week in advance. Pennsylvania requires an outline of the original speech submitted in advance. A few states specifically prohibit visual aids. Costumes are not allowed in any state. Some states (e.g., Tennessee) have separate divisions for male and female participants.

As in the case of Informative Speaking, Wisconsin has two events which can (depending on a specific presentation) fit either the Informative Speaking category or the Original Oratory category. Those two events in Wisconsin are called "Four Minute Speech" and "Public Address."

J. Speech to Entertain

Four states have an event fitting the description of the Speech to Entertain. The Speech to Entertain is defined as an oral presentation of the work of the contestant which specifically seeks to entertain an audience.

Delivery may be extemporaneous (with notecards) or memorized in most states surveyed. No state allows a manuscript delivery. Time limits in this event vary from no minimum to a 5 minute minimum; maximum time limits range from 5 minutes to 8 minutes. The topic is generally left to the contestant who is expected to choose a topic which is of good taste and propriety.

No visual aids are allowed in North Dakota. Oregon requires submission of a manuscript before the event. No props are allowed by any state.

III. Blended Events

A. Storytelling

The final event described in this paper is the only one which does not qualify rather clearly as either an Interpretative event or Original event. Storytelling is the retelling of a story originally told by someone else (or, in at least one state, an original story). It is generally not memorized. The primary purpose is to entertain. Seven states, including Wisconsin, have such an event.

Time limits vary from state to state from no minimum time limit to a 5 minute minimum time limit; maximums range from 6 to 10 minutes. No costumes or props are allowed. Kentucky forbids manuscript but allows notes for quotations. In Minnesota, a selected list is furnished by the state organization. The contestant draws three titles and chooses one, returning the remaining titles to the other unchosen titles. The contestants are given 12 minutes to prepare a speech. Wisconsin suggests material "suitable for children in any age grouping under age 12." Notes may be used, Utah's event, "Retold Stories," consist of three rounds: (a) children's story, (b) teenage story, and (c) adult story. One hour of preparation time is permitted in Utah to provide a story which can be retold in 10 minutes or less.

Conclusion

Although some uniformity of the state-conducted speaking events throughout the United States can be seen through application of generic descriptors, a lack of uniformity in the more specialized events (e.g., Impersonation) reveals the independence of the various state forensic organizations. Much variety is seen in what the states specifically name their various events.

The purpose of this survey is to examine the trends among the state forensic organizations regarding various speaking contest events. A more comprehensive survey, including all 51 organizations, would perhaps be beneficial. Positions could be established and defended regarding future independence of the states regarding forensic activity. Additional information could also be elicited from each state (e.g., the number of years each state has had a particular event, the number of contestants participating each year, plus any other information each state organization might feel would be beneficial to other forensic organizations seeking development of a forensic tournament).



APPENDIX B: STATE ORGANIZATIONS'S NAMES
FOR THEIR EVENTS WITHIN EACH GENERIC DESCRIPTOR

I. Interpretative Events

A. Speaking

1. Choral Speaking

Hawaii Choral Speaking

2. Declamation

Alabama	Dramatic Interpretation
Florida	Interpretation of Literature
Hawaii	Dramatic Interpretation (memorized)
Hawaii	Humorous Interpretation (memorized)
Illinois	Dramatic Interpretation and Humorous Interpretation
Indiana	Dramatic and Humorous Interpretation
Kansas	Dramatic Interpretation
Kentucky	Dramatic Literature: Humorous and Serious
Louisiana	Interpretative Reading
Massachusetts	Dramatic Interpretation
Massachusetts	Humorous Interpretation
Mississippi	Dramatic Interpretation
Missouri	Dramatic Interpretation
Missouri	Humorous Interpretation
New Jersey	Dramatic Interpretation
New Jersey	Humorous Interpretation
New Mexico	Dramatic Interpretation
Ohio	Dramatic and Humorous Interpretation
Oklahoma	Oral Interpretation of Dramatic and Serious Literature
Pennsylvania	Oral Interpretation of Dramatic Literature
South Dakota	Oratorical Prose
Wisconsin	Declamation

3. Extemporaneous Reading

Minnesota	Extemporaneous Reading
North Dakota	Extemporaneous Interpretation

4. Impersonation

Hawaii Impersonation

5. (Non-Original) Broadcast Announcing

Hawaii	Radio Speaking
Illinois	Radio Speaking
Indiana	Broadcasting
Massachusetts	Radio Newscasting
Michigan	Radio Broadcasting
Missouri	Radio Speaking
Pennsylvania	Radio Announcing
North Dakota	Broadcasting
Tennessee	Radio-Television Newscasting

6. (Non-Original) Oratory

Colorado	Interpretation of Oratory
Hawaii	Oratorical Declamation
Illinois	Oratorical Declamation
Indiana	Oratorical Interpretation
Massachusetts	Oratorical Interpretation
New Jersey	Oratorical Interpretation
Ohio	Oratorical Interpretation
Oklahoma	Standard Oratory

7. Play Reading

Colorado	Interpretation of Dramatic Literature
Colorado	Interpretation of Humorous Literature
Georgia	Oral Interpretation
Hawaii	Interpretation of Dramatic Literature
Hawaii	Interpretation of Humorous Literature
Massachusetts	Children's Literature
Massachusetts	Play Reading
Michigan	Humorous Interpretative Reading
Michigan	Serious Interpretative Reading
Minnesota	Serious Interpretative of Drama
Minnesota	Humorous Interpretation
Montana	Oral Interpretation of Literature
North Dakota	Dramatic Oral Interpretation
Oregon	Humorous Interpretation
Oregon	Serious Interpretation
South Dakota	Dramatic and Humorous Prose
Tennessee	Oral Interpretation of Humorous Literature/Oral Interpretation of Dramatic Literature
Utah	Dramatic Readings and Humorous Readings
Washington	Oral Interpretation

8. Poetry Reading

Alabama	Prose/Poetry Interpretation
Colorado	Interpretation of Poetry
Georgia	Oral Interpretation
Hawaii	Poetry Reading
Illinois	Verse Reading
Indiana	Poetry Reading
Iowa	Oral Interpretation
Kansas	Oral Interpretation of Poetry
Kentucky	Poetry Interpretation
Louisiana	Interpretative Reading
Massachusetts	Children's Literature
Massachusetts	Poetry Reading
Michigan	Humorous Interpretative Reading
Michigan	Serious Interpretative Reading
Minnesota	Serious Interpretative of Poetry
Minnesota	Humorous Interpretation
Mississippi	Interpretative Reading
Missouri	Poetry Reading
Montana	Oral Interpretation of Literature
New Jersey	Poetry Reading
New Mexico	Oral Interpretation

North Dakota	Oral Interpretation
Oklahoma	Oral Interpretation of Poetry
Oregon	Poetry Reading
Pennsylvania	Oral Interpretation of Poetry
South Dakota	Poetry Interpretation
Tennessee	Oral Poetry Interpretation
Texas	Poetry Interpretation
Utah	Dramatic Readings and Humorous Readings
Virginia	Girls and Boys Poetry Reading
Washington	Oral Interpretation
Wisconsin	Poetry Reading
9. <u>Prose Reading</u>	
Alabama	Prose/Poetry Interpretation
Colorado	Interpretation of Dramatic Literature
Colorado	Interpretation of Humorous Literature
Georgia	Oral Interpretation
Hawaii	Interpretative Reading of Dramatic Literature
Hawaii	Interpretative Reading of Humorous Literature
Illinois	Prose Reading
Iowa	Oral Interpretation
Kansas	Oral Interpretation of Prose
Kentucky	Prose Interpretation
Louisiana	Interpretative Reading
Massachusetts	Children's Literature
Massachusetts	Prose Reading
Michigan	Humorous Interpretative Reading
Michigan	Serious Interpretative Reading
Minnesota	Serious Interpretative of Prose
Minnesota	Humorous Interpretation
Missouri	Prose Reading
Montana	Oral Interpretation of Literature
New Mexico	Oral Interpretation
North Dakota	Oral Interpretation
Oklahoma	Oral Interpretation of Prose
Oregon	Humorous Interpretation
Oregon	Serious Interpretation
Pennsylvania	Prose Reading
South Dakota	Dramatic and Humorous Prose
Tennessee	Oral Interpretation of Prose Literature
Texas	Prose Reading
Utah	Dramatic Readings and Humorous Readings
Virginia	Girls and Boys Prose Reading
Washington	Oral Interpretation
Wisconsin	Prose Reading
10. <u>Reader's Theatre</u>	
Florida	Group Interpretation
Hawaii	Group Interpretative Reading
Illinois	Reader's Theatre
Massachusetts	Multiple Reading
Michigan	Multiple Reading
Tennessee	Reader's Theatre
Wisconsin	Interpreter's Theatre

B. Acting	
Alabama	Duet Acting
Colorado	Solo Acting
Colorado	Drama
Georgia	One-Act Play
Hawaii	Drama Duet
Illinois	Drama Duet Acting
Illinois	Dramatics
Kansas	One-Act Play
Kansas	Duet Acting
Kansas	Improvised Duet Acting
Kentucky	Drama
Kentucky	Duo Acting
Kentucky	Solo Acting
Michigan	Drama Competition
Minnesota	One-Act Play
Missouri	One-Act Play
Missouri	Duet Acting
Montana	Humorous and Serious Duo Acting
Montana	Humorous and Serious Solo Acting
Montana	Pantomime
New Mexico	Duo-Drama
North Dakota	One-Act Play
Ohio	Duet Acting
Oklahoma	One-Act Play
Oklahoma	Duet Acting
Pennsylvania	Drama
South Dakota	Duet Memorized Interpretation
South Dakota	Drama Contest
Tennessee	Solo Acting
Tennessee	Duet Acting
Tennessee	Pantomime
Tennessee	One-Act Play
Texas	One-Act Play Contest
Utah	Mono-Acting
Utah	One-Act Play
Utah	Pantomime
Utah	Scenes from Plays
Utah	Improvisation Troupe
Virginia	One-Act Play
Wisconsin	Play Acting
Wisconsin	Drama

	Solo	Duet	Play	Improv.	Pantomime
Alabama		X			
Colorado	X		X		X
Florida					
Georgia			X		
Hawaii		X			
Illinois		X	X		
Indiana					
Iowa					
Kansas		X	X	X	
Kentucky	X	X	X		
Louisiana					
Massachusetts					
Michigan			X		
Minnesota			X		
Mississippi					
Missouri		X	X		
Montana	X	X			X
New Jersey					
New Mexico		X			
North Dakota			X		
Ohio		X			
Oklahoma		X	X		
Oregon					
Pennsylvania			X		
South Dakota		X	X		
Tennessee	X	X	X		X
Texas			X		
Utah	X	X	X	X	X
Virginia			X		
Washington					
Wisconsin		X	X		

II. Original Events

A. Analysis of Public Address

Kentucky	Analysis of Public Address
Minnesota	Significant Speeches
Montana	Memorized Public Address with Analysis
Wisconsin	Significant Speeches

B. Congress

Indiana	Congress
Iowa	Student Senate
Michigan	Student Congress
Montana	Student Congress
New Jersey	Student Congress
North Dakota	Student Congress
Ohio	Student Congress
Utah	Student Legislature

C. Creative Expression

Minnesota	Creative Expression
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D. Discussion

Colorado	Discussion
Hawaii	Discussion
Indiana	Discussion
Kentucky	Discussion
Massachusetts	Group Discussion
Michigan	Discussion
Minnesota	Discussion
New Jersey	Forum
Utah	Discussion

E. Extemporaneous Speaking

Alabama	Boys and Girls Extemporaneous Speaking
Colorado	Extemporaneous Speaking
Florida	Extemporaneous Speaking-Men
Florida	Extemporaneous Speaking-Women
Georgia	Extemporaneous Speaking
Hawaii	Extemporaneous Speaking
Illinois	Extempore Speaking
Indiana	Extemporaneous Speaking
Iowa	Extemporaneous Speaking
Kansas	Extempore Speech
Kentucky	Extempore Speaking
Louisiana	Extemporaneous Speaking
Massachusetts	Extemporaneous Speaking
Michigan	Extempore Speech
Minnesota	Extemporaneous Speaking
Mississippi	Extemporaneous Speaking
Missouri	Extemporaneous Speaking
Montana	Extemporaneous Speaking
New Jersey	Extemporaneous Speaking
New Mexico	Extemporaneous

North Dakota	Extemporaneous Speech
Ohio	Extempore Speaking
Oklahoma	Extemporaneous Speaking for Men and Women
Oregon	Extempore Speaking
Pennsylvania	Extemporaneous Speaking
South Dakota	Extemporaneous Speaking
Tennessee	Extemporaneous Speaking for Men
Tennessee	Extemporaneous Speaking for Women
Texas	Informative Speaking
Texas	Persuasive Speaking
Utah	Extemporaneous Speaking
Virginia	Extemporaneous Speaking
Washington	Extemporaneous Speaking
Wisconsin	Extemporaneous Speaking

F. Impromptu Speaking

Colorado	Impromptu Speaking
Hawaii	Impromptu Speaking
Indiana	Impromptu Speaking
Michigan	Impromptu Speaking
Montana	Impromptu Speaking
Oregon	Impromptu Speaking
Utah	Impromptu Speaking
Washington	Impromptu Speaking

G. Informative Speaking

Hawaii	Demonstration Speaking
Kansas	Informative Speaking
Kentucky	Public Speaking
Michigan	Informative Speaking
Montana	Expository Speaking
Oregon	Expository Speaking
Pennsylvania	Informative Speaking
Washington	Expository Speaking
Wisconsin	Demonstration Speaking
Wisconsin	Four-Minute Speech
Wisconsin	Public Address

H. (Original) Broadcast Speaking

Iowa	Expository Speaking on Television
Iowa	News Commentary on Radio
Louisiana	Radio Speaking
North Dakota	Broadcasting
Oregon	Radio Commentary
Pennsylvania	Radio Programming

I. Original Oratory

Alabama	Original Oratory
Colorado	Original Oratory
Florida	Original Oratory
Hawaii	Original Oratory
Illinois	Oratory
Indiana	Original Oratory

Iowa	Original Oratory
Kansas	Original Oration
Kentucky	Original Oratory
Louisiana	Original Oratory
Massachusetts	Original Oratory
Michigan	Original Oratory
Minnesota	Original Oratory
Mississippi	Original Oratory
Missouri	Original Oratory
Montana	Original Oratory
New Mexico	Original Oratory
North Dakota	Original Oratory
Ohio	Original Oratory
Oklahoma	Original Oratory
Oregon	Oratory
Pennsylvania	Persuasive Speaking
South Dakota	Original Oratory
Tennessee	Original Oratory
Texas	Persuasive Speaking
Utah	Oratory
Virginia	Original Oratory
Washington	Original Oratory
Wisconsin	Four-Minute Speech
Wisconsin	Oratory
Wisconsin	Public Address

J. Speech to Entertain

Alabama	After Dinner Speaking
Illinois	Original Comedy
North Dakota	Speech to Entertain
Oregon	After Dinner Speaking

III. Blended Events

A. Storytelling

Hawaii	Storytelling
Kentucky	Storytelling
Michigan	Storytelling
Minnesota	Storytelling
Missouri	Storytelling
Utah	Retold Stories
Wisconsin	Storytelling

APPENDIX C: LIST OF SOURCES

High School Services
James L. Nishet, Director
203 Continuing Education Center
P. O. Box 2967
University of Alabama
University, Alabama 35486

Colorado State Speech League
University of Colorado
Boulder, Colorado 80302

Florida Forensics Program
Dr. John I. Sisco, Coordinator
Department of Speech
University of South Florida
Tampa, Florida 33620

Georgia High School Association
P. O. Box 271
Thomaston, Georgia 30286

Hawaii Speech League
c/o Lynn Yamaguchi
J. B. Castle High School
45-386 Kaneohe Bay Drive
Kaneohe, Hawaii

Illinois High School Association
2715 McGraw Drive
Box 2715
Bloomington, Illinois 61701

Indiana High School Forensic
Association
William S. Hicks
P. O. Box 247
Howe, Indiana 46746

Iowa High School Forensic League
228 Jessup Hall
The University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa 52240

Kansas State High School Activities
Association
520 West 27th Street
P. O. Box 495
Topeka, Kansas 66601

Alabama High School Forensic
League and Forensic Educators
Association Handbook, 1976-77

Handbook of Speech and Drama
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Florida Forensics Program Policy
Booklet, 1976-77

Constitution and By-Laws, 1976-
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Handbook of Speech Activities,
1972

The 1977 Contests in Speech

Rules and Regulations

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Speech and Drama Manual, 1976-
77, 1977-78

Kentucky High School Speech League
Gifford Blyton, Director
205 McVey Hall
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506

Louisiana High School Rally
Association
P. O. Box 16003
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803

Massachusetts Forensic League
c/o Dale DeLetis, Secretary
Speech Department, Milton Academy
Milton, Massachusetts 02186

Michigan Interscholastic Forensic
Association
Bureau of School Services
The University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109

Minnesota State High School League
2621 Fair Oak Avenue
P. O. Box 672
Anoka, Minnesota 55303

Mississippi High School Activities
Association
c/o Marilyn F. Norris
NUEF Representative for Mississippi
Department of Speech
Mississippi University for Women
Columbus, Mississippi 39701

Missouri State High School Activities
Association
P. O. Box 1328
Columbus, Missouri 65201

Montana High School Association
One South Dakota Avenue
Helena, Montana 59601

New Jersey Forensic League
George Johnson, President
Montville High School
Montville, New Jersey 07045

Kentucky High School Speech
League 1976-77 Handbook

Louisiana High School Rally
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League Handbook, 1976-77

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Activities Handbook, 1976

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Manual for Missouri High Schools,
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Forensic and Drama Bulletin,
Rules and Regulations, 1976-77

New Jersey Forensic League of
Secondary Schools Constitution
and By-Laws, Rev. 1976-77

New Jersey Forensic League
Program of Events, 1976-77

New Mexico Speech Association
 Dan DeStephen, Director of Forensics
 Department of Speech Communication
 1801 Roma, N.E.
 The University of Mexico
 Albuquerque, New Mexico 87131

North Dakota High School Activities
 Association
 134 N. E. Third Street, Box 1007
 Valley City, North Dakota 58072

Ohio High School Speech League
 Ohio University
 Kantner Hall 107
 Athens, Ohio 45701

Oklahoma Secondary School Activities
 Association
 Box 53464, 222 N. E. 27th Street
 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105

Oregon High School Speech League
 c/o Patty Hastings Smith
 Newberg High School
 Elliott Road
 Newberg, Oregon 97132

Pennsylvania High School Speech League
 205 Sparks Building
 University Park, Pennsylvania 16802

South Dakota High School Activities
 Association
 P. O. Box 1217
 Pierre, South Dakota 57501

Tennessee High School Speech & Drama
 League
 East Tennessee State University
 Johnson City, Tennessee 37601

University Interscholastic League
 Rhea H. Williams, Director General
 The University of Texas at Austin
 Bureau of Public School Service
 Box 8028, University Station
 Austin, Texas 78712

New Mexico Speech Association
Manual, 1976-77

North Dakota High School
 Activities Association Handbook
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Utah Speech Program
 Merrill F. Frost
 Department of Communications
 D-501 Harriss Fine Arts Center
 Brigham Young University
 Provo, Utah 84602

1975-77 Speech Program

Virginia High School League
 University of Virginia
 School of Continuing Education
 Box 3697, University Station
 Charlottesville, Virginia 22903

Virginia High School League
 Handbook, 1976-77

Washington Interscholastic Activities
 Association
 910 Fifth Avenue, Suite 308
 Seattle, Washington 98104

Washington State Forensic Guide,
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Wisconsin High School Forensic
 Association
 Larry E. Larmer, Secretary-Treasurer
 Room 224, Lowell Hall
 610 Langdon Street
 Madison, Wisconsin 53706

Teachers Manual--Drama-Debate,
 1976-77; Teachers Manual--
 Speech Supplement, 1976-77

THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC STUDIES

by William A. Yaremchuk*

Over the past five years, the need for the development of a philosophy and structure for forensic studies has been cited on several occasions.¹ Moreover, the National Developmental Conference on Forensics recently has recommended future goals for forensics. Two of these future guidelines for forensic education include:

- (1) Opportunities for experience in forensics . . . for as many people as possible by developing programs that are responsive to changes in the composition of student populations and to their emerging needs in other settings, and by adjusting the demands of instruction in forensics to the goals of a liberal education and the social and intellectual development of people.²
- (2) Forensics should be viewed as humanistic education. Forensics educators should provide a wholesome, exciting learning environment in which students are encouraged to develop positive attitudes toward the worth of ideas and toward themselves, other persons, and society at large.³

The purpose of this article is to describe a program of forensic studies that has embraced the philosophy and purpose of "Forensic Education" which has been encouraged in the past and recently re-affirmed. The description of the author's Forensic Studies course serves to illustrate one attempt to apply forensics to achieve the previously cited goals of the National Developmental Conference on Forensics.

Description of the Forensic Studies Course

The Forensic Studies course was developed in order to promote the study and application of forensic theories, principles, and practices to areas of importance selected by the students enrolled in the program. Each student was given an opportunity to conduct a forensic study project in which his understanding of and use of communicative principles, argumentation, and problem-solving could be demonstrated. The intent of the course was to explore a variety of historical and contemporary issues and problems rather than enhance competitive skills previously developed and refined in traditional debate and individual-events tournaments.

The overall goal of the course was to enhance the student's abilities to analyze controversies, evaluate evidence, construct rational

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arguments, and solve problems. Moreover, the classroom seminars were designed to provide a forum for each student so that each idea or aspect of the special project could be analyzed and tested rationally by the other members of the various work groups. After each idea and procedure was thoroughly examined, analyzed, and evaluated, the student sought to apply the knowledge derived toward the actual solution of the problem investigated. A significant advantage of these procedures was to enable each student to determine his educational needs and set performance outcomes. In this respect, the course was adapted to the needs of the students and encouraged "a wholesome, exciting learning environment."

The Type of Study Projects

The project approach for forensic studies produced several unique applications of forensic principles to the "real-world" problems facing the students enrolled in the course. For example, one project involved a study of the organization, rules, and procedures of the United Nations. Since the college was to host a Model United Nations for high schools in the spring, the student prepared a MUN handbook for participants, advisors, and sponsors of such activities. The end-product of the project was a tangible, operational guide for the administration of an MUN event, which attracted over forty high schools with nearly five hundred participants. The MUN handbook and related procedural guidebooks were found to be extremely helpful efficient educational tools.

Another functional project involved an analysis of student governance in the university setting. After data was collected on the various forms of student-faculty-school administration governance procedures, the student prepared a re-organization document for the operation of the college's Student Government Organization.

A third significant project undertaken was a study of fund-raising campaigns and their operations. After an investigation of the various techniques for fund-raising, the student prepared an operational guide for the hosting of a dance marathon and ancillary projects for the American Cancer Society. The blueprint of the project was implemented and resulted in the most successful ACS project ever held on the campus.

A fourth major of forensics analyzed by four members of a study group was the development and administration of a forensic tournament from start to finish. After the students had studied all phases of tournament operations and administration, a systematic procedure was selected for implementation. Later that semester the students were asked to conduct an individual-events tournament at another college which had never hosted a speech event. The systematic tournament outline and administrative guide, plus simulation training given in a laboratory setting, provided the group with sufficient competence to conduct a state-wide forensic tournament.

Although not all of the projects were as spectacular as those previously mentioned, all provided a major challenge to each student and were specifically adapted to the student's major interests and needs.

Other projects included a salesmanship manual of persuasion techniques prepared by a business major; an instructional manual of speech activities for future teachers of speech and forensics; a study of creativity in forensics which focused on original prose, poetry, and storytelling; and a study of rhetoric, persuasion, argumentation, propaganda, and media control in totalitarian states. In each instance, the student attempted to apply the principles of forensics, argumentation, and problem-solving to a selected area for analysis.

Conclusions

First, it is important that additional courses, mini-courses, seminars, workshops, or independent studies in forensics be established.⁴

Second, students should be permitted a greater latitude of freedom to choose problems which are meaningful, relevant, and specifically adapted to said students.

Third, it is important that forensic studies courses accent the study of argumentation and problem-solving rather than concentrating on competitive speech activities.

In the Forensic Studies course described in this article, the goal was to develop a program which would be responsive to student goals and needs and to provide an exciting learning environment. Both of these objectives appeared to have been achieved by the students in the course.

During the 1970's there have been repeated pleas for the development of forensic education. To this date, little tangible evidence exists of the implementation of such forensic study courses. One effort, at least, has been undertaken. Now is the time for the expansion of the forensic studies approach so that when the National Developmental Conference on Forensics convenes in 1980⁵ it may report that forensic education has achieved its rightful place in institutions of higher learning in America.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Donald G. Douglas, "Toward a Philosophy of Forensic Education," Journal of the American Forensic Association, VIII (Summer, 1971), 36-41; Donald G. Douglas, "A Need for Review: Forensic Studies in Contemporary Speech Education," Journal of the American Forensic Association, VIII (Spring, 1972), 178-181; William A. Yaremchuk, "Forensic Studies," The Forensic, LIX (January, 1974), 13.

² James H. McBath, ed., Forensics as Communication: The Argumentative Perspective (Skokie, IL: National Textbook Co., 1975), p. 12. See also: James H. McBath, "Future Directions for Forensic Education," The Speech Teacher, XXIV (November, 1975), 366.

³ McBath, Forensics as Communication, p.14.

4 Yaremchuk, p. 13.

5 McBath, Forensics as Communication, p. 40.